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Preface
In his essay Negative Gro¨ßen Kant characterised the concept of “negative
magnitude” as “a concept which has hitherto not been used but which is
nonetheless of the utmost importance” (AA II, 170/21). He valued this
concept highly, because he was convinced that philosophical thought in all
its varieties could benefit a great deal from this fine example of abstract
thinking. In Negative Gro¨ßen he presented the considerations, arguments
and examples to substantiate this claim.
Likewise, I intend to show in the present study that our understanding of
Kant’s philosophy could benefit a great deal from the philosophical notion
of Realrepugnanz (real repugnance, real repugnancy, real opposition), to
which the major part of Negative Gro¨ßen is devoted. Unlike other notions
from the Kantian vocabulary “real opposition” has suffered from a certain
neglect. It has rarely been used in view of explaining and understanding
(parts of) Kant’s work. Although it may have been unused (ungebraucht) in
this respect, I will argue that it is highly needful (ho¨chst no¨tig). I think it
could provide a helpful, sometimes even indispensable contribution to our
understanding of several issues in Kant’s work.
When I first read Kant’s essay in the early 90’s, I was touched by a
tone that was both light and resolute, by the great variety of subjects
that was discussed in a very limited amount of pages. It also seemed a
perfect prelude to some of his later thoughts, as well as an exemplary
specimen of an approach to philosophy that he would continue to practice
throughout his life. The relevance and importance of this essay, and especially
of Realrepugnanz, in the larger context of Kant’s œuvre seemed obvious and
beyond all doubt. Surprisingly, there was hardly any confirmation of this
impression in secondary sources on Kant’s work. References to Negative
Gro¨ßen and Realrepugnanz were rare, and if there were such references,
they looked more like ceremonious lip service than contributions to an
explanation of the meaning and significance of this aspect of Kant’s work.
This comparative lack of attention caused me to engage in a search for the
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background, the meaning and the function of the notion of Realrepugnanz.
The main results of this search are presented in this study.
I would not have succeeded in bringing these philosophical attempts
to a favourable conclusion, if it wasn’t for invaluable support I received
from many people in many different ways. Encouraging remarks, occasional
jokes, the hesitant question “What about your . . . ?”, the continuous, but
not continuously expressed interest in my philosophical whereabouts, all of
this turned out to be necessary for keeping me on the right track.
Thanks to the support of the department of Social & Political Philosophy
(Faculty of Philosophy, University of Nijmegen) and its members I was offered
the opportunity to get this project started.
I am thankful to the participants in our Kant study group for the possi-
bility to share the interest in and fascination for this notoriously complicated
author. I would especially like to mention Willem Perreijn. His meticulous
approach to Kant offered me the example of the right intellectual attitude
toward philosophical texts. I hope that I have been able to practice this
approach at least at some points in the present study and I wish he could
have seen the results.
Kind assistance provided by the Radboud Stichting (Vught) and the
De Bussy Stichting (Eibergen) made it possible to attend the Eighth Kant
Congress in Memphis (TN) where I presented some of the early results of
this project.
Chapters 2–4 (except for §2.1) of my study comprise the revised and
English version of ‘Een metafysica van strijd. Logische en ree¨le repugnantie
in het vroegere werk van Kant’ published in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 57
(1995), 461–504. I gratefully acknowledge the editors of this journal for their
permission to reprint the article in this form. I am grateful to Stephen Pursey
for his efforts to translate the Dutch text into English.
Much of the material in chapter 7 was presented in my paper ‘The Legal
Metaphor in Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft : its Structure and Meaning’
which was published in Kantovsky Sbornik 21 (1999), 108–140.
An earlier version of chapter 8 on infinite judgement appeared in ‘Infi-
nite Judgment in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason’, Logical Kant Studies 4.
Proceedings of the International Workshop, Kaliningrad 1998, 199–215. I am
grateful to the editor for his permission to reuse the material.
I gratefully acknowledge the generous support offered by Mrs. J.E.H.
Rombach–de Kievid (Rheden).
The patience of three women granted me the opportunity to remain
preoccupied with this one idea for so long. I would like to thank them for
granting me this opportunity, but much more than this I would like to thank
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them for all of the ideas we manage to share. Julia, you have this precious
ability to enrich the world with the abundance of your ideas. I am so lucky
to be part of your world. Liesbeth, do you remember that sudden hunch
occurring to the both of us at the same time? If that is what it means to
be in touch, what more is there to ask for? And Christel, with you I share
some of those rare ideas that derive their significance from the fact that they
are better not, or at least not too often expressed in words. Breaking their
silence would diminish what is important about them, and therefore de nobis
ipsis silemus, Christina.
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Chapter 1
A Highly Needful Concept
1.1 Oblivion and the starry heavens
Towards the end of his life Kant had become increasingly dependent on the
good care of others due to the decline of his mental abilities, and due to an
increase of the physical infirmities of his old age. Martin Lampe, however,
the servant who had been taking care of Kant for almost forty years, was
no longer able to do so in a way that was acceptable to Kant; gradually,
Lampe had become quarrelsome, he tried to obtain unreasonable favours,
did not carry out his job properly and was frequently drunk, sometimes
even at Kant’s expenses. In january 1802 these habits, and the incidents
they gave rise to, caused Wasianski to dismiss Lampe on behalf of his friend
Kant. A new servant by the name of Johann Kaufmann was engaged, but for
Kant it was hard to get accustomed to his presence, not in the least because
Kaufmann was not familiar with Kant’s peculiar habits and demands which
had to be met with. Initially, Kant even called his new servant “Lampe”.
In an attempt to prevent himself from doing so, Kant wrote a note: “Der
name Lampe muß nun vo¨llig vergessen werden.”1 The name “Lampe” must
now be completely forgotten. It seems as if Lampe’s physical absence had
to be completed by the eradication of his name, in order to keep away bad
memories of the unpleasant events that had preceded it. Oblivion would have
put Kant at ease again.
Anyone who is familiar with this story would be inclined to regard this
strange note as decisive proof of Kant’s deteriorated mental state. This is also
the way this anecdote is dealt with in the world of Kant-interpretation. No
1E. Wasianski, ‘Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren (Ko¨nigsberg, 1804)’,
in: Felix Groß, editor, Immanuel Kant. Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen,
Darmstadt, 1968, 213–306, here: 264.
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one writes down something in order to forget it, unless—of course—you have
lost your mind. This is the common view with respect to Kant’s reminder.
In my opinion, however, the note is not a sign of the decline of Kant’s
mental abilities. On the contrary, this strange reminder is an indication of
a remarkable philosophical awareness on the part of Kant, even though his
abilities had become increasingly weak. The note was not written down due
to the steady decline of Kant’s mental abilities, but rather in spite of it.
Furthermore, the note is exemplary for several closely related issues in Kant’s
philosophy. I will substantiate these claims further on, but before doing so, I
will present some evaluations representing the common view.
Wasianski, who reported on the events in relation to Lampe’s dismissal,
was the first to express what has now become the common view. He called
the note: “Ein sonderbares Pha¨nomen von Kants Schwa¨che”.2
Uwe Schultz calls it an absurdity and an aporia to remember what must
be forgotten. Surely, Kant would not have written this note, if the mental
powers that enabled him to solve the antinomies in KrV had been available
to him towards the end of his life.3
Manfred Kuehn has a rather reserved attitude towards the anecdotes
about the last years of Kant’s life: “They indicate nothing about his philoso-
phy or about his true personality. They are, if you will, post-philosophical.”4
Therefore, he states: “I will not mention most of them, since they add nothing
to our understanding of Kant. A few examples should be sufficient to show
that they were signs of senility.”5 The note about Lampe is Kuehn’s most
telling example in this respect: “This kind of performative contradiction is
perhaps more indicative of his condition than any of the other anecdotes
that are told about the old Kant.”6 Kuehn seems to be suggesting that this
note is an indication of Kant’s mental deterioration, and that there is no
other philosophical or biographical significance to be attached to it. In this
2Sc. “A strange phenomenon of Kant’s weakness”, Wasianski, ‘Immanuel Kant . . . ’,
264.
3Cf. Uwe Schultz, Immanuel Kant in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten, Reinbek
bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1979 (1965), (Rowohlts Monographien 101), 59: “Der Name Lampe
muß nun vo¨llig vergessen werden. Das ist der Salto mortale, den sein Ordnungsprinzip
hier bis ins Absurde vollfu¨hrt und dessen er sich selbst nicht mehr bewußt war. Sich an
das zu erinnern, was vergessen werden muß: einer solchen Aporie wa¨re der Philosoph,
der das Problem der sich selbst widersprechenden vernu¨nftigen Logik in der Kritik der
reinen Vernunft lo¨ste, sicherlich nicht verfallen, ha¨tten ihm noch die Kra¨fte jener Zeit zur
Verfu¨gung gestanden.”
4Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001,
416.
5Kuehn, Kant . . . , 509n134.
6Kuehn, Kant . . . , 417–418.
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respect Kuehn also represents the common view.
Contrary to this view I think this note is an expression of Kant’s presence
of mind, and that it clearly expresses certain philosophical issues against the
background of which it is easy to understand what Kant intended to do with
the note. Indeed, this note is indicative of Kant’s condition, but this condition
should be characterised as one of a remarkable philosophical awareness; the
story is neither post-philosophical, nor strange and absurd. By this I do not
mean that each and every story about Kant’s life is philosophically relevant.
Like Kuehn one should take care not to attach too much meaning to anecdotes
with respect to Kant’s philosophy or personality. It is always difficult, if
not impossible, to determine the relationship between a philosopher’s life
and his œuvre. Surely, we do not need to understand Kant’s life in order to
understand his philosophy. In this case, however, the event reported to us by
Wasianski may serve as an example of certain philosophical issues and—on
the other hand—against the background of these philosophical topics it is
easier to understand that this note is not a sign of weakness.
If the note is regarded as decisive proof of Kant’s mental deterioration,
then one is forced to acknowledge that this decline of mental abilities had
already started in the early 1760’s, since there are written sources from
this period which strongly remind us of the Lampe note. These sources are
Metaphysik Herder and Kant’s essay on the concept of negative magnitude.
Surely, nobody would maintain that Kant had already gone out of his mind
in those days. The sources mentioned will help us understand the note about
Lampe and it will help us to put it in the proper philosophical perspective.
In the Metaphysik Herder, dating back to the years 1762–1764 when
Herder attended Kant’s lectures in Ko¨nigsberg, we find a copy of Kant’s
comments on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. In relation to Baumgarten’s §135
(about Reale et negativum) Herder wrote down the following remarks:
1 Remotio logica wodurch etwaz blos nicht gesezt wird z.E. im
Menschlichen Erkenntnis wird manches nicht gesezt waz man
nicht weis.
2 Remotio realis wodurch manches aufgehoben wird z.E. im
Menschlichen Erkenntnis wird vieles durch Vergeßenheit aufge-
hoben.
Bei der Ersteren darf man blos unterlaßen (e. zu lernen) bei
der zweiten etwaz thun, vergeßen. (Metaphysik Herder, in: AA
XXVIII–1, 20, all italics by WvdK).7
7Jon Elster interprets oblivion in terms of Kuehn’s “performative contradiction” notwith-
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If we compare the term “vergessen” in the note on Lampe to “etwaz thun,
vergeßen” in the Herder-remarks, it should not be too hard to figure out a
plausible meaning of the seemingly strange note. “Etwaz thun, vergeßen”,
or “durch Vergeßenheit auf[heben]” are examples of a remotio realis which
is, according to Kant, opposed to a remotio logica. The difference between
both kinds of remotio is exemplified by two different senses of “not knowing
something”.
Firstly, one may not know something simply because any ground on
which this knowledge would have to be based is absent. In this case one is
ignorant about something. On the other hand, one may not know something,
because one has forgotten it. In this case the ground on which knowledge or a
thought is based is not simply absent, but annihilated. The result is oblivion,
which is something quite different from ignorance. In the case of ignorance
thoughts are lacking; in the case of oblivion thoughts that were present have
been removed from one’s mind. This removal, cancellation, annihilation or
Aufhebung (which would be the proper German equivalent in this context)
of thoughts requires action (“etwaz thun”), whereas ignorance is based on
negligence, in the sense of “blos unterlaßen (e.[twas] zu lernen)”.
The note about Lampe is merely a reminder to do something about the
awkward situation Kant was confronted with after Lampe’s dismissal. It
echoes the Herder-remark: etwaz thun, vergeßen! It also expresses Kant’s
philosophical awareness that thoughts can only be made to disappear if
specific action is taken and it was written down to remind himself of the
fact that he must make a real effort in order to get rid of the unpleasant
thoughts.
However strange it may seem that Kant wrote down what had to be
forgotten, he did not do so as a result of his deteriorating state of mind. To
standing his own careful distinction between internal and external negation which he even
discusses in relation to Kant’s essay on negative magnitude (cf. Jon Elster, Psychologie
politique (Veyne, Zinoviev, Tocqueville), Paris: Les E´ditions de Minuit, 1990, 78–79). Elster
characterises the order “Oublie-le” (“Forget it!”) as an “injonction contradictoire” and “un
projet impossible” (Elster, Psychologie politique . . . , 81). He concludes the paragraph by
stating: “Vouloir oublier, c’est comme si l’on se de´cidait a` cre´er l’obscurite´ par la lumie`re.”
(Elster, Psychologie politique . . . , 82). In fact, creating darkness by means of light is possible.
In the text immediately following the above quotation from the Metaphysik Herder, Kant
draws the very same comparison though he does not make a joke out of it like Elster seems
to be doing: “Die Nacht ist nicht blos Verneinung, denn es gibt wirklich Gru¨nde des Lichts;
es muß also eine Beraubung seyn davon.” There is a remarkable and persistent analogy
in Kant’s work between thoughts or knowledge and light. “Night” conceived of as the
result of a remotio realis could, for example, serve to understand the relation between the
concepts of tutelage and enlightenment as they occur in the beginning of Kant’s essay on
enlightenment.
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be sure, Kant’s mental abilities were declining during the last years of his
life.8 Since his deteriorating short-term memory9 might cause him to forget
it easily, he wrote it down in order not to forget it. He could do so because
his long-term memory was stil intact.10 He still knew that something had to
be done, if thoughts were to be buried in oblivion.
So contrary to what I have been referring to as the common view, it is more
plausible to maintain that the note was written down in spite of the decline
of mental abilities, and that it served to overcome the consequences of Kant’s
deteriorating short-term memory. It reflects his philosophical considerations
regarding ignorance and oblivion from the early 1760’s. As such it is a sign of
his resistance against mental weakness, rather than a sign of the fact that he
had already surrendered to the infirmities of his age. It is the final flicker of a
formerly brightly shining light, representing the tragic attempt to enlighten
the remains of a daily life that is about to be swallowed by nocturnal darkness.
The note on Lampe is not a decisive sign of mental weakness. The kind of
proof I have been providing may not be considered decisive either; the text is
Herder’s and therefore the evidence it contains is only circumstantial. How-
ever, Kant’s essay on the notion of negative magnitude, Versuch den Begriff
der negativen Gro¨ßen in die Weltweisheit einzufu¨hren, published in 1763
when Herder attended his lectures, contains direct evidence to substantiate
my claim.
In this essay Kant also makes the distinction between “unterlassen” (to
neglect, to refrain from) and “etwas thun” (to do something) in the context
of thoughts, knowledge or representations.11 According to Kant the case of
an absent thought is easy to understand:
Daß ich jetzt einen gewissen Gedanken nicht habe, ist, wenn er
vorher auch nicht gewesen ist, daraus freilich versta¨ndlich genug,
wenn ich sage, ich unterlasse dieses zu denken; denn dieses Wort
bedeutet alsdann den Mangel des Grundes, woraus der Mangel
der Folge begriffen wird. (AA II, 192).
8E. Gru¨nthal, ‘Die senile Gehirnerkrankung Immanuel Kant’s’, Confinia psychiatrica,
14 (1971), 36–63.
9Kuehn, Kant . . . , 415.
10Kuehn, Kant . . . , 415.
11The general context is described in terms of “Accidenzien der geistigen Naturen” as
opposed to “die ko¨rperliche Natur”, “ko¨rperliche Welt” or “Zustand der Materie”. More
specifically, Kant refers to “thought” as “ein inneres Accidens, ein Gedanke der Seele”,
“durch die Tha¨tigkeit der Seele wirklich gewordenen Vorstellungen”, “Tha¨tigkeiten unserer
Seele”, “Vorstellung”, “Gedanke” (all these descriptions are taken from AA II, 190–192).
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It is easy to understand the mere absence of a thought; where there is no
ground, there can be no effect (sc. a thought), and thus the absence of
a thought can be understood simply by referring to the lack of a ground.
According to Kant the phrase “ich unterlasse dieses zu denken” serves to
indicate the lack of a ground. This sense of “unterlassen” corresponds to the
one that was mentioned in the quotation from Metaphysik Herder above.
With reference to that quotation “absent thought” must be understood in
the sense of a remotio logica. Kant continues his considerations by addressing
the case of an absent thought that was present shortly before:
Heißt es aber: woher ist ein Gedanke in mir nicht mehr, der
kurz vorher war?, so ist die vorige Antwort [sc. “ich unterlasse
dieses zu denken”, WvdK] ganz nichtig. Denn dieses Nichtsein ist
nunmehr eine Beraubung, und das Unterlassen hat anjetzt einen
ganz andern Sinn, na¨mlich die Aufhebung einer Tha¨tigkeit, die
kurz vorher war. (AA II, 192).
If we want to understand the absence of a thought that was present shortly
before, the previous answer (sc. “ich unterlasse dieses zu denken”) is void,
except when “unterlassen” is taken in another sense, sc. that of “annihilating
an action”.12 The absence of a thought in this second case is not based on
the absence of a ground, but it is a kind of “Nichtsein” resulting from the
annihilation of a previous action. This kind of absence, understood in terms
of “Beraubung” and “Aufhebung”, corresponds to the case of remotio realis
in the Herder remarks above, where “aufgehoben” is mentioned explicitly.
Notwithstanding this confusing attempt to distinguish between two senses
of “unterlassen”, it is clear that in Negative Gro¨ßen we also find the opposition
between “unterlassen” and “etwaz thun”, but Kant introduced new terms
to describe the opposition: “Mangel” on the one, and “Beraubung” and
“Aufhebung” on the other hand.13
12This sense of “unterlassen”, however, is confusing the earlier distinction between
“unterlassen” and “etwas thun”. Kant was aware of this and therefore, he added a footnote
to the phrase “einen ganz andern Sinn” stating that this (second) sense of the word
“unterlassen” is inappropriate to the word (sc. “unterlassen” in a sense that indicates the
absence of a ground): “Dieser Sinn selbst kommt dem Worte nicht einmal eigentlich zu.”
(AA II, 192n1).
13Elsewhere in Negative Gro¨ßen the distinction is also made in these terms. Cf. AA II,
177–178: “. . . Beraubung (privatio) . . . Mangel (defectus, absentia) . . . Die letztere erfordert
keinen positiven Grund, sondern nur den Mangel derselben; die erstere aber hat einen
wahren Grund der Position und einen eben so großen entgegengesetzten.”. Cf. also AA II,
182 where “U¨bel des Mangels (mala defectus)” is opposed to “U¨bel der Beraubung (mala
privationis)”.
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In this part of Negative Gro¨ßen (AA II, 190–192) Kant makes reference
to the case of “not knowing something”, in the sense of “ignorance” as well as
“oblivion”, which supports my reading of the Lampe note. Kant describes the
case of “Abstraction” (in the sense of “distraction”, as well as “abstraction”):
Eine jede Abstraction ist nichts anders, als eine Aufhebung ge-
wisser klaren Vorstellungen [. . . ]. Jedermann weiß aber, wie viel
Tha¨tigkeit hiezu erfordert wird [. . . ] das ist, ein wahrhaftes Thun
und Handlen, welches derjenigen Handlung, wodurch die Vorstel-
lung klar wird, entgegengesetzt ist und durch die Verknu¨pfung
mit ihr das Zero, oder den Mangel der klaren Vorstellung zu-
wege bringt. Denn sonst, wenn sie eine Verneinung und Mangel
schlechthin wa¨re, so wu¨rde dazu eben so wenig Anstrengung einer
Kraft erfordert werden, als dazu, daß ich etwas nicht weiß, weil
niemals ein Grund dazu war, Kraft no¨thig ist. (AA II, 190–191).
With an appeal to common sense (“Jedermann weiß aber”) Kant argues
that the process of abstraction requires a great effort, and therefore the
“Aufhebung” in this case must be understood as “Beraubung” (as opposed
to “Mangel” or defectus). In support of this appeal Kant provides a reductio
ad absurdum: if (in the opposite case) the disappearance of a representation
would be indistinguishable from the absence of a representation, then we
would have to acknowledge that abstraction (or oblivion), just like ignorance,
does not require any effort. Clearly, this is counter-intuitive, even absurd.
Ignorance does not, but abstraction does require a considerable effort. This
is commonly known to be a fact. On the same page, after yet other examples,
Kant concludes:
Und so ist zu urtheilen, daß das Spiel der Vorstellungen und
u¨berhaupt aller Tha¨tigkeiten unserer Seele, in so fern ihre Folgen,
nachdem sie wirklich waren, wieder aufho¨ren, entgegengesetzte
Handlungen voraussetzen, davon eine die Negative der andern ist,
zu Folge den gewissen Gru¨nden, die wir angefu¨hrt haben, ob uns
gleich nicht immer die innere Erfahrung davon belehren kann.
In fact, this conclusion is an example of the second rule of real repugnancy
(AA II, 177) applied to actions of the soul.
In addition to this exemplification Kant mentions a new point. Although
we know that there must have been an opposite action for a thought to be
caused to disappear, we may not always be able to identify it by means of
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inner experience.14 Notwithstanding the insufficiency of inner experience in
this respect, Kant mentions an example of inner experience that seems to
forecast his own situation in the winter of 1802. In the context of Negative
Gro¨ßen this example serves to indicate that relations between actions in a
spiritual sphere are analogous to those in the material sphere:
Allein auch die innere Erfahrung u¨ber die Aufhebung der durch die
Tha¨tigkeit der Seele wirklich gewordenen Vorstellungen und Be-
gierden stimmt damit [i.e. locomotion in material nature, WvdK]
sehr wohl zusammen. Man empfindet es in sich selbst sehr deut-
lich: daß, um einen Gedanken voll Gram bei sich vergehen zu las-
sen und aufzuheben, wahrhafte und gemeinlich große Tha¨tigkeit
erfordert wird. (AA II, 190).
This appeal to one’s own inner experience is intended to exemplify the
point. If a body is moving in a certain direction (due to a moving force) it
can only be stopped by a force exerted on the body in the opposite direction.
Correspondingly, a thought can only be dispelled, if it is opposed by a strong
action of the soul. Together with the theoretical background of the notion of
real opposition this actual example provides the philosophical background
for an adequate understanding of the note on Lampe. What is more, if we
understand the note in this context there is no need to make extra-textual
references to Kant’s mental disposition. My interpretation of the note is
based on texts, and it is backed by arguments. It is not based on arbitrary,
psychological assumptions concerning Kant’s mental state. An appeal to such
assumptions would in my opinion disqualify the interpretation since it ignores
the relevant, available texts and it makes the intepretation invulnerable for
objections or alternative readings. If a claim about Kant’s mental state of
mind could be proven at all, it would still not instruct us with respect to the
meaning of the note.
Taking into consideration Kant’s mental illness (though not as a basis for
explaining the meaning of the note) Kant’s long-term memory must have been
14In the same paragraph (AA II, 191) Kant refers several times to the insufficiency of
inner experience in this respect. This insufficiency, however, is no reason to doubt the fact
that an opposite thought or force is required in order to cause a thought to disappear:
“U¨berhaupt aber, auch außer den Fa¨llen, da man sich dieser entgegengesetzten Tha¨tigkeit
sogar bewußt ist und die wir angefu¨hrt haben, hat man keinen genugsamen Grund sie
alsdann in Abrede zu ziehen, wenn wir sie nicht in uns klar bemerken.” and “welche
bewunderungswu¨rdige Gescha¨ftigkeit ist nicht in den Tiefen unsres Geistes verborgen, die
wir mitten in der Ausu¨bung nicht bemerken, darum weil der Handlungen sehr viel sind,
jede einzelne aber nur sehr dunkel vorgestellt wird.” (AA II, 191).
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comparatively good towards the end of his life. His short-term memory, on the
other hand, was rapidly deteriorating (which, by the way, is another indication
of the fact that the note was not written due to Kant’s mental decline; if this
had been the reason he probably would not have had unpleasant reminscences
in the first place). Lampe’s dismissal, however, did pose a problem, because
Kant had become accustomed to Lampe’s presence in the course of the
preceding forty years. Yet Kant was continuously confronted with the fact of
Lampe’s absence, and probably even with painful memories of events related
to the dismissal. The experience of Lampe’s actual but inexplicable absence
in relation to old remembrances of his continuous presence must have caused
an uneasiness that could only be remedied by an immediate and absolute
eradication of any thought about Lampe whatsoever. Apparently, this would
take away the source of uneasiness and therefore the name “Lampe” had
to be forgotten altogether. In addition, this also had to be written down,
because the risk of forgetting—due to an ever decreasing performance of his
short-term memory—was too imminent. In this setting the note is not a sign
of increasing mental weakness. It is Kant’s way of coping with the mental
disadvantages of his age; it testifies to his resistance to his mental decline.
It also proves that the philosophical topics he had been dealing with forty
years earlier were still present in his mind; he knew that it took a great effort
“um einen Gedanken voll Gram bei sich vergehen zu lassen und aufzuheben”
(AA II, 190).
I have drawn so much attention to this seemingly post-philosophical
note because it is exemplary for the philosophical issue of Realrepugnanz
(real opposition) which is the subject of this study. Earlier in this section
terms like remotio realis, “Beraubung”, and “Aufhebung” referred to issues
closely related to that of real opposition. In Negative Gro¨ßen Kant provides
a systematic account of real opposition. Ever since the first time I read this
essay I have been surprised by the fact that this comparatively early Kantian
work does not get the attention I think it should get. What surprised me even
more was the disregard of the idea of real opposition itself. The parallels to
notions such as “unsocial sociability” and “purposiveness without a purpose”
were so unmistakingly clear that a reference to any such resemblance seemed
completely superfluous.15 Much to my surprise though, I soon found out
that this was not the reason why these parallels were not mentioned; many
15Freundschaft could be added to the list of notions sharing structural resemblances
with real repugnance. The outlines of an interpretation of Freundschaft in terms of real
opposition have been sketched in Willem van der Kuijlen, ‘Kant over vriendschap of:
“To fight the unbeatable foe” ’, in: L. Pijnenburg, editor, Vijandbeeelden in de filosofie,
Wageningen: Landbouwuniversiteit, Departement Sociale Wetenschappen, 1997, 37–43.
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scholars simply did not seem to be aware of a link between the topic of this
earlier work and notions from later periods of Kant’s philosophical work.
Consequently, this neglect of the proper background of some of the notions
from Kant’s later work may lead to misunderstanding the significance of this
earlier work, and to misunderstanding the specifically Kantian meaning of
those notions.
Every now and then in the history of Kant scholarship it has been noted
that the essay on negative magnitude and the idea of real repugnance played
an important role in the development of Kant’s thought. Schopenhauer paid
tribute to Kant for having made the distinction between absolute nothing
and relative, or privative nothing.16 In 1840 Rosenkranz characterised the
essay as one of the most profound and most elucidating of Kant’s writings
and even of philosophy in general. At the same time, however, Rosenkranz
maintains that the essay and its central thought slipped out of Kant’s sight
like a meteor.17 Heimsoeth acknowledged the significance of this writing,
but he restricted the significance of the notion of real repugnance to the
field of morality.18 Saner has no explicit reference to the significance of
Negative Gro¨ßen, although real repugnance plays a role in his evaluation
of Kant’s moral and political philosophy.19 Michael Wolff maintains that
Kant’s introduction of the mathematical concept of negative magnitude
“ist fu¨r Kants spa¨tere Philosophie sowie fu¨r die nachkantische Dialektik
16Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I, Zu¨rich, 1977, (Werke
in zehn Ba¨nden, Zu¨rcher Ausgabe, Band II), §71.
17“Man tut Kant nicht unrecht, wenn man behauptet, daß sie [the essay, WvdK] ihm wie
ein Meteor entschlu¨pft und selbst nicht wieder zu Gesicht gekommen sei.” (Karl Rosenkranz;
Steffen Dietzsch, editor, Geschichte der Kant’schen Philosophie, Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
1987, (originally: Leipzig: Leopold Voss 1840), 118).
18Heinz Heimsoeth, Die sechs grossen Themen der abendla¨ndische Metaphysik und der
Ausgang des Mittelalters, [s.l.]: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 19584, 56: “Der fu¨r die Kantische
Entwicklung so bedeutungsvolle Grundgedanke seiner Schrift u¨ber die ‘negativen Gro¨ßen’
zielt letzlich nicht auf die ‘Realrepugnanz’ von Plus und Minus im Mathematischen, von
Anziehung und Abstoßung in der Natur—sondern auf die von Gut und Bo¨se im sittlichen
Leben.”
19Hans Saner, Kants Weg vom Krieg zum Frieden I (Widerstreit und Einheit, Wege zu
Kants politischem Denken), Mu¨nchen: R. Piper & Co, 1967, 51–57. Saner’s interpretation
is based on the claim that there is a similarity between real repugnance in the context of
metaphysics and Kant’s thought about peace and war. This relation between metaphysics
and political philosophy is also mentioned by Knebel (S. K. Knebel, ‘Repugnanz I’, in:
Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie, Volume VIII, Darmstadt, 1992, column 879–883,
column 884). In his review of Saner’s work Orth questions the tenability of this claim, cf.
E.W. Orth, ‘Kants Politikbegriff zwischen Existenzmetaphysik und kritischer Philosophie’,
Kant-Studien, 64 (1973), 103–119. Orth maintains (at p. 112–115) that a foundation of
this claim should at least clarify the Kantian notion of analogy (cf. §7.3 below).
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(insbesondere Hegels und des dialektischen Materialismus) von großer (aber
bisher nur wenig beachteter) Bedeutung geblieben.”20 In a more recent
and extensive commentary on the first Critique Baumanns remarks that
the significance of the notion of real repugnance with respect to Kant’s
philosophical development must not be underestimated.21 An assessment of
the exact role of the notion, however, is lacking.
The aim of the present study is to fill part of this gap. It is not my
intention to come to a complete assessment of the meaning and function of
“real repugnance” in Kant’s philosophy as a whole. The scope of this study is
limited to the investigation into the background, meaning and significance of
Realrepugnanz in Kant’s early philosophy and KrV. In the next section I will
outline the methodological principle of this investigation into Kant’s texts.
The beginning of chapter 2 is devoted to a short historical overview
of the notion of repugnantia in philosophy which will show that Kant’s
Realrepugnanz had no precedent in modern philosophy, and that it would
nevertheless be recognised as an obvious and appropriate philosophical term
by anyone acquainted with German philosophy of the time. The main part of
chapter 2 is focussed on Kant’s interest in metaphysics which is common to
most of his earlier philosophical efforts. Insofar as this interest is aimed at a
revival of metaphysics Kant does not want to ignore some of the achievements
of the mathematical approach in philosophy. His metaphysical attempts in
philosophy, to some extent also explicitly opposed to philosophical rationalism,
constitutes the background for the introduction of real opposition.
This Kantian ambivalence with respect to rationalism is highlighted in
chapter 3 and 4. In chapter 3 attention is drawn to logical repugnance,
which will turn out to be the loyal guide of everything Kant has to say
about real repugnance (cf. also §5.2 and §6.2). Due to its rationalistic ori-
gins contradiction may be a powerful, and in some respect even necessary
philosophical instrument, but it is insufficient as far as Kant’s metaphysical
and epistemological aspirations are concerned.
In chapter 4 we will see in what way philosophy could benefit from
mathematics; the concept of real repugnance is developed on the basis of the
20Michael Wolff, Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Eine Studie zur Dialektik Kants und
Hegels, Ko¨nigstein/Ts.: Verlag Anton Hain, 1981, (Philosophie. Analyse und Grundlegung,
Band 5), 62. Harry Mulisch also offers a discussion of Realrepugnanz in view of post-Kantian
dialectic, cf. Harry Mulisch, De compositie van de wereld, Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij,
19862, 63–65.
21Peter Baumanns, Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis. Durchgehender Kommentar zu
den Hauptkapiteln der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, Wu¨rzburg: Ko¨nigshausen & Neumann,
1997, 35: “Die Bedeutung, die der ‘Realrepugnanz’ in Kants Denkentwicklung zukommt,
soll nicht unterscha¨tzt werden.”
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mathematical concept of negative magnitude. The metaphysical background
in combination with the fruitful employment of a mathematical notion account
for the fact that the notion of real repugnance is applicable to a wide variety
of philosophical disciplines (ethics, physics, psychology, chemistry, etc.). With
the help of real repugnance Kant is able to understand relations between
significant concepts in these various disciplines as positive relations, instead
of mere privative or exclusive relations. Real repugnance is philosophically
important in that it enables Kant to exceed the possibilities of the application
of rationalistic contradiction. As such it is a powerful tool that can meet some
of the deficiencies of contradiction. It also enables him to put the question
about the epistemology of causality very concisely.
In chaper 5 we will examine real opposition in the context of the Dis-
sertation. The notion itself may be absent in this work, but real opposition
will turn out to be a convenient pattern of thought in his critique of an
overrated and misplaced use of contradiction and in his discussion of the
relation between the cognitive faculties of sensibility and understanding.
Kant does not really develop his thoughts about the philosophical problem of
real repugnance, but he rather seems to be trying to understand this relation
between cognitve capacities in terms of a real opposition.
In KrV the philosophical problem of real repugnance has become part of
a more comprehensive project concerning the question about the possibility
of the synthetic a priori. References in KrV to the notion itself indicate
the significance of real repugnance; the case of real repugnance presents
a firm counterweight to the rationalistic approach in philosophy. The line
of thought that was initiated in 1770 is continued in KrV; real opposition
offers a pattern of thought that may serve to structure the relation between
seemingly incompatible opposites. In chapter 6 I will argue that this the
pattern is applied in the cases of original apperception and the noumenon,
both of which play an important role in Kant’s critical answer to the question
about the synthetic a priori.
As a result of this critical answer knowledge is limited to the field of
possible experience. Beyond these limits there is no objective validity, but
only illusory and dialectical knowledge. Yet, the determination of objects in a
practical perspective, or metaphorical thought about objects is not ruled out
by Kant’s critique of illusory knowledge. On the contrary, meta-knowledge
about the possibilities of reason beyond the limits of possible experience,
which is critical self-knowledge of reason, is expressed by means of figurative
speech. As we shall see in chapter 7, Kant employs the legal metaphor for
this purpose.
In the final chapter we will focus on infinite judgement. This type of
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judgement is, according to my analysis, the technical means available to
Kant for the expression of the critical results. We won’t be able to recognise
this function of infinite judgement unless we fully appreciate Kant’s own
statements about infinite judgement, and unless we interpret this kind of
judgement in terms of the legal metaphor. Furthermore, the basic stucture
of infinite judgement required for this function is derived from the pattern of
real opposition.
This latter point shows in what way real opposition remains significant,
even after the initial, related philosophical problems have been solved. The
significance and the application of the pattern of real opposition is linked
to the fact that Kant’s interest in philosophy is primarily aimed at prac-
tical philosophy and metaphysics, rather than theoretical knowledge and
epistemology.
1.2 Taking Kant’s words for granted; methodological remarks
Apart from introducing the subject-matter of the present study, the previous
section also served to make a methodological point with respect to Kantian
texts. My reading of the note has shown that it is possible to provide a
coherent and systematic explanation of this seemingly odd note with reference
to Kant’s texts only. The methodology of this approach to Kant’s work can
be expressed in one single formula: “Take Kant’s words for granted!” By this
I do not mean that Kant is always right, or that he has final authority in
philosophical matters. Truth and authority are not the primary issues here.
What I do mean is that while trying to figure out what a certain text means,
we have nothing else to rely upon than the very words themselves.
The imperative to take Kant’s words for granted is a methodological sign
to indicate the starting point of the study of a Kantian text: the interpetation
of that text must be based on textual evidence, not on a value judgement
about the text or its meaning, nor on extra-textual or biographic material. If
the text does not suffice to establish a clear meaning extra-textual evidence
may be referred to, but only after the necessity for doing so has been made
explicit. One may be surprised at certain phrases or one may be puzzled by
the apparent meaning of a text, but extra-textual reference that is intended
to reassure and ease the reader cannot replace the need for explanation
of the text. Any such reference is simply not a substantial contribution to
understanding the very words themselves, as has been shown in the case of
the reference to Kant’s mental state in relation to “vergeßen”.
All this may sound too obvious, and it may look as if I was forcing
an open door, but regretfully many discussions about Kant’s work seem
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to be characterised by negligence of just this methodological principle. So,
for example, publication of the secret article in Zum ewigen Frieden is
interpreted with reference to some (extra-textual) irony22 thereby neglecting
the serious and theoretical (textual) conditions which make publication of
the secret article possible and meaningful.23 The hasty reference to irony is
an obstruction to further text based interpretation and it distracts attention
from the real issue presented in the secret article.
Another, quite random example would be Jonathan Bennett’s approach
to the Transcendental Dialectic of KrV. He frankly confesses that he is a
commentator who is more interested in what Kant ought to have thought
than what he actually did think, and he maintains that the Dialectic is full of
mistakes and inadequacies. As to the motivation for taking this approach he
states: “when there is evidence of error the truth is better served by an open
accusation than by a respectful averting of one’s eyes”.24 Surely, no one would
disagree with this, but it is not fair to qualify the written text as erroneus
simply because it does not correspond to what Kant ought to have thought,
or to what the reader is having in mind. The writer and his text cannot be
blamed for failing to satisfy the needs of the reader. The “evidence of error”
must be found in the text, not in the mind of the reader. So when Bennett
accuses Kant of a “poor selection of material for the antinomies [sic] chapter”,
and of a “feeble account of why there are exactly four antinomies”,25 these
charges may be helpful as part of his own line of argument, but they fail to
provide evidence, if Kant’s arguments are not refuted. Bennett seems to have
good reasons not to evaluate Kant’s arguments in this respect, but again
these reasons remain unsubstantiated, which makes Bennett’s arguments
hopelessly circular. He maintains that sections 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the antinomy
22See for example Volker Gerhardt, Immanuel Kants Entwurf ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’.
Eine Theorie der Politik, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995, (Werkinter-
pretationen), 126, 128; Georg Cavallar refers to this irony, but his approach is intended
to explicate the serious philosophical tenor of the article (Georg Cavallar, Pax Kantiana:
systematisch-historische Untersuchung des Entwurfs ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’ (1795) von
Immanuel Kant, Wien/Ko¨ln/Weimar: Bo¨hlau Verlag, 1992, (Schriftenreihe der O¨sterre-
ichischen Gesellschaft zur Erforschung des 18. Jahrhunderts, 2), 337, 339
23For arguments supporting this claim, see Willem van der Kuijlen, ‘The Politics of Rea-
son: The Theoretical Background of Perpetual Peace and Secrecy’, in: H. Robinson, editor,
Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress Memphis 1995, Volume II-2, Mil-
waukee: Marquette University Press, 1995, 839–848. In this article Cavallar’s sophisticated
position is not mentioned.
24Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974,
viii. In my approach truth is not the primary issue; there is no point in wondering whether
some statement is true, if one hasn’t the faintest idea of its meaning.
25Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, 114.
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chapter are “less important than the rest” and the latter three are “not
central, deep, or difficult”.26 Evidence in support of these claims is absent.
This evidence would have to be presented in the course of an evaluation of
these sections. Apparently, there is no need for such evaluation because of
their minor importance. If the claim about the minor importance of a text
remains unsubstantiated, it cannot discharge the need to provide textual
evidence in support of some accusation. And if the minor importance itself is
a reason not to study the text, then the evidence is circular. While reading
such accusations, one wonders why Bennett bothered to read Kant’s texts at
all.
The fact that we have nothing else to rely upon than the words seems to
be a shortcoming and disadvantage—if only we had additional information
about Kant’s mental state that would explain the note; or about the real
conception of the antinomy, which would account for Kant’s errors; or about
the ironic state of mind, which would reason away the apparent oddity
of a published secret—if only we had such information, we could finally
understand what was meant. However, our methodological imperative tells
us to look at the text from the opposite point of view: if our understanding of
the text would depend on information from outside the text, it simply is not
a proper understanding of the text. Our interpretation must be based on the
words contained in the text. The words suffice. This underlying assumption
constitutes the backbone of my methodology and the full methodological
strenghth of the imperative depends on it. Let us consider it in greater detail.
The assumption states that the words must suffice. Any meaning or
interpretation of the text must be based on the words, simply because only
the words are available. If an interpretation could be based on what is not
available in the text (sc. a diagnosis of Kant’s psyche; an ironic state of mind
on the part of the author; the author’s intention), any supposition in this
regard would be as good as any other. When the words are considered to be
sufficient, however, it is not implied that they are. Nor does it imply that the
text represents the final words with respect to the subject under consideration
(e.g. dialectic tout court). Our consideration is merely methodological; any
meaning ascribed to the text is based on evidence contained in the text. A
text may turn out to be erroneus or extra-textual reference may be needed,
but only after the methodological assumption has proven to be wrong. The
sufficiency of the text is assumed, its insufficiency must be proven.
26Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, 116. In §8.5 below I will argue in favour of the opposite view;
section 2 seems to be less important if we concentrate on Kant’s main line of argument
and if we recognise that in this argument Kant is dealing with the antinomy (singular).
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The assumption is not made arbitrarily. It is necessary to make it if
we want to do justice to the text and it is implied by an attitude towards
the text (and its author) that I would describe as benevolent. To be sure,
“benevolence” is to be understood in a methodological, not in a moral sense.
By this attitude the reader acknowledges that the words presented in the
text represent whatever the author intended to express. Supposedly, they are
the adequate representation of what the author had in mind. Again, this does
not mean that the author is right, or that the words in fact are an adequate
expression of what he really had in mind. The point is just that the only
way of gaining access to what the author meant is by means of the words
he chose to write about it. If he chose to write down the things he did, they
must—according to our methodology—be considered conclusive. The author
was not stupid; if he chose to write the things he did, why should we interpret
it in the light of something he did not write?27 There is no way round it:
either you adopt a benevolent attitude, acknowledge that words presented
in the text are sufficient in view of an interpretation, or you quit reading
the author’s text and state your case without reference to an authority or
authorative text, like a decent philosopher should. This is the basic and
minimum prerequisite for the study of a text, if we want to do justice to
the text, if we don’t want to jump to conclusions, and if we do not want to
blame the author for failing to solve our own problems.
Thusfar I have been trying to clarify the phrase “taking for granted”, but
which words qualify as Kant’s words? We need an answer to this question if
we want to know which texts our investigation has to be based on. There
are several more or less obvious answers. Any answer, however, immediately
raises a question that is more difficult to answer, while at the same time
its philosophical relevance seems to be greater in comparison to our initial
question (i.e. “Which words are Kant’s?”). In this respect the philosophical
relevance of a question seems to be inversely proportionate to the chance of
getting an answer to that question. Let us consider some answers and see
what happens.
Firstly, one would be inclined to take Kant’s published works for “his
words”. Supposedly, the fact that they were published by Kant is a guarantee
of their origin, and hence, those are the words to be studied if we want to
understand his philosophical thought. The A- and B-edition of KrV show
what kind of problems are to be expected if we try to approach his work by
27I disagree with Kant on this point (thereby violating my own methodological principle!).
In KrV, B370 he claims that it is not unusual to understand an author better than he did
himself (“ein Verfasser [. . . ] sogar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand”). I think
this kind of “better understanding” must not be aimed at.
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means of the published works. What is the difference between both editions
and what does it mean that in Kant’s opinion there were reasons to revise
the A-edition so as to restate his critical point in the form of the B-edition?
Secondly, the example of the Rechtslehre shows that a work published
by Kant may contain his words, but at the same time it also shows that
the originally published words do not necessarily represent Kant’s thoughts
about a certain subject. As B. Ludwig has shown the original publication
of the Rechtslehre in 1797 represents a distorted version of the manuscripts
Kant had prepared.28 Hence, the words of the original Rechtslehre do not
offer the appropriate access to the doctrine of right. If, on the other hand,
the original version would be regarded to be the proper representation of
Kant’s thought one would be forced to conclude that it is merely the work
of an old man, as some have done.29
Thirdly, even if we would be able to avoid such complications, it is
doubtful whether we are right in assuming that all of Kant’s publications
represent his philosophy. See for example the Logik, which was edited and
published by Ja¨sche in 1800 under Kant’s auspices, and which is a compilation
of Kantian material on logic from different periods that was not written for
the purpose of publication. Undoubtedly the words are Kant’s, but in what
way does the Logik contain Kant’s thoughts on logic?
Lastly, one could ignore the author, his or her intentions, actual thoughts,
etc. and just consider a text no matter what its origin or purpose may be.
This would certainly solve the kind of problems mentioned, but it would
also blur quite obvious and significant differences between different kinds
of texts, e.g. publications, different versions of the same work, drafts, notes,
and Reflexionen. This, of course, would be too high a cost; some words, like
publications, seem to have priority over other words, like occasional scribbled
notes.30
28Bernd Ludwig, Kants Rechtslehre (mit einer Untersuchung zur Drucklegung Kantischer
Schriften von Werner Stark), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988, (Kant-Forschungen,
Band 2), ch. 1.
29Cf. Bernd Ludwig’s introduction to Bernd Ludwig, editor, Metaphysische An-
fangsgru¨nde der Rechtslehre (Metaphysik der Sitten, Erster Teil), Hamburg: Felix Meiner
Verlag, 19982, (Philosophische Bibliothek, Band 360), XXVII–XXVIII. In Ludwig, Kants
Rechtslehre . . . , 39–41 Ludwig maintains that Kant’s declining mental abilities did not
affect the composition of the content of this part of the MS.
30Especially in view of a Entwicklungsgeschichte of Kantian thought the works published
by Kant himself have priority over other sources, cf. Norbert Hinske, ‘Prolegomena zu einer
Entwicklungsgeschichte des Kantschen Denkens. Erwiderung auf Lothar Kreimendahl’,
in: R. Theis and C. Weber, editors, De Christian Wolff a` Louis Lavelle. Me´taphysique
et histoire de la philosophie (receuil en hommage a` l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire),
Hildesheim/Zu¨rich/New York: Georg Olms, 1995, (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte
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Obvious anwers do not settle the matter. They only confront us with
more serious questions that are even harder to answer. I would like to suggest
the following strategy to answer the question about Kant’s words. It is a
pragmatic strategy that enables us to continue our investigations without
running the risk of getting entangled in fundamental discussions the outcome
of which is either insignificant and meaningless, or more problematic than
the initial issue.
Again, the previous section offers a clear example of the strategy I am
proposing. We did not get a comprehensive explanation of the note until
it had been related to other texts, which—in the course of interpretation—
proved to be relevant to the topic of the note. According to this strategy a
text must be interpreted in the context of related texts. Obviously, we cannot
know which texts are related until we know what they mean, but this is where
the pragmatic part starts. The interrelation between texts must also show in
the course of interpretation. Supposedly, coherence and meaningfullness of an
interpretation will increase depending on the degree of interrelation between
texts. So the question whether one text is related to another depends on the
question whether the former contributes anything to the understanding of
the latter and vice versa. By “text” I do not necessarily mean an entire book
or treatise as it was published or written by Kant. “Text” may also refer
to a sentence, a phrase, or even a single word. As long as Kant’s words are
considered to derive their meaning from the way they are related to other
texts, we may assume that these words are meaningful to the extent that
they turn out to be so related. This vicious circle now seems to have replaced
the threat of endlessly regressing questions of philosophical relevance. In the
previous section, however, this pragmatic strategy proved to be fruitful. We
took the initial, isolated phrase about Lampe’s name for granted and we
refused to reduce the matter to the simple question about Kant’s mental
condition. We also did not try to settle the matter by answering the question
to what extent the words could be regarded as Kant’s own. In fact, only
a lesser part of the words that were used in the explanation of the note
in §1.1 were Kant’s own in the strict sense of the word and he is only an
indirect source of the major part. “Kant’s words” is more like a heterogeneous
amalgam of related phrases and texts. The words of Kant’s note as they have
been handed down to us are Wasianski’s copy of the words written by Kant.
Since Wasianski is a reliable source, we have good reasons to suppose that
they originate from Kant himself. The notes on remotio logica and realis
from Metaphysik Herder are not Kant’s either. They were written down
der Philosophie, Band 39), 102–121, 110–113.
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by Herder, who is reporting on the words spoken by Kant about issues in
Baumgarten’s textbook. Finally, the words from Negative Gro¨ßen are Kant’s.
Their origin may give these words priority over other, indirect sources, but
this does not diminish the importance of the latter.
This pragmatic approach merely shows that it makes sense to take an
isolated phrase for granted and that it makes sense to do so exactly to the
extent that we are able to relate the phrase to other words that add to our
understanding of the initial phrase. To some people such an explanation may
look more like a self-fulfilling prophecy than a serious attempt to understand
Kant’s philosophy. Indeed, the explanation must prove itself, but reluctance
to be satisfied with instant answers does not license the proclamation of
random or prophetic associations. Successful interpretation of a phrase,
once it has been taken for granted, depends on the way it turns out to be
interrelated with other texts, some of which may have priority over others.
Taking Kant’s words for granted is what constitutes the pragmatic beginning
of our understanding of Kant. We cannot get there unless we assume that
some isolated phrase makes sense and that the phrase makes even more sense
depending on the way it is related to other texts.
In a final attempt romantic minds might try to solve the entire issue
about Kant’s words by means of an answer to the question “Who is Kant?”.
Once we have a clear picture of the man, his life and character, i.e. once we
know who he was, it is easy to understand what he wrote, or what he must
have meant by some of the things he wrote. Unfortunately, all that is needed
to make such a “picture” has been handed down to us in the form of texts.

Chapter 2
Metaphysics
2.1 Historical notes on the notion of repugnantia
The general meaning of the Latin noun repugnantia is “inconsistency” or
“contradiction”. Repugnantia in the plural (neuter, nominative) derived from
the participium praesens of repugnare means “incompatible or conflicting
things”. The verb repugnare has both the literal and figurative meaning
of “to resist”, and “to be in conflict with”. The Latin noun and verb have
come down to pre-modern Romance languages (Spanish, Italian, French) and
English in their literal and figurative senses. In modern Romance languages
and English, however, noun, verb, and adjectival form acquired additional
connotations which express a strong personal and subjective aversion to
something. Moreover, these connotations of “aversion”, or “antipathy” and
“distasteful”, “repulsive” and “objectionable” have become the prevailing
meanings of the noun, adjective and verb in present day ordinary language.
In English though, the verb has fallen into disuse. For example, in present
day English “repugnancy” and “repugnant”, in the sense of “inconsistency”
and “inconsistent”, are technical terms in legal discourse, but outside this
particular field these terms will most likely occur in the context of personal
or moral rejection.1 In contemporary philosophy Derek Parfit’s Repugnant
Conclusion presents a unique but very fine example of “repugnant” in this
1Cf. for example a lawyer arguing in a custody case against a lesbian mother and her
friend: “They live a lifestyle that this court has condemned as repugnant, immoral and evil.”
(USA Today, february 28 1995, 3A). Leon Kass recommended revulsion and repugnance as
expressions of deep wisdom, as if the absence of sufficient moral and rational explanation
would cause the emphatic expression of feelings to become the definite sign of supreme
wisdom (thereby putting the burden of argumentative proof on the antagonist), cf. Leon R.
Kass, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’, The New Republic, 216 (1997), 17–26.
21
22 Metaphysics
sense.2
In Germanic languages like Dutch and German terms derived from
repugnantia/repugnare have always been rare and unusual. In the 16th and
17th century the Dutch noun repugnantie means “contradiction”.3 The verb
repugneeren occurs in legal discourse (also in the 16th and 17th century) in
the sense of “being opposed to, in conflict with, contradictory to”. From the
16th until the 19th century it mainly occurs in dictionaries in the sense of
“to resist”, and “to obstruct”.4 By now both noun and verb have become
completely extinct in Dutch. In German occurrences of the notion are even
more rare; it is completely absent in 19th century German.5 In the Duden
dictionary, however, both Repugnanz and Realrepugnanz are listed.6 The
former, presented in the general philosophical sense of “Widerspruch” and
“Gegensatz”, seems to have been listed in support of the more specific term
Realrepugnanz, which is presented in the Kantian meaning and which has
a reference to him only. As is clear from this occurrence the terms do not
belong to the current German (philosophical) vocabulary.
Cicero was the first to use repugnantia as a technical term in philosophy.
He introduced it as the Latin equivalent of the Greek mache¯ (conflict), a
notion in Stoic logic. Throughout the history of philosophy repugnantia
has retained the meaning of “contradiction” (contradictio) in the logical
sense. It was often used as its synonym, although contradictio itself has
remained the common term to refer to logical opposition. In Scholasticism it
was used in different fields of philosophy (metaphysics, ethics, physics) to
denote a variety of oppositions or inconsistencies. Apart from repugnantia
contradictionis, we find repugnantia in expressions such as repugnantia
realis7 and repugnantia inter conceptus, repugnantia formalis, and we find
2It is a conclusion regarding the poor quality of life of some extremely large future
population. It is repugnant because it is “very hard to accept” and Parfit even maintains
that it is “intrinsically repugnant”. Therefore it needs to be avoided (cf. Derek Parfit,
Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, 388, 390).
3Cf. “repugnantie” in: Woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal (deel XII-3), ’s-
Gravenhage/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff-A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitg. Mij. N.V. 1972, column 2661.
4Cf. “repugneeren” in: Woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal (deel XII-3), column 2661–
2662.
5Cf. J. Grimm & W. Grimm, Deutsches Wo¨rterbuch (Band 8), Leipzig: Verlag von S.
Hirzel, 1893.
6Cf. “Repugnanz” and “Realrepugnanz” in: Duden ‘Das große Wo¨rterbuch der deutschen
Sprache’ (Band 7), Mannheim/Leipzig/Wien/Zu¨rich 1999 (3. vo¨llig neu bearb. und erw.
Auflage).
7Ockham mentions repugnantia realis in discussion with Walter Chatton: “dico quod
in re nulla est contradictio nec est aliqua repugnantia realis inter non esse deitatem et
deitatem, quia non esse deitatem non importat aliquam rem quae repugnat.” Cf. Ockham,
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descriptions of cases of incompatibility and incompossibility in terms of
repugnantia. The works of Thomas Aquinas show the great semantic variety
of repugnantia in Scholasticism.8 As a consequence of changes in early modern
philosophy of nature (non-Aristotelian approaches, changes of world view)
repugnantia could become a category of conscience in the course of the 17th
century.9
During the first half of the 18th century the term repugnantia was not very
current in German philosophy, at least not in the Latin and German writings
Kant was familiar with.10 Repugnantia and repugnare, whenever they occur
in the context of logic, mean “contradiction” and “to contradict”, but there
are also incidental cases in which they are used in the less technical, and
general sense of “opposition” and “to oppose”. Notions such as repugnantia
realis, oppositio realis are absent.
In Wolff’s Logica11 repugnare is used in a general sense of “being opposed
to” (e.g. §311). In §310 it is defined in a metaphysical context.12 This
definition is used in subsequent sections and depending on the context of
these sections repugnare has more specific meanings: in §514 it indicates
the relation between predicate and subject (in a logical and epistemological
context), in §519 it recurs in a metaphysical and epistemological context of
(im)possible notions, and in §609, §622, §720–721 it is mentioned in relation
to epistemology. Repugnantia does not occur in the sense of “contradiction”,
which is systematically referred to by contradictio (§309, §518), and related
phrases like propositiones contradictoriae (§288, §300), and contradicere (§306,
§550). However, it does occur in a sense closely related to the definition of
repugnare in §310. In §526 repugnantia indicates the opposition between
Quodlibeta septem I, quaestio 2, in: G. de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica, Opera
Theologica IX, St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University 1980, 17, cited after
Knebel, ‘Repugnanz’.
8For historical information and references regarding Cicero, Scholasticism and Aquinas
cf. Knebel, ‘Repugnanz’, column 879–881.
9Cf. Knebel, ‘Repugnanz’, column 882. “Category of conscience” is my translation of
Knebel’s “Bewußtseinskategorie”. He refers to the occurrence of interior repugnantia in
Leibniz.
10Cf. “Opposition der Sa¨tze” in: Johann Georg Walch, Philosophisches Lexikon, Leipzig,
17754, which presents the common Aristotelian distinctions in the form of the square of
opposites.
11Christian Wolff, Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, Frankfurt/Leipzig, 17403 (17281),
(facsimile reprint in: Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke (II Abteilung, Band 1.1, 1.2, 1.3),
Hildesheim/Zu¨rich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1983).
12Wolff, Logica, §310: “Quae salvis essentialibus, aut attributis, vel iis, quae per modum
attributorum insunt, consequenter definitione salva (§. 173. 174. 175. 176.), subjecto
convenire nequeunt; eidem repugnare dicuntur.”
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subject and predicate (which opposition serves to recognise the falsehood of
a proposition).13 In §635 repugnantia occurs as the equivalent of “contrarity”
(between a syllogism and the rules of logic). Remarkably, Frobesius14 in his
compendium of Wolff’s Logica introduces a new entry called Repugnantia
which refers to repugnare in §310 and which is presented as a fifth kind
of opposition in addition to contradictio, contrarietas, subcontrarietas, and
subalternatio (which are also Frobesius’s terms, since Wolff himself speaks of
propositiones (sub)contrariae, etc.).
Repugnat in a general sense occurs in §66 and §574 of Baumgarten’s
Metaphysica15 which Kant also used for his own lectures.16 Repugnans is
mentioned in §7 in relation to the principium contradictionis. This principle,
as well as the principium identitatis, is formulated in terms of contradictio.
Repugnantia does not occur in this context (§7–13 about possibile). In his
exposition of reale et negativum (§135–147) Baumgarten does not mention re-
pugnantia either, but discusses the opposition between negation and reality.17
In R3558 Kant wrote oppositio realis in the margin of §136 commenting on
this exclusive, privative opposition between negation and reality. Moreover,
in R3753–3754, oppositio realis, as well as oppositio logica, occurs several
times.18 In 1758 Kant used Baumeister’s handbook on metaphysics instead of
Baumgarten’s.19 The following year, however, he resumed teaching according
to Baumgarten. Baumeister’s metaphysics followed the Wolffian principles
and style and we find no significant occurrences of repugnantia or repugnare20,
13“Falsitatis criterium consistit in eo, quod praedicatum notioni subjecti repugnet. Cum
enim propositio falsa sit, in qua praedicatum subjecto repugnat (§. 514.); ex ista repugnantia
falsitas propositionis agnoscitur. Est igitur ea falsitatis criterium (§. 525.).”
14J.N. Frobesius, Christiani Wolfii philosophia rationalis sive logica, 1746, (fac-
simile reprint in: Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke (III Abteilung, Band 6),
Hildesheim/Zu¨rich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1980), 66.
15Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysica, Halle, 17574, (reprinted in AA XVII
and XV).
16In 1757 (cf. AA II, 10), in 1759–1760 (cf. AA II, 35) and in 1765–1766 (cf. AA II, 308).
17Cf. §135: “negationes et realitates sunt sibi invicem oppositae” (cf. the references to
this section Metaphysik Herder in §1.1 above).
18These Reflexionen are entirely in Latin, and were written in phase ζ (1764–1766) and
were written in the margins of Metaphysica §14. In R3754 Kant mentions privatio in the
sense of a result of a real opposition.
19See Kant’s own announcement in AA II, 25.
20Friedrich Christian Baumeister, Institutiones metaphysicae (Ontologiam, cosmologiam,
psychologiam, theologiam denique naturalem complexae, methodo Wolfii adornatae, Wit-
tembergae et Servestae, 1738, (facsimile reprint in: Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke (III
Abteilung, Band 25), Hildesheim/Zu¨rich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1988). Repugnantia
occurs in the sense of “contradiction” (contradictio sive repugnantia in §172, cf. §44) and
repugnare is used in the context of “contradiction” (§46, §58).
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with the exception of what is “morally impossible” (moraliter impossibile).
Such an impossibility is not based on contradiction, like impossibility tout
court, although it involves some repugnantia. Baumeister’s example is that
God cannot prefer what is worse, in comparison to what would be better,
because that would oppose his wisdom and sanctity, although it would not
involve a contradiction if he did.
In Meier’s handbook on logic21, which Kant used for his own lectures
on logic22, repugnantia does not occur. Repugnare is mentioned in §292 as
the Latin translation of the German phrases “einander zuwider sein” and
“mit einander streiten”, which refer to logical relations between concepts
(“Begriffe”). In §263–265 these relations are indicated by the German term
“widersprechen” without reference to the corresponding Latin phrases.23
Meier does not mention the Latin terms in his treatment of contradictory
judgements in §343.
In 1763 Realrepugnanz occurred for the first time in Kant’s publications.24
It was introduced in Beweisgrund in close connection with logical opposition
in a discussion about necessary being and supreme reality. Four years earlier
this discussion had already been announced in Optimismus.25 In Negative
Gro¨ßen, however, the term was used in a less restricted context. Apparently
Kant had realized that “Realrepugnanz” was a convenient and appropriate
term to refer to an issue that was common to a great variety of scientific
disciplines (mathematics, economics, physics, psychology, metaphysics, moral
philosophy). In the context of German philosophy the choice to adopt this
term was a lucky one. Any philosopher familiar with this philosophy of
the time around 1750 would recognize “Repugnanz” as the equivalent of
repugnantia.26 Although one would be inclined to identify repugnantia with
“logical contradiction”, the philosophical practice of that time—as we have
just seen—also offered the opportunity to use the Latin term, and in this case
even the German equivalent, to indicate a quite specific kind of opposition.
21Georg Friedrich Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, Halle: J. J. Gebauer, 1752, (based
on Meier’s Vernunftlehre (1752) and reprinted in AA XVI)
22Cf. AA I, 503; AA II, 35, 310. Presumably, Kant started using the Auszug in 1756–1757.
Earlier lectures were based on the Vernunftlehre, cf. Hinske, ‘Prolegomena . . . ’, 109–110,
and his references in notes 27–30.
23Kant, however, seems to be paraphrasing the first part of §263 in R2887 by the Latin
formula Qvicqvid repugnat Generi, illud et speciei et individuo.
24In Beweisgrund (cf. AA II, 86/5–7), and later that year in Negative Gro¨ßen.
25Cf. Optimismus in: AA II, 31/34–35.
26So, for example, Mendelssohn mentions “Repugnanz” as the equivalent of “Entge-
gensetzung” and “Opposition” in his review of Negative Gro¨ßen (cf. Moses Mendelssohn,
‘324ter Brief’, Briefe die neueste Litteratur betreffend , XXIIter Theil (1765), 159–176, 162.
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Kant attached the prefix “Real-” to specify what kind of opposition he
had in mind, and to emphasize the difference with logical opposition. The
first paragraphs of Negative Gro¨ßen (first section) serve to achieve these
objectives.
It is important to note that for Kant the immediate cause to introduce
“Realrepugnanz” was the context of cosmotheology (in Optimismus and
Beweisgrund). However, according to Negative Gro¨ßen, which was written
immediately after he had completed the manuscript of Beweisgrund27, the
underlying issue was present in every branch of philosophy. In section 2
of Negative Gro¨ßen Kant presents these cases of real opposition but it is
noteworthy that every example contains at least an analysis of the relation
between the relevant concepts (Undurchdringlichkeit–Anziehung, Lust–Unlust,
Tugend–Untugend) and that every analysis is carried out with the help of
the mathematical notion of negative magnitude.
These three points (sc. the contextual origin for introducing Realrepug-
nanz, the great variety of cases of real opposition, and Kant’s mathematico–
philosophical approach) need to be emphasized in order to make a historical
remark with respect to the issue of real opposition (as opposed to the his-
torical origin of the notion). According to Susan Shell “Hume is frequently
credited with bringing to Kant’s attention the distinction between logical
and real opposition”.28 Surely, Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas
(which can be ascertained by the operations of thought) and matters of
fact (which cannot be demonstrated in the same way) resembles Kant’s
distinction. Hume specifies the latter distinction by stating that “All reason-
ings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause
and Effect.”29 Kant’s considerations and questions regarding this particular
relation in the closing remark of Negative Gro¨ßen may seem to be inspired
by Hume, but there is no clear and direct evidence that Hume is to be
regarded as the historical source of the distinction.30 To do so on the basis
of a similarity of corresponding phrases about cause and effect would, in
addition to Kreimendahl’s arguments, ignore the three points mentioned
27For details about this chronology cf. remarks at AA II, 470, 478.
28Susan Meld Shell, The Embodiment of Reason. Kant on Spirit, Generation, and
Community, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 359. At p. 338
she also refers to Hume as the historical source: “The distinction between real and logical
opposition is generally attributed to Hume.”
29Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1740–1749, section IV, part 1.
The German translation of this Enquiry was published in 1755.
30For an extensive evaluation and rejection of the view that Hume’s influence on Kant—
the famous wake up call—dates back to the years 1762–1763, cf. Lothar Kreimendahl,
Kant—Der Durchbruch von 1769, Ko¨ln: Ju¨rgen Dinter Verlag, 1990, 28–38.
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above and in particular it would be a depreciation of Kant’s philosophical
efforts. These efforts are not limited to the specific problem of causality. Kant
mentions the problem of causality, because it represents a specific case of
a more general metaphysical problem that he is dealing with. Moreover, in
Negative Gro¨ßen the means by which Kant is trying to do so is a concept
(sc. negative quantity) which he borrowed from mathematics, a discipline
that according to Hume belongs to the realm of mere operations of thought.
The amount of attention that Kant had given to the notion and idea of
real repugnancy during the first half of the 1760’s remained unparalleled
in the course of his later philosophical publications. In his later writings
“Realrepugnanz” does not occur. Perhaps the term was regarded as an awk-
ward Latinism, but in any case there were more obvious, equivalent German
notions and descriptions available, like for example “Widerstreit”, “Wider-
spiel”, “Gegensatz”, and “Opposition”31, which were all used by Kant in
his works published after 1781 whenever real repugnancy was the issue.32 In
KrV we find the following descriptions: “nur logisch, nicht realiter [. . . ] entge-
gengesetzt” (B290n), “so la¨ßt sich zwischen den Realita¨ten kein Widerstreit
denken” (B320), and “reale Widerstreit” (B329).
The 1796 Latin translation of Kant’s first Critique33 is indicative of
the fact that the term “Realrepugnanz” had not become a current notion.
31Cf. “Gegensatz” in: Rudolf Eisler, Kant-Lexikon, Hildesheim/New York: Georg Olms
Verlag, 1979, (8. unvera¨nderter Nachdruck der Ausgabe Berlin 1930; 19161); “Opposition”
in Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, Enzyklopa¨disches Wo¨rterbuch der kritischen Philosophie
(in sechs Ba¨nden), Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1970–1971, (facsimile of Zu¨llichau/Leipzig
1797–Jena/Leipzig 1804), Band 4, 472–482 and “Widerstreit” in Mellin, Enzyklopa¨disches
Wo¨rterbuch . . . , Band 6, 173–174.
32In line with current academic practice (see, for example, Meier’s Auszug) sometimes
the Latin expression is mentioned in addition to a German notion or description. Significant
occurrences in Kant’s later works are: “Der Tugend = +a ist [. . . ] das Laster [. . . ] = −a
als Widerspiel (contrarie s. realiter oppositum) entgegen gesetzt” (MS in: AA VI, 384);
“Vergnu¨gen ist die Lust [. . . ] Schmerz ist die Unlust [. . . ]. Sie sind [. . . ] eines dem anderen
nicht blos als Gegentheil (contradictorie s. logice oppositum), sondern auch als Widerspiel
(contrarie s. realiter oppositum) entgegengesetzt.”; (Anthropologie in: AA VII, 230); “Wenn
das Gute = a ist, so ist sein contradictorisch Entgegengesetztes das Nichtgute. Dieses ist
nun die Folge entweder eines bloßen Mangels eines Grundes des Guten = 0, oder eines
positiven Grundes des Widerspiels desselben = −a; [etc.]” (Religion in: AA VII, 22n).
33Fredericus Gottlob Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, in: Immanuelis Kantii Opera ad
philosophiam criticam (Volumen primum), Lipsiae, 1796. Pugna in this sense seems to be
echoing the meaning of the original Greek notion mache¯. Born’s translations in this respect
are very consistent; “Widerstreit” is translated into pugna (for example in B450 and in the
four titles announcing the antinomical conflicts), and repugnantia (Born, ‘Critica rationis
purae’, 205, 354) is reserved for “Widerspruch” (B310, 532) in the logical sense.
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“Reale Widerstreit” (B329) is translated into pugna realis34, whereas one
would have expected repugnantia realis or oppositio realis on account of
Negative Gro¨ßen. In the Latin translation repugnantia was reserved for “con-
tradiction” (“Widerspruch”).35 Although repugnantia could be used in this
sense—as is shown by the case of Baumeister above—the obvious translation
of “Widerspruch” would have been contradictio.
Born’s Latin translation of Negative Gro¨ßen (published 1798)36 does not
show remarkable differences from what he did with the Critique. He follows
Kant’s German terms very closely, and consistently. Repugnantia is reserved
for contradiction (“Widerspruch”) and repugnantia logica is the literal trans-
lation of “logischer Repugnanz”. “Satz des Widerspruchs” is translated into
decretum repugnantiae. Each Latin description of real opposition closely
follows the German original: repugnantia realis (for: “Realrepugnanz” and
“reale Widerstreit”); oppositio realis (for: “reale Entgegensetzung” and “reale
Opposition”). Since repugnantia is primarily used to refer to logical opposi-
tion, the translation of Kant’s first description of real opposition in Negative
Gro¨ßen seems strange. Born translated “Diese Entgegensetzung [. . . ] ist
real, d.i. ohne Widerspruch.” into “Haec oppositio [. . . ] est [. . . ] realis, sine
repugnantia.”37
After 1763 the word “Realrepugnanz” has disappeared from Kant’s
vocabulary. In Negative Gro¨ßen it was a convenient term to cover all of the
philosophical issues he wanted to discuss. It is, I think, precisely because of
this great variety of issues, that Kant, in his later discussions of these topics,
chose terms that suited the issue at hand, instead of employing this artificial
notion over and over again. The very word itself may have disappeared after
1763, the underlying subjects and Kant’s concern about them certainly did
not. On the contrary, the philosophical issue of real repugnancy remained
a persistent theme throughout Kant’s work. Although he used different
34Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 216. “Realiter entgegengesetzt” (B290n) is translated
into realiter oppositum (Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 193n.).
35Cf. for example “Widerspruch” (B818) and Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 543; De-
cretum repugnantiae is Born’s translation of “Satz des Widerspruchs” (B12, 190), cf.
Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 10, 128. “Satz des Widerspruchs” at B14 is translated into
effatum repugnantiae/repugnantium (Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 12). An exception is
“Widerspruch” right at the beginning of B330 which Born translates into contradictio (Born,
‘Critica rationis purae’, 217, also 211), because it occurs in the context of the discussion
about logice repugnare and pugna realis.
36Fredericus Gottlob Born, ‘Specimen de conceptu quantitatum negativarum in
philosophiam introducendo’, in: Immanuelis Kantii Opera ad philosophiam criticam (Volu-
men quartum), Lipsiae, 1798, 161–199.
37Cf. AA II, 171/4–5 and Born, ‘Specimen de conceptu quantitatum negativarum . . . ’,
164.
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concepts, terms and phrases to discuss this theme in various contexts, the
notion of real repugnancy as presented in Negative Gro¨ßen may still offer
the basic framework for interpreting these issues throughout his work.
2.2 Metaphysics
For the study of Kant’s work we shall employ a twofold approach: we shall
view Kant’s work in terms of its chronology, and our review of this work shall
be based on the assumption that it should be classified as metaphysics. The
emphasis on chronology is prompted by the fact that Kant’s earlier work
on the concept of negative magnitude prominently features the theme of
real repugnance. In order to ascertain the precise position and meaning of
this theme within the broader context of Kant’s earlier work, we need to
establish what exactly were the most significant themes and developments
from that period. The emphasis on metaphysics is in keeping with what is
referred to as the metaphysical or ontological Kant-interpretation38, in which
it is emphasized that metaphysical themes are the key to our understanding
of Kant’s work. As such this interpretation specifically goes against the
neo-Kantian interpretation in which Kant’s philosophy is more one-sidedly
viewed as epistemology. Metaphysical themes specifically mentioned by Heim-
soeth include the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity and the
conceptions of space and time.39
As we shall see, Kant also treats the concept of real repugnance in the
context of metaphysical topics. When we view these topics in the light of
the chronology of Kant’s work, this provides us with a clearer understanding
of our theme, but it also ensures that Kant’s different works are not studied
as separate, isolated entities but rather as a whole. In chapters 2, 3 and 4 we
will focus entirely on the works from the period before 1770 including the
Reflexionen.40
38Cf. particularly Max Wundt, Kant als Metaphysiker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der
deutschen Philosophie des 18. Jahrhundert, Hildesheim/Zu¨rich/New York, 1984, (facsimile
reprint of Stuttgart 1924) and two compilations of articles by Heinz Heimsoeth: Heinz
Heimsoeth, Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants I. Metaphysische Urspru¨nge und
ontologische Grundlagen, Bonn, 19712, (Kantstudien, Erga¨nzungshefte 71); and Heinz Heim-
soeth, Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II. Methodenbegriffe der Erfahrungswis-
senschaften und Gegensa¨tzlichkeiten spekulativer Weltkonzeption, Bonn, 1970, (Kantstudien,
Erga¨nzungshefte 100).
39Heinz Heimsoeth, ‘Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus’,
in: Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants I. Metaphysische Urspru¨nge und ontologische
Grundlagen, Bonn, 19712, (Kantstudien, Erga¨nzungshefte 71), 189–225. Cf. also Wundt,
Kant als Metaphysiker . . . , 93–119.
40Especially the Reflexionen contained in Kant’s copies of Meier’s Auszug and Baum-
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The emphasis on metaphysics is not solely prompted by the metaphysical
Kant-interpretation. It also stems from the fact that Kant sees his involvement
with philosophy as a philosophical battle on behalf of metaphysics and its
claims of knowledge. Even in the preface of KrV, A Kant phrases it in these
terms. This involvement was a driving philosophical force behind Kant’s
work.
From the very beginning Kant’s attitude towards metaphysics has been
ambivalent. On the one hand his work resonates with a profound skepticism41;
on the other hand Kant frequently states the need for renewal, and voices
his confidence in the future of metaphysics.42 This ambivalence can be
attributed to the problematic relation between metaphysics and mathematics
as two competing ways of describing nature. The explanatory value of the
metaphysical approach to nature had been challenged by Newtonian physics.
Due to the use of mathematics, physics was able to lay claim to a universal
validity whereas metaphysics merely became mired down in speculation.
This gave rise to the question whether, given the apparent supremacy of
mathematical explanation, metaphysics might still serve a purpose, and if so,
what its object would be and in what relation it would stand to mathematics.
In his early work Kant constantly tries to determine the mutual relation
between metaphysics and mathematics.43
In Gedanken he does so by examining the point of contention between
the Leibnizians and the Cartesians regarding the living forces.44 Kant argues
that the mathematical conceptions of body and force do not correspond to
bodies and forces as they exist in nature. Therefore there is no mathematical
proof to explain the living forces in nature.45 To fill this explanatory void
garten’s Metaphysica. Reflexionen are dated by Adickes, cf. AA XIV, xxxv–xlvii. Reflexionen
from the period until 1770 belong to phase α through κ.
41Already in Gedanken, AA I, 30. Cf. also Beweisgrund, AA II 66/1–6, 71/24–25; Negative
Gro¨ßen, AA II, 167–169; Deutlichkeit, AA II, 275/13–16. Cf. also Norbert Hinske, Kants
Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie. Der dreißigja¨rige Kant, Stuttgart/Berlin/Ko¨ln/Mainz:
W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1970, 115–119.
42Gedanken, AA I, 30/32–35; Tra¨ume, AA II, 367–368.
43See, for example, the complete titles of Monadologia and Negative Gro¨ßen, and Hinske,
Kants Weg . . . , 115–119. An extensive overview is offered in Alfred Menzel, ‘Die Stellung
der Mathematik in Kants vorkritischer Philosophie’, Kant-Studien, 16 (1911), 139–213.
44The development of a philosophical point on the basis of a confrontation between
opposite opinions remains a characteristic of Kant’s work (cf. the antinomy, and the
“Ausgleichung eines auf Mißverstand beruhenden mathematischen Streits, AA VIII, 407–
410). This characteristic is discussed in Saner, Kants Weg vom Krieg . . . , 89–96, 224–232,
and Hinske, Kants Weg . . . , 83–88, 127–133.
45Cf. Gedanken, AA I, 40/4–6, 70/16–17, 74/32–34, 149/1–3, and Menzel, ‘Die Stellung
der Mathematik . . . ’, 145–149. The mathematical method is dismissed as an inappropriate,
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Kant states that metaphysics also plays an important role in explaining
nature, and that the combination of metaphysics and mathematics could
yield beneficiary results for both approaches. The respective weaknesses of
the two approaches would thus be complemented by the strengths of their
respective counterparts.46
Even after establishing this mutual dependency it still remains to be
determined what the object of metaphysics is. Kant therefore prefaces his
Gedanken by a chapter on metaphysics entitled “Von der Kraft der Ko¨rper
u¨berhaupt”. By taking the concept of “force” and expressly discussing it in a
metaphysical context, Kant is able to thematize the conception of relation47
within the boundaries of traditional substance ontology. Repugnance (whether
logical or real) is also classified under the general heading of “relation”. The
metaphysical conception of force thus forms the relevant background for our
examination of the theme of repugnance in chapter 4.
2.3 Force and interiority
In the 18th century the reliance on a force in a metaphysical explanation
was sure to bring about great controversy. In 17th century mechanics the
scholastic, Aristotelian methods of explanation, which depended on internal
qualities and capacities, were replaced by mechanistic explanations. In these
mechanistic explanations a force was the result of an external movement
caused by either an immediate touch or a thrust (impulse) of external
origin. Internal principles of purposiveness were considered anathema.48
Newton’s appeal to the gravitational force represented, in effect, a reversion
to scholastic pseudo-explanations49, but due to the mathematical formulation
it was possible to discuss force as a principle of movement. Kant, too, views
philosophical method in Negative Gro¨ßen (AA II, 167) and Deutlichkeit (AA II, 283),
thereby criticising Wolff (Deutlichkeit, AA II, 277) and, perhaps, Spinoza. The logical
requirements for a philosophical method, the modus cognosciendi mentioned at AA I, 60,
are presented in Gedanken (AA I, 93–98, 151), cf. Menzel, ‘Die Stellung der Mathematik
. . . ’, 143–144, and Hinske, Kants Weg . . . , 119–123.
46Gedanken, AA I, 107 and Hinske, Kants Weg . . . , 42, 115–118. The combination of
metaphysics and mathematics is clearly referred to in a phrase such as “aus den wesentlichen
und geometrischen Eigenschaften eines Ko¨rpers” (AA I, 152).
47The Latin term is respectus. More discussion on the various meanings of this significant
notion of respectus is offered in the present and subsequent two chapters.
48Cf. E. J. Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld, Amsterdam, 1950, part
IV, §133–137, 210, 213–215.
49Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering . . . , §292, 298 and 312–313. Kant’s ideas on gravitation
are discussed in §4.2 below.
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force as an internal principle with which movements can be explained.50 The
contrast between the interiority (of the force) and the mechanistic exteriority
(of movement) is constantly emphasized this way.
In the chapter on metaphysics in the Gedanken Kant introduces the
notion of an essential force as something that a body possesses even before
it possesses extension (AA I, 17). An express distinction is made between
this essential force, referred to by Kant as “innerliche Kraft des Ko¨rpers”
(AA I, 30), and the exteriority that a body “receives” only at a later stage.
The contrast is even more clearly demonstrated in Kant’s elaboration on the
concept of force in nature as opposed to the concept of force in mathematics
and mechanics (AA I, 140). Instead of an impulse of external origin there is
an internal “Basis der Activita¨t” (AA I, 141) which maintains the movement
and can even increase it. This basis, or ”Bestrebung [. . . ] diese Bewegung zu
erhalten” (AA I, 141), is referred to by Kant as the “Intension”. Movement
is merely the external manifestation of an internal force and intension.51
With these views on the subject of force, Kant remains in keeping with the
tradition of metaphysics that he is familiar with. Baumgarten, whose manual
Kant used in his lectures52, provides the definition that Kant used as a basis.
Force, in the general sense, is the ground which renders accidents inherent in
a substance. If this basis is sufficient, Baumgarten refers to it as a force in the
strict sense.53 When the intrinsic force of the substance is a sufficient basis
to affect change, then this change is an action (actio, actus or operatio).54
The possibility to act is a faculty (facultas, vis or potentia activa).55 Kant
adopts this view, but deviates from Baumgarten by emphasizing that the
50He is aware of the fact that he is running the risk of giving a pseudo-explanation.
At AA I, 70 he mentions Entelechie as an example of a qualitas occulta. This Entelechie,
however, has been misunderstood by all teachers who have followed Aristoteles (AA I, 17;
cf. R2330). Cf. also R2107, 3849, 3851 and R3414 which has Entelechie as a later addition
to conceptus deceptor. More detailed discussion of Aristoteles’s entelecheia in relation to
motion and force is offered in Friedrich Kaulbach, Der philosophische Begriff der Bewegung.
Studien zu Aristoteles, Leibniz und Kant, Ko¨ln/Graz, 1965, (Mu¨nstersche Forschungen
Band 16), 1–13.
51“Die Bewegung ist das a¨ußerliche Pha¨nomen der Kraft” (AA I, 141); cf. ook AA I,
410: “motus est nexus permutati phaenomenon”. Therefore, vis motrix (AA I, 18 and 26)
is rejected in favour of vis activa (AA I, 17–18).
52Baumgarten, Metaphysica. Kant called it “dieses nu¨tzlichste und gru¨ndlichste unter
allen Handbu¨chern seiner Art” (AA I, 503, cf. also AA II, 10, 35, 308).
53Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §197.
54Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §209–210. A change that is brought about by external force
(per vim alienam) is called passio.
55Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §216. The possibility of passio is receptivity (receptivitas,
potentia passiva, capacitas).
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word “force” is used as an indication of a relation, i.e. the relation between
substance and accident.56 From this it follows that an act is the result or
effect of a force.57 Gerhardt therefore describes an “action” in the Kantian
sense of the word as the relation between cause and effect.58
This emphasis on the relational nature of a force provides the opportunity
to specify in more detail a number of other metaphysical themes. Within
the boundaries of substance metaphysics it is possible, in addition to deter-
mining the relation between accident and substance (force), to determine
the mutual relation between substances (space) and the mutual relation
between accidents (time).59 The result of this emphasis on relation is that
force, space and time are the three core concepts of metaphysics.60 In view
of this it becomes clear why, at the beginning of the chapter on metaphysics
in Gedanken, Kant emphasizes that a force is possessed by a body even
before it possesses extension. Spatial conceptions such as “extension” are
only conceivable in terms of a theory of space. A metaphysics of the internal
or essential relations based on the conception of force precedes this theory.
“Internal” is therefore not in and of itself a spatial determination, but rather
it refers to the essential or metaphysical aspect. That which is internal does
not have any dimensions.
56Cf. Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 191/35–37. A force is not the ratio inhaerentiae, but
rather the respectus between ground (substance) and accident, cf. R3786: “vis non est
accidens, sed respectus substantiae tanquam rationis [resp] erga accidentia.” (commenting
on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, §197). Cf. also Metaphysik Herder, AA XXVIII-1, 25/6–8
and Nachtra¨ge Herder, AA XXVIII-2.1, 844–845) and KrV, B250 and U¨ber den Gebrauch
teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie (1788), AA VIII, 181n.
57Cf. R3582–3590.
58Volker Gerhardt, ‘Handlung als Verha¨ltnis von Ursache und Wirkung. Zur Entwicklung
des Handlungsbegriff bei Kant’, in: G. Prauss, editor, Handlungstheorie und Tranzen-
dentalphilosophie, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1986, 98–131; and Volker Gerhardt,
‘Handlung und Kausalita¨t. Zum Handlungsbegriff in Kants vorkritischen Schriften’, in:
Gerhard Funke and Thomas Seebohm, editors, Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant
Congress, Volume II-1, Lanham/Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1989,
19–32.
59R3902. Cf. R3785, 4063.
60R3716 (AA XVII, 257/5–6 and 259/27–29; R3717 (AA XVII, 260/22). As to the
dating of these Reflexionen, cf. Josef Schmucker, ‘Kants kritischer Standpunkt zur Zeit
der Tra¨ume eines Geistersehers im Verha¨ltnis zu dem Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, in:
Ingeborg Heidemann and Wolfgang Ritzel, editors, Beitra¨ge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft
1781–1981, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981, 1–36, especially 10–20.
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2.4 Space, time and exteriority
The categorical distinction between (temporal-spatial) extension and (non-
spatial) interiority is established in the first chapter of Gedanken (“Von den
Kraft der Ko¨rper u¨berhaupt”). When a substance changes the internal state
of another substance, there is an outwardly directed force. Based on this,
these two substances assume a spatial relation towards each other. Spatial
relations and space thus exist where different substances affect each other
by means of force.61 This explains why, in the previous section, movement
was referred to as an external phenomenon: movement is displacement in
relation to a certain space.
In the Nova dilucidatio Kant sees space in a similar way (AA I, 414/10–
12 and 23). This relational theory of space corresponds to Leibniz’s theory:
space is not absolute and real, but exists only as a relation between two
substances.62 Kant’s view of space changed over the years. In the Monadologia
the relational theory of space63 is presented in a metaphysical sense, but also
in terms of natural science: sc. as physical space in which matter acts.
In Kant’s 1768 text on space (Gegenden) the theory of space is greatly ex-
panded in light of the shortcomings of the mathematical-physical conception
of relational space.64 Although space remains relational, Kant now questions
the environment in which this relation occurs. This environment is an “abso-
lute Weltraum” (AA II, 377) in which relational space is imbedded. With
this theory Kant stands midway between Leibniz’s and Newton’s conceptions
of space.65 Kant succeeds in adopting this stance by introducing an observ-
61AA I, 19–21, 23. Respectus is the common denominator of notions such as “relation”,
“connection”, “influence”. On the basis of his conception of spatial relations Kant addresses
the issues of possible worlds (sc. it is possible for a substance to have no external relation
with our world), and the influx physicus (sc. in so far as mind and body have a spatial
relation, there may be some sort of influence). Cf. also Nova dilucidatio, AA I, 414–416
and Heimsoeth, ‘Metaphysische Motive . . . ’, 216–217.
62Newton, however, advocated absolute space, cf. Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering . . . ,
IV 323 and Friedrich Kaulbach, Die Metaphysik des Raumes bei Leibniz und Kant, Ko¨ln:
Ko¨lner Universita¨tsverlag, 1960, (Kantstudien, Erga¨nzungshefte 79), 11–18.
63AA I, 480: “Quia vero spatium non est substantia, sed est quoddam externae substan-
tiarum relationis phaenomenon . . . ”. Cf. Kaulbach, Die Metaphysik des Raumes . . . , 79,
81–90; Martin Carrier, ‘Kants Theorie der Materie und ihre Wirkung auf die zeitgeno¨ssische
Chemie’, Kant-Studien, 81 (1990), 170–210, 172–175; Tra¨ume, AA II, 327.
64Cf. AA II, 377/18–21; R3790 and Kaulbach, Die Metaphysik des Raumes . . . , 92–98.
65Cf. Martin Carrier, ‘Kant’s relational theory of absolute space’, Kant-Studien, 83
(1992), 399–416; also Kaulbach, Die Metaphysik des Raumes . . . , 105–107; and Peter
Alexander, ‘Incongruential counterparts and absolute space’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society ( New Series), LXXXV (1985), 1–21.
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ing body66, i.e. a human being who is capable of making an observational
distinction between different locations within an absolute, surrounding space.
This absolute or original space itself is not observed, but is a “Grundbegriff”
(AA II, 379, 383) which makes relational space possible. The introduction of
an observing body is to be seen in the context of the emphasis Kant placed
on the role of experience before 1768. This point will be examined in greater
detail later on.
Whereas relations between substances are spatial relations, the relations
between accidents are temporal relations. This is to be understood as follows.
When the state of a substance changes, the substance in itself must be
considered immutable, otherwise there would be no something to which a
change could occur.67 Change occurs when a substance is determined in
relation to an accident, whereas this substance had previously not been
determined in relation to said accident. This determination may be internal
or external, but the change of a substance relates to the alternation of
accidents. This alternation can only occur consecutively, i.e. in temporal
succession. The relation between different accidents within one and the same
substance is a temporal relation. Change is, in fact, the occurrence of action
in time.68
Although Kant’s theory of space changes, the categorical distinction
between interiority and exteriority is not affected. It is a recurring theme in
Kant’s earlier work.69 As is shown in the dialogue in the Nova dilucidatio,
the distinction is particularly important to practical philosophy. This much
was already illustrated by Baumgarten’s definition of action as the change in
a state by means of an internal force.70
66AA II, 378–379, cf. Kaulbach, Die Metaphysik des Raumes . . . , 102–104. This change
in the theory of space is known as the subjectivation or idealisation of space and time.
“Subject” in this context denotes the human faculty of knowledge.
67R3771, 3904, 4059.
68AA I, 19; R3941 and 4093.
69Monadologia, AA I, 481/29–30. In the Nova dilucidatio internus plays a role in a moral
argument. In Falsche Spitzfindigkeit the capacity to judge is called “Vermo¨gen des innern
Sinnes” (AA II, 60) and in Negative Gro¨ßen the distinction is made between external,
material causes on the one hand, and internal, mental causes on the other (AA II, 191–192).
Inner experience in Deutlichkeit will be discussed in §4.4 below. In Tra¨ume (AA II, 321,
324–328) it recurs in the discussion about immaterial beings.
70In R3855–3872 this is discussed in relation to spontaneity, freedom and the will.
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2.5 Power of thought
Forces are not only the object of (substance-) metaphysics; there is also a
special force, sc. the power of thought, by means of which the philosophical
discipline of metaphysics itself is developed. The effects of this power are
also actions, sc. thoughts. I will now briefly touch upon the effect this has
on metaphysics.
Power of thought is referred to as “Erkenntnißkraft” or “Denkungskraft”71,
and as such it is a fundamental faculty. Kant refers to this general faculty as
the capacity to judge.72 This capacity relates to judgements, as a force or
power relates to action.73 Kant defines a judgement as an action by means
of which one acquires a clear conception of a thing (AA II, 58). In this sense
a judgement is an act of understanding. Additionally Kant distinguishes
another faculty, i.e. the faculty of reason with which one is able to deduce.74
These are, however, not two separate faculties. Reason as the higher faculty
of knowledge is based on the faculty to judge: “Beide bestehen im Vermo¨gen
zu urtheilen; wenn man aber mittelbar urtheilt, so schließt man.”75
Because the workings of understanding are themselves actions of force,
the concept of metaphysics takes on a double meaning. In the first place
there is metaphysics in the strict sense of substance-metaphysics. In the
second place there is metaphysics which focuses on actions of force resulting
from the power of thought. The study of the principles of the human faculty
of judgement is therefore also considered as metaphysics.76
Kant affirms at an early stage that everything that results from a certain
faculty must be subject to certain rules.77 The same applies to the faculty
71Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, AA I, 355, 357 and Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 199. Kant’s
study of faculties is in line with trends in German enlightenment philosophy. Kant does
not reduce his study to a purely psychological or physiological approach. (Max Wundt,
Die Deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufkla¨rung, Hildesheim, 1964, (facsimile of
Tu¨bingen 1945), 272–276). Since logical operations are the result of forces (sc. forces of
thought), thoughts can be discussed in terms of spatial relations, as is done by Kant in
Orientiren?.
72AA II, 59/16. Cf. KrV, B106: “. . . na¨mlich dem Vermo¨gen zu urteilen (welches eben so
viel ist, als das Vermo¨gen zu denken)”.
73Falsche Spitzfindigkeit, AA II, 58/30–32; Negative Gro¨ßen (AA II, 196/32).
74AA II, 59 (“Vernunft”), AA II, 321 (“Vernunftkraft”).
75Falsche Spitzfindigkeit, AA II, 59. Cf. R 3190: “Gleich wie die Begriffe, so werden auch
die Urtheile verbunden.” (a reflection to Meier, Auszug , §353).
76Cf. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §1; the complete title of Nova dilucidatio and R3716,
3946 and 3952.
77R1562 (a reflection on Meier, Auszug , §1). Cf. Kant’s Logik (AA IX, 11) and also
Beweisgrund (AA II, 129/33–34).
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or power of thought (Deutlichkeit, AA II, 291/6–7). The rules according
to which this faculty works are made explicit in logic. We will now first
concentrate on repugnance in logic, and in doing so deal with metaphysics
in the aforementioned second sense of the word.

Chapter 3
Logical Repugnance
3.1 Principles of metaphysical knowledge 1
In keeping with the German philosophical tradition, the Nova dilucidatio
is a treatise on the first principles of metaphysical knowledge. Contrary to
the rationalistic, Wolffian version of this tradition1, Kant does not believe
in the existence of a single, first and universal principle for metaphysical
truths. This is because the first, universal principle is dual in nature, seeing
as it must apply to both positive and negative truths (Nova dilucidatio, AA
I, 388-389 and Deutlichkeit, AA II, 294/10). The principle that applies to
positive truths is “quicquid est, est”; the principle that applies to negative
truths is “quicquid non est, non est”. Together they constitute the principle
of identity.
The difference with the traditional view is confirmed by the position that
Kant attributes to the principle of contradiction. Although the section in
which he introduces both principles is called de principio contradictionis, the
principle of contradiction is still secondary to the principle of identity. The
principle of contradiction consists of the definition of impossible and reads as
follows: “impossibile est, idem simul esse ac non esse”.2 This subordination is
based on the duality of truth that determines the principle of identity. This
way Kant ensures the autonomy and the priority of an ontological domain
(being and non-being) in relation to the logical domain of determinations
of thought (to which the principle of contradiction applies). The fact that
the title of this section is still called “on the principle of contradiction”
is an indication of the fact that Kant adopts a critical stance towards the
1Wundt, Kant als Metaphysiker . . . , 122–126.
2At KrV, B189–192 the temporal qualification is criticised. The principle is discussed
in greater detail in §5.2 and §6.2 below.
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rationalistic movement that attaches the highest importance to this principle.
The formal principle of identity is subsequently supplemented in sec-
tion 2 with the ratio determinans, the principle of determining or sufficient
ground. By ratio is meant: “quod determinat subiectum respectu praedicati
cuiusdam”. By determinare is meant: “ponere praedicatum cum exclusione
oppositi”. The ratio determinans therefore expresses the specific and deter-
mined logical relation between subject and predicate. Logical repugnance is
mentioned in a more detailed explanation of this relation. In a determination
a predicate is posited while at the same time its opposite is excluded. This
occurs “vi principii contradictionis” (AA I, 393/27–28), i.e. in virtue of the
principle of contradiction.3 This means that the joining of two opposite pred-
icates in one subject is impossible, and that the ratio determinans expresses
the exact and exclusive relation between these two predicates.
Next, Kant links both principles to each other when he states that nothing
is true without a determining ground (AA II, 393). This means that, in light of
the duality of truth, a true proposition expresses the logical relation between
a subject and a predicate whereby the opposite predicate is simultaneously
excluded. In as far as a judgement is true, it expresses, in relation to the
subject, the state of balance of all possible predicates, some of which do
belong to the subject (by position) and some of which do not (by exclusion).
Kant does not employ the phrase “state of balance” in this context, but it
seems the appropriate phrase to indicate the result of a determining ground:
a typical and unique conjunction of position and exclusion.
A judgement is the logical representation of the (ontological) relation
between that which is and that which is not. This ontological relation, that
which the subject of the judgement refers to and which we commonly refer
to as a “thing” (res), is also characterized by a state of balance. After all,
in as far as it is, it must be precisely determined as that which it is. This
means that that which it is not has been excluded (by a ground of being). In
principle this determination is complete (otherwise the thing would not exist,
cf. AA II, 399/19–20) and is referred to by Kant as omnimoda determinatio.4
The relation between position and exclusion on a logical level corresponds to
3Cf. AA I, 394/2 and Beweisgrund, AA II, 77: “Diese Repugnanz nenne ich das Formale
der Undenklichkeit oder Unmo¨glichkeit”.
4Omnimoda determinatio or “durchga¨ngige Bestimmung” is a complete determination
and occurs in: AA I, 27/5; Nova dilucidatio AA I, 395/19, 396/12, 397/19, 28-29, 409/19;
AA II, 32/33 and 72/19 and AA IX, 99/11. Cf. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §53, 148. In
the Nova dilucidatio it is presented in close connection with a conception of God, which is
also its context in KrV. In §8.6 below we will encounter it again. Peter Rohs seems to be
missing the specific metaphysical background of Nova dilucidatio, cf. Peter Rohs, ‘Kants
Prinzip der durchga¨ngigen Bestimmung alles Seienden’, Kant-Studien, 69 (1978), 170–180.
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a similar relation of opposites on an ontological level. As we shall see later
on, these relations reappear in the principles of judgement and reasoning.
3.2 Logical principles in judgements and syllogisms
Identical to the way in which he distinguishes between positive and negative
truths, Kant also distinguishes between positive and negative judgements
(Falsche Spitzfindigkeit, AA II, 47 and Deutlichkeit, AA II, 294). A true
judgement indicates that a specific subject-predicate relation applies to a
thing. In this judgement a feature (predicate) is compared to a thing (subject)
(Falsche Spitzfindigkeit, AA II, 47, 58). As a result, identity and contradiction
are, on a logical level, the primary relations. These relations are described
by Kant in the form of principles:
Einem jeden Subjecte kommt ein Pra¨dicat zu, welches ihm iden-
tisch ist. Dieses ist der Satz der Identita¨t. Und da der Satz,
welcher das Wesen aller Verneinung ausdru¨ckt: keinem Subjecte
kommt ein Pra¨dicat zu, welches ihm widerspricht, der Satz des
Widerspruchs ist, so ist dieser die erste Formel aller verneinenden
Urtheile (AA II, 294, cf. AA II, 60 and R3710).
These principles apply equally to (syllogistic) reasoning. A judgement is an
expression of immediate knowledge, and a syllogism is an expression of the
relation between the characteristic marks.5
The relations between predicate and subject in judgements that Kant
refers to are—as phrased in later terms—in fact analytic relations, meaning
that the predicate is a constituent concept of the subject. The logical rule
of identity thus expresses an analytic relation of identity. The logical rule
of contradiction expresses a contradictory relation and prevents a predicate
from being assigned to a subject that it is in opposition with. It expresses
a negative truth (non-identity). Other relations besides analytic and non-
identical relations cannot be expressed using these rules. These rules are thus
limited in scope as they do not apply to synthetic relations.6
5Falsche Spitzfindigkeit, AA II, 49 and 60. Cf. R3710, 3217, and R3218, and also Meier,
Auszug , §292, 362, 363. A series of chain-syllogisms can produce a complete concept
(Falsche Spitzfindigkeit, AA II, 58–59 and R 3309, 3310). Every syllogism or chain of
syllogisms contains an indemonstrable proposition or judgement, cf. Falsche Spitzfindigkeit,
AA II, 60–61; Deutlichkeit, AA II, 294–295 and R3119 (cf. Adickes’s comment at AA XVI,
667/16–23).
6Cf. Wundt, Kant als Metaphysiker . . . , 124n1. The logical, analytic relation between
concepts must be distinguished from the metaphysical relation between things. Relevant
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The Nova dilucidatio adds a more detailed specification to the principles
of metaphysical knowledge, thus partially offsetting this limitation. The first
step in doing so is a differentiation of the principle of determining reason.
3.3 Ground of being and ground of truth
With regard to the principle of determining ground Kant provides a more
detailed specification that once more articulates the difference between meta-
physics as the study of the principles of human knowledge and metaphysics
in the sense of (substance-) ontology. He distinguishes between the ratio
antecedenter determinans (or: ratio cur sive ratio essendi vel fiendi) and
the ratio consequenter determinans (or: ratio quod sive cognosciendi), and
he discusses this in relation to Crusius’s distinction between Realgrund and
Idealgrund.7
In order to ensure that it is possible to gain knowledge of grounds of
being, Crusius8 made a distinction in which a ground of knowledge can also
be a ground of being. This is essential to his theory of truth, according to
which truth exists in the relation between something as it is thought and
the actual thing.9
Kant on the other hand tries to avoid such an identification. In order to
ascertain the truth it is sufficient that the logical relation between the subject
and the predicate has been determined, and he emphatically refers to the two
different forms of determining ground as ratio existentiae and ratio veritatis
(Nova dilucidatio, AA I, 394, 396, 398). Kant further develops this distinction
and the confinement of the ratio veritatis to a ground of knowledge in
confrontation with Crusius’s principle of certitude of metaphysical knowledge,
which reads as follows: what cannot be thought as other than true is true,
and what cannot be thought as other than untrue is untrue. (Logik §256, 261;
metaphysical aspects and discussion about analyticity in Kant are mentioned in Willem R.
de Jong, ‘Kant’s Analytic Judgments and The Traditional Theory of Concepts’, Journal of
the History of Philosophy , 33 (1995), 613–641.
7Christian August Crusius, Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie
den zufa¨lligen entgegen gesetzt werden, Leipzig, 1745, (facsimile reprint: Hildesheim: Georg
Olms 1964), §34–36; and Christian August Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverla¨ßigkeit
der menschlichen Erkenntniß, Leipzig, 1747, (facsimile reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms
1965), §140-142 Cf. Wundt, Kant als Metaphysiker . . . , 123–124, 128. Kant mentions
Crusius distinction in Nova dilucidatio, AA I, 396-397, 398-399; Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II,
203 and Deutlichkeit, AA II, 293–295. Cf. also R1716, and R1723 (reflecting on Meier,
Auszug , §15).
8Crusius, Metaphysik , §37; Crusius, Logik , §142.
9Crusius, Metaphysik , §28 and Wundt, Die Deutsche Schulphilosophie . . . , 261.
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Metaphysik §15 and Deutlichkeit, AA II, 295). Together with the (partial)
identification of ideal and real ground this principle places such an emphasis
on determinations of thought that on this particular point Crusius’s view
hardly differs from Wolffian rationalism in which reality was absorbed by the
determinations of thought.10
Kant points out the limitations of this strictly logical approach and
states that Crusius’s principle merely expresses that at a certain point no
further ground of knowledge for a judgement can be provided and that
this knowledge is thus indemonstrable (Deutlichkeit, AA II, 295). Kant’s
criticism of Crusius’s distinction illustrates how adamantly Kant espouses
the differences between the ground of being and the ground of knowledge.
The copula (“is” or “to be”) in a judgement does not express the existence
of the subject or the predicate, but merely the logical relation between the
two. This does not however determine the existence of the thing that is
being referred to (Beweisgrund, AA II, 74/18–20). This existence must have
been determined a priori, or rather antecendently, and in proposition VIII
of the Nova dilucidatio Kant claims that all that is contingent cannot be
without an antecedently determining ground, which comes down to his later
claim that “being” is not a predicate.11 Kant uses this in Beweisgrund when
he claims that existence must precede every possible further determination.
Existence is the absolute position of a thing. The logical position, expressed
by the copula of the judgement, is however relative, i.e. the copula expresses
the relation (respectus logicus) in which the predicate (feature, characteristic
mark) and the subject (thing) relate to each other.12
The emphasis on the distinction between the ground of knowledge and
the ground of being once more illustrates the limitations of metaphysics.
Metaphysics as the study of the principles of human knowledge seems to
exclude knowledge of the grounds of being. Moreover, grounds of knowledge
are limited to logical (analytic) relations between subject and predicate.
Within this framework it is not possible to do justice to other grounds of
knowledge (such as experience mentioned at AA I, 392/14). In order to offset
these limitations Kant provides two other principles in section 3 of the Nova
10Wundt, Die Deutsche Schulphilosophie . . . , 71–73. Elsewhere (at p. 260) Wundt states
that in this respect there is a “eigentu¨mliche Steigerung des Idealismus noch u¨ber Wolff
hinaus (trotz des unleuchbare Realismus)”.
11If “being” had been a predicate, then something could merely exist on account of
a judgement about it (R3761). Only God is able to make judgements like that (AA II,
74/14). Schmucker draws parallels between Nova dilucidatio and Kant’s later views, cf.
Josef Schmucker, Die Ontotheologie des vorkritischen Kants, Berlin/New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 1980, (Kantstudien, Erga¨nzungshefte 112), 65.
12Beweisgrund, AA II, 72–74; R3724, 3725.
44 Logical Repugnance
dilucidatio as a complement to the already mentioned principles. These two
principles will be discussed in the following section.
3.4 Principles of metaphysical knowledge 2
The first principle that Kant adds to the principle of determining ground
in section 3 of the Nova dilucidatio, is the principium successionis. This
principle states that change of a substance cannot take place unless this
substance is connected to one (or several other) substance(s) (AA I, 410).
After all, the ground of change cannot reside in the substance itself, because
in as far as it has been determined, the opposite is excluded (given the
principle of determining ground). Grounds of possible change, i.e. grounds
of an opposite determination can therefore not be internal, and thus must
be external. Only in as far as an external relation with another substance
exists, is the occurrence of change possible.13
The previously made distinction between force or interiority on the one
hand and exteriority on the other, is of interest here. The fact that change
depends on an external relation between substances means that the principle
of determining ground takes on a temporal dimension. After all, the succession
of determinations takes place in time, and thus Kant claims, in proposition
XII of the Nova dilucidatio (AA I, 410) that the negation of the nexus
substantiarum also results in the negation of time and succession.
The principle of determining ground states that a judgement is an ex-
pression of the logical relation between ground and effect.14 The expansion
of this principle by means of the principle of succession provides a basis
for the possible thematization of those relations other than logico-identical
relations. The non-identical external relation to another thing can serve as
a causal model for the explanation of change (origin, change, decay, etc.)
within metaphysics. Hence a causal explanation is not based on solely logical
or identical grounds: “Das Verhaltnis der Ursache zur Wirkung ist kein
Verhaltnis der identitaet” (R3843).
The second principle, the principium coexistentiae, states that (finite)
substances, due to their actual existence, have no mutual relation, unless they
have a common ground of existence on which the mutual relation is based
and by which it is maintained. This mutual ground is the divine intellect.
The principle is illustrated as follows: the fact that two substances can
13The idea of a causa sui is hereby rejected, cf. e.g. R3876. Cf. also Nova dilucidatio,
propositio VI (AA I, 394–395).
14R3755: “Die Verha¨ltnis des logischen Grundes zur Folge ist ein Urthel.” (cf. also R3756).
This relation is not temporal: “ratio et rationatum logicum sunt semper simul” (R3754).
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simultaneously exist does not mean that there is an actual relation between
the two. If there is a mutual relation, the existence of the two substances
must be predetermined. Because a finite substance cannot be the cause
(ratio essendi) of another substance, the mutual relation must lay in a ratio
antecedenter determinans that has determined their relation towards each
other. It is beyond all doubt that there are relational and causal connections
between substances, because: “everything in the universe is found in mutual
connection”.15
These two principles represent a complement to the logical principles; they
allow for the thematization of an external, spatial and temporal dimension
within metaphysics. Kant does this from a theological perspective.16 It is
this theological perspective from which Kant also addresses real repugnance.
Once we take a look at experience in connection with repugnance, the
aforementioned dimensions will also be examined.
3.5 Metaphysics and reality
The fundamental logical relations exist in the form of either identity or
contradiction. The limitations inherent in the logical expression of identity
and contradiction are essentially obviated by the principles of succession and
coexistence, which imply an expansion of the strictly logical approach of
metaphysics. This expansion adds a spatial and a temporal dimension. The
changes that occur with regard to Kant’s ideas of space and time affect the
status of the logical principles. This is illustrated when Kant distinguishes
other relations in addition to logical relations.
With regard to respectus, Kant distinguishes real respectus in addition
to logical respectus, each of which can be subdivided into nexus and oppo-
sitio.17 Logical nexus and oppositio were already identified as identity and
contradiction in previous sections. Real respectus however has proven to be
somewhat more problematic for Kant. His first description is a negative one:
in any case it cannot be expressed by means of identity and contradiction.
In order to gain a clearer understanding of real respectus he distinguishes, in
accordance with the view of metaphysics as the study of the principles of
15Cf. AA I, 413/13. It is also clear from Kant’s explanation towards the end of Nova
dilucidatio (AA I, 414–416).
16Cf. Schmucker, Die Ontotheologie . . . , 13–49, 304–305 and Martin Moors, ‘Die Bes-
timmungsgestalt von Kants Gottesidee und das Gemeinschaftsprinzip’, in: Gerhard Funke
and Thomas Seebohm, editors, Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress,
Volume II/I, Lanham/Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1989, 49–65.
17R3591, 3753, 3754 and 3756.
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human knowledge, between the various faculties of knowledge by means of
which knowledge of (real and logical) relations can be obtained.
Logical relations can be rationally understood; understanding and reason,
i.e. the powers of thought, are sufficient to grasp such relations. Knowledge
of real relations however is empirical and is based on (sensory) experience.18
As we have already seen, the copula of a judgement does not indicate the
existence or the absolute position of a thing, and the absolute position
precedes the understanding of a logical relation. This absolute position must
be a given, and it is responsible for giving content to our thought. Kant calls
this material side of thought the datum and the data, or “das Materiale”,
“das Etwas”, or “das Reale der Mo¨glichkeit” (Beweisgrund, AA II, 77–82).
Reference to the empirical origin is not sufficient to adopt something as datum
(AA II, 80), but it does indicate the different origin of our understanding of
real relations (AA II, 83).
The moments of empiricism, data and materiality are to be found on
the real side, whereas the opposite moments of rationality, non-givenness
(i.e. ‘contrivedness’) and formality are to be found on the logical side. This
provides the foundation for the later elaboration on the contrast between
receptive sensibility and spontaneous understanding.
The limitations of logical repugnance and identity, and the lack of clarity
regarding real respectus make it necessary to evaluate the epistemological
role of experience in a metaphysical perspective. This will be touched on
at a later point (§4.4). For the time being it is important, in keeping with
logical repugnance, to establish the meaning of real “respectus”, and “real
repugnance” in particular.
18R3754, 3756, 3957. The problems and issues Kant is dealing with in terms of respectus
at this stage, are examined in KrV in terms of synthesis (cf. chapter 6 below), cf. Friedrich
Kaulbach, ‘Die Entwicklung des Synthesis-Gedankens bei Kant’, in: Heinz Heimsoeth,
editor, Studien zur Kants philosophischer Entwicklung, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967,
(Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Band 6), 56–92.
Chapter 4
Real Repugnance
4.1 Real repugnance and negative magnitude
The mathematical notion of negative magnitude may be adorning the title
of Negative Gro¨ßen, but the real topic of the essay is real repugnance.
Realrepugnanz is the philosophical notion coined by Kant to indicate a
relation between things insofar as these things are or can be related as
negative magnitudes. Negative Gro¨ßen consists of three sections, the first of
which is devoted to an explanation of the meaning of negative magnitude,
as well as an explanation of real repugnancy. In the second section Kant
offers examples of occurrences of negative magnitude and real opposition
in various philosophical areas. Section three, the extent of which equals the
extent of both preceding sections taken together, contains considerations
in preparation for the further application of negative magnitude and real
opposition in philosophy.
Real repugnance is different from logical opposition and can therefore not
be understood on the basis of identity and contradiction.1 In his Beweisgrund
(AA II, 86) Kant defines real repugnance as something that occurs “wenn
etwas als ein Grund die Folge von etwas anderm durch eine reale Entgegen-
setzung vernichtigt”. Expanding upon this definition Kant formulates the
following rules in Negative Gro¨ßen (AA II, 175, 177): “Die Realrepugnanz
findet nur statt, in so fern zwei Dinge als positive Gru¨nde eins die Folge des
andern aufhebt” and “Allenthalben, wo ein positiver Grund ist und die Folge
ist gleichwohl Zero, da ist ein Realentgegensetzung”.2
1Beweisgrund, AA II, 86; Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 171, 202–203; R3719–3720, R3754
and 3756.
2Kant employs a wide range of descriptions to indicate real repugnance, cf. AA II,
86/19, 175/7, 33, 36, 176/5, 177/28–29, 193/25–26, and 196/16. For definitions cf. R3719
and 3720.
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It is necessary that both opposing determinations are able to be united in
one subject. In such a case the (temporal or spatial) opposition is called an
actual opposition. As an example Kant mentions a ship that travels distances
in different directions as a result of the morning and evening winds. If, on the
other hand, both determinations cannot be united in one subject (because
they belong to different subjects), and if they are nonetheless really opposed,
Kant uses the term potential opposition (either spatially or coexistently
determined). As examples he mentions two bodies moving away from each
other, or one person’s desire compared to another’s aversion (AA II, 176n,
193–194). In both types of opposition the determinations are real and opposed,
as they (are able to) result in a zero-state when brought into connection with
each other: “Auf solche Weise sind Dinge, deren eins als die Negative des
andern betrachtet wird, beide, fu¨r sich betrachtet, positiv, allein in einem
Subjecte verbunden, ist die Folge davon das Zero” (AA II, 176).
In order to clarify the concept of real repugnance Kant uses the mathe-
matical concept of negative magnitude:
Eine Gro¨ße ist in Ansehung einer andern negativ, in so fern sie mit
ihr nicht anders als durch die Entgegensetzung kann zusammen
genommen werden, na¨mlich so, daß eine in der andern, so viel
ihr gleich ist, aufhebt. (AA II, 174/7–13)
Kant even refers to a simple accounting problem that he uses in this context
as an example of the real opposition of mathematical magnitudes (AA II, 172).
The example concerns a person who owes 100 Reichstahler, and who at the
same time is owed 100 Reichstahler. Debits and credits, when combined, result
in nothingness, i.e. a “relative nothing” (“ein verha¨ltnißma¨ßiges Nichts”)
which is of a completely different nature compared to the consequence of a
logical contradiction. The latter is nothing at all, “gar nichts (nihil negativum
irrepraesentabile)”. The former is still something (cogitabile, repraesentabile)
and is also referred to as nihil negativum repraesentabile3 or as Zero = 0.
In case of a real opposition both moments are related just as mathemat-
ical magnitudes are related in the example of debits and credits; they are
opposed, and yet related, and the consequence of this opposition is nothing
in the sense of a nihil repraesentabile, also referred to as: nihil privativum,
“Beraubung (privatio)”, “Mangel, Abwesenheit”.4 The negation as a result of
a real opposition is distinct from the privatio in the sense of “lack” as it is
understood throughout the history of philosophy. The latter is referred to by
3Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 171. Cf. R3711, 3720, 3754, 3990 and KrV, B348.
4Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 172, 177. Cf. R3740, 3754, 3873, 4043.
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Kant as “Mangel (defectus, absentia)”.5
The exact formulation of the conception of real opposition depends on
the various types of negation that Kant distinguishes.6 Logical opposition
is expressed by means of copula negation and results in nothing at all, an
impossibility. Real opposition, expressed by means of a predicative, or a
(sub)contrary negation, results in a relative or privative nothing.
The philosophical areas to which the concepts of negative magnitude and
real repugnance can be applied are physics, moral philosophy, psychology
(i.e. the study of the actions of the soul and the faculties of desire and
aversion) and natural science. Examples with regard to physics are the forces
of attraction and repulsion, as well as their reciprocal relation, which can be
characterized as a negative correlation. Another important field of application
for real opposition is morality. Characteristics of virtue, vice and negligence
are phrased in terms of real repugnance. Set against the background of the
theodicy for instance, this provides the possibility of viewing evil in the world
as something real, and not merely as a lack (privatio boni). Thus there is a
basis with which to counter evil. In the field of psychology this application
revolves around the specification of the relations between desire, aversion,
indifference and balance (equilibrium). Similarly, real repugnance also applies
to the actions of the soul, otherwise we would never be able to think of
something else after first having thought about something in particular (cf.
§1.1). Natural phenomena such as cold and heat, electricity and magnetism
are also addressed in terms of real repugnance.
The fact that Kant uses the concept of “force” as a central theme in
his metaphysics provides the advantage that seemingly different kinds of
events can be understood as the actions of force. In as far as an event is
the resultant of an action of force, there is no difference between moral
action and a physical event. They do differ to the extent that their causes
(can) differ.7 This also illustrates that developments in metaphysics can be
successful without having to rely on a mathematical method. Mathematics
5Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 178. Cf. R3526, 3997. Cf. also “Mangel” in Orientiren? (AA
VIII, 139n).
6It may be true that “Kant offers no elaborate theory of negation” (de Jong, ‘Kant’s
Analytic Judgments . . . ’, §9), but Kant’s views on negation, expressed in Negative Gro¨ßen
and in KrV, make it possible to reconstruct a fairly sophisticated and original theory of
negation. Cf. also Heinz Heimsoeth, ‘Chr. Wolffs Ontologie und die Prinzipienforschung
I. Kants. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Kategorienlehre’, in: Studien zur Philosophie
Immanuel Kants I. Metaphysische Urspru¨nge und ontologische Grundlagen, Bonn, 19712,
(Kantstudien, Erga¨nzungshefte 71), 1–92, 10–12, 55–63.
7Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 191/37–192/5. Moral actions are motivated by an inner law,
cf. inner law, consciousness of a positive law, inner moral feeling at AA II, 182–183.
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has no bearing here except for Kant’s use of the mathematical conception of
negative magnitude within the area of philosophy.
According to Heimsoeth8 the exact reasons for Kant to develop the
theme of repugnance are of a theological and cosmotheological nature. Kant’s
treatment of the theodicy focuses on the question regarding the difference
between realities, in order to compare the existing world to possibly better
worlds. Subsequently the question arises how the composite whole of realities
(in the world) relates to the highest degree of reality in the sense of an ens
realissimum.
The first of these questions is dealt with in Optimismus. Realities as
such do not differ from each other, because they are determined by solely
positive characteristics.9 One reality is distinct from another reality in so
far as the former possesses (or lacks) a characteristic that the latter reality
lacks (or possesses). The lack or absence of a characteristic is never in itself
a characteristic10, but rather a quantitative limitation of reality:
Demnach unterscheiden sich Realita¨t und Realita¨t von einander
durch nichts als durch die einer von beiden anha¨ngende Negatio-
nen, Abwesenheiten, Schranken, das ist nicht in Ansehung ihrer
Beschaffenheit (qualitate), sondern Gro¨ße (gradu). (Optimismus,
AA II, 31).
This quantitative and gradual distinction between realities in Optimismus
forms the basis for the elaboration of real repugnance in Beweisgrund and
Negative Gro¨ßen. The difference between realities can now be considered
as a negative relation between magnitudes. In Optimismus Kant further
concludes that our world is the best of all limited worlds (after all, there is
still evil in the world) and that there is such a thing as a highest possible
degree of reality, sc. in God. This brings us to what Heimsoeth called the
theological motivation for the introduction of real repugnance. The notion of
real repugnance prevents the reality of our world from being identified with
God. Were this to occur, it would result in the possibility of real oppositions
occurring in God. The result of this, a negation or defect, would however
8Heimsoeth, ‘Chr. Wolffs Ontologie . . . ’, 59–60; Heimsoeth, ‘Metaphysische Motive
. . . ’, 209; and Heinz Heimsoeth, ‘Zum kosmologischen Ursprung der Kantischen Frei-
heitsantinomie’, in: Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II. Methodenbegriffe der
Erfahrungswissenschaften und Gegensa¨tzlichkeiten spekulativer Weltkonzeption, Bonn, 1970,
(Kantstudien, Erga¨nzungshefte 100), 248–270, 269.
9Optimismus, AA II, 31/7–8 and Beweisgrund, AA II, 86/3–4.
10Optimismus, AA II, 31/32–33 and Beweisgrund, AA II, 87/8–9. Cf. R3778 and 3901.
About reality and negation cf. also Orientiren? (AA VIII, 137n–138n).
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contradict the conception of God as the most real being.11 Real repugnance
is therefore characteristic of a limited reality. Consequently the result of
Optimismus remains valid. Kant answers the question of the relation between
God and our world by claiming that the ens realissimum relates to every
possible reality, in the sense that the data for all that is possible can be
found in the ens realissimum either as a determination or as a consequence
of this ens. A state of real repugnance, too, must thus be considered the
result of the most real being. (Beweisgrund, AA II, 85/17–20 and 86/24–25).
Such considerations about God, the world and their mutual relation are
meant to serve as a counterbalance to Spinozism. A Spinozistic identifica-
tion of God with the world and of reality with perfection would exclude
the possibility of a relation and a mutual influence between God and the
world, meaning, in effect, that the world would be unable to change.12 Real
repugnance therefore serves not just to explain the occurrence of changes in
the world, but also to refute a Spinozistic outlook.
Just as logical respectus could be subdivided into logical nexus and op-
positio, so too is real respectus subdivided into real connection and real
opposition. The latter should be viewed in the light of the qualitative dis-
tinction between realities and the relation to the ens realissimum in the
following manner. Every connection (synthesis) is either a connection in the
sequence (of states), or a connection such as exists between a part and a
whole. Kant refers to the former as the subordination of ground and effect
and to the latter as the coordination of part and whole.13
Both types of connection represent the opposite of real opposition, but
can still serve to facilitate a more detailed explanation of real repugnance.
A state of real repugnance, as we saw before, can be considered the result
of the ens realissimum. As such, each of the repugnant moments in such
a state is indirectly included in a subordination of relations. Similarly, an
actual, real opposition (oppositio actualis) is a state in which the opposite
determinations are combined in one subject and are related to each other as
ground and effect. Real determinations can also be potentially opposed in as
11Beweisgrund, AA II, 86/18–21, Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 200/34–35.
12Cf. references to Heimsoeth in note 8 above. Around 1765 Kant denies Spinozistic
options for the relation between God and the world on account of his criticism of the causa
sui and of the idea of one substance (cf. R3781, 3907, 3924 and R3803, 4094). Nauen tries
to establish possible influence of Optimismus on the development of German Spinozism, cf.
Franz Gabriel Nauen, ‘Kant as an Inadvertent Precursor of 18th Century Neospinozism.
On Optimism (1759)’, Kant-Studien, 83 (1992), 268–279.
13R3717, 3925 and 3968. This distinction is frequently made in the Reflexionen, it recurs
in the Dissertation, and MS (AA VI, 316). Cf. also Moors, ‘Die Bestimmungsgestalt . . . ’,
53–59.
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far as they could lead to a state of real repugnance when joined in one single
subject. The potential opposition can only be thematized when the whole of
realities is considered. Kant refers to such a whole as omnitudo realis (R3890,
4024). This background illustrates the two propositions formulated by Kant
towards the end of Negative Gro¨ßen (AA II, 194, 197; cf. R4002).
Particularly in the second proposition there are a number of themes that
converge. The sum of all real grounds in the universe equals zero. In the
explanation Kant adds that the world is merely something in so far as it is
based on the will of something else (in this case God).14 Only in relation
to something else are the world, the universe (and all possible realities)
something positive. The natural changes in the world do nothing to either
increase or decrease the whole of positive reality (as claimed in the first
proposition). An increase or a decrease would require a supernatural or
unnatural act. One could say that the world, in as far as it is nothing, can
be considered as a big barrel full of potential, real oppositions.
The combination of the theme of real (subordinated and coordinated)
connection and that of real repugnance provides a clear picture of the relation
between God and the world. The world is mutable, but the evil aspects of it
cannot be attributed to God. Although He is, by His will, the origin or the
creator of the world, the distance he maintains in relation to the mutable
world gives man the freedom to adopt a practical or moral position in the
world. Real repugnance thus contributes to the field of cosmotheology, but
the question of how real repugnance itself is to be explained remains.
This question focuses on another question, i.e. what is the real connection
between cause and effect, or as Kant puts it: “wie soll ich es verstehen,
daß, weil Etwas ist, etwas anders sei?” (AA II, 202) and “wie darum, weil
etwas ist, etwas anders aufgehoben werde” (ibid. 203). These questions
explicitly address the problem of causality. Although Kant, at this point
in his development, is able to formulate this as a philosophical issue, he
is unable to provide a solution (Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 203/1–5). He is
merely able to give a negative answer by strictly distinguishing between the
real relation of cause and effect and the analytic logical relation of ground
and consequence based on identity and contradiction (AA II, 202/3–5). A
positive answer would not be explicitly formulated until the second half of the
1760’s, when Kant stated that real connections come to us in experience.15
The question regarding an explanation of real repugnance thus leads to the
14The first ground of a succession of subordinated relations is a free act of the will of
God (AA II, 197).
15Cf. §3.5 above and §4.4 below; Tra¨ume, AA II, 370/11–13 and R4021.
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question regarding the statute of experience in relation to rational knowledge.
This development of the question can be characterized as the subjec-
tification of metaphysics16 and can be briefly explained as follows. As a
result of the appeal to logical principles, the answer is confined to rational
knowledge. Subsequently the question arises how (metaphysical) knowledge
of non-rational or synthetic relations is possible. The provisional answer is
that this is possible on the basis of experience, but this leads to the question
of how experience is possible. The Transcendental Logic in KrV answers this
question with the logification of the form of experience.
According to Heimsoeth the introduction of real repugnance is based on
the actual experience of the (real) opposition itself, which in turn is based
on a Fundamentalfaktum from Newton’s natural philosophy, i.e. force and
counterforce.17 Consequently, in the next two sections we will focus on the
role of the Newtonian concept of force and counterforce within Kant’s model
of metaphysics. In §4.4 we will resume our focus on the role of experience.
4.2 Attraction
Earlier on brief mention was made of how the (re-)introduction of forces in
(natural) philosophy was controversial in comparison to 17th century mechan-
ics, because this seemed to represent the re-introduction of hidden qualities.
With regard to the force of attraction Newton dismissed any criticism along
these lines.18 Perhaps the cause of this force will one day be discovered,
but nevertheless the existence of a force is indisputable because we have
ascertained it through experience19 and it can be mathematically formulated.
As a systematic description of an experience, the force of attraction is not a
hidden quality, nor is it a random hypothesis (Dijksterhuis, De mechaniser-
ing . . . , IV 314). Through his mathematical formulation of an experience
Newton distances himself from metaphysics as the study of internal forces
(Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering . . . , IV 324).
In doing so the problem arises of the actio in distans and the related
problem of empty space. The dismissal of force as an internal principle implies
that force would only exert its influence on another body across a distance by
16For example, cf. R3946, 3952, 3970, 3988.
17Heimsoeth, ‘Chr. Wolffs Ontologie . . . ’, 57, 60–61, and Heimsoeth, Studien zur Philoso-
phie Immanuel Kants II . . . , 120.
18Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering . . . , IV 316, 326–328.
19Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering . . . , IV 315. Cf. Helmut Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbe-
griff. Quellengeschichtliche und bedeutungsanalytische Untersuchungen, Basel/Stuttgart:
Schwabe, 1970, 79–82.
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means of the transference of an impulse via the interlaying particles. In this
case one cannot assume that space is empty (Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering
. . . , IV 204–205, 324). Newton’s view with regard to the actio in distans and
empty space is ambiguous at best (Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering . . . , IV
325), but in general he dismisses the interiority of forces, empty space and the
action of force across distance as metaphysical and hypothetical. He explains
any unanswered questions on this subject by placing the actions of force
in the absolute space of God’s omnipresence. By doing so the (im)material
action of force across distance is guaranteed, thus dismissing the question
whether space is empty or not. In any case the force need not be internal.20
Kant emphatically appeals to Newton when introducing the force of attrac-
tion in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte. Similar to Newton, Kant maintains
three moments that are of importance and that guarantee the explanatory
value of the force of attraction. These are experience, the explanation thereof
by means of a force, and the mathematical formulation to guarantee its
universal character. Contrary to Newton, Kant acknowledges the metaphysi-
cal tenor of the assumption that forces are internal principles. He therefore
speaks of an “essential force of attraction” (AA I, 230, 264, 335, 467) thus
risking being accused of having resorted to a pseudo-explanation.21 Attrac-
tion is first referred to as a force in Die Frage, and is later mentioned on
several occasions in the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, as well as in many other
works.
The experience of attraction is a defining moment in the forming of
a theory of force. “Experience” is not the terminus technicus we find in
KrV. Kant also refers to it as “Beobachtungen”22 or “phenomena”.23 A
certain, indisputable experience is important, because this is both the basis
(phenomenon that is to be explained), as well as a final test required to
determine whether the existence of a force can and may be assumed. In
his Neue Anmerkungen, Kant keeps searching for a “Besta¨tigung aus der
Erfahrung” of his statements (AA I, 493, 494, 496, 498). In Tra¨ume it is
20As to actio in distans, attraction, and repulsion, cf. Karl J. Fink, ‘Actio in distans, repul-
sion, attraction. The origin of an eighteenth century fiction’, Archiv fu¨r Begriffsgeschichte,
XXV (1981), 69–87.
21Kant is aware of this and expresses his doubts regarding the explanatory value of
attraction, cf., for example, R3160 (to Meier, Auszug , §338 about qualitates occultae):
“Wenn die zu erkla¨rende Sache zur Ursache genommen wird. vis plastica ...” (cf. Adickes’s
addition at AA XVI, 688/21–22) and R3417.
22For example in AA I, 244/32. Cf. Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbegriff . . . , 134n4 and the
complete title of Beobachtungen.
23“Schwere”, attraction or gravitation is called an “ausgemachtes Pha¨nomen der Natur”
(AA I, 244). Cf. also Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbegriff . . . , 136
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mentioned that concepts such as cause, force, and action only have validity
in as far as they have been experienced.24 Elsewhere constant emphasis is
placed on the relation between experience and assumptions (Deutlichkeit,
AA II, 275/17–18; Tra¨ume, AA II, 358–359). The appeal to phenomena and
experience is necessary in order to provide a solid basis for hypothetical or
metaphysical assumptions (both in the pejorative sense of the word).25
Through the appeal to the force of attraction, specific experiences, phe-
nomena or observations are explained in a way that transcends the concrete
level of experience. The reference to a force gives the experience legitimacy.
On the other hand the experience constitutes the ratio cognosciendi of this
force. Without such a ratio the appeal to a force would lack explanatory
value. In this sense, explanation and experience rely on each other and are
inextricably linked.
Thirdly, as a means of legitimizing his appeal to a force, Kant emphasizes
the mathematical form in which the force of attraction can be universally
and systematically formulated. The mathematical form is referred to by
Kant on many occasions, and often in conjunction with experience.26 The
mathematical formulation renders the metaphysical hypothesis in a form
that eliminates all doubt as to its explanatory value. Thus it exemplifies the
fruitful way in which Kant utilizes mathematics in the service of (limited)
metaphysics.
In terms of the Nova dilucidatio it is fair to say that an appeal to
experience provides metaphysics with rationes cognosciendi. For example,
experience (experientia, AA I, 392/14) is the ground of knowledge for evil
in the world. Purely ontological rationes essendi are not always within the
scope of metaphysics (of force). One can also not refer to forces as underlying
grounds without running the risk of making an appeal to qualitates occultae.
The place of experience in conjunction with the ratio cognosciendi also
24Tra¨ume (AA II, 370/11–13 and 20–22). Schmucker considers emphasis on experience
to be a critique of a speculative approach in moral philosophy (cf. Schmucker, ‘Kants
kritischer Standpunkt . . . ’, 4–5).
25Newton’s exclamation “Hypotheses non fingo!” (Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering . . . ,
IV 314, 319) clearly expresses the pejorative sense of “hypothesis”. Kant employs the
pejorative sense in Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, AA I, 234/12; Tra¨ume, AA II, 333/30 and
341/11. If a hypothesis is related to experience there is no objection to using hypotheses,
cf. Beweisgrund AA II, 139/17, 145/5; Deutlichkeit, AA II, 275/10; Tra¨ume, AA II, 371/8.
This positive though limited appreciation of hypotheses is present in KrV, B797–799 (“Die
Disziplin der reinen Vernunft in Ansehung der Hypothesen”). At B798–799 attraction and
repulsion, in relation to experience, are mentioned in the context of hypotheses.
26Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, AA I, 225/35, 230/29, 234/33, 243–244, 296/31; Nova
dilucidatio, AA I, 415; Fortgesetzte Betrachtung, AA I, 466, 468; Beweisgrund, AA II, 139;
Deutlichkeit, AA II, 275; Tra¨ume, AA II, 335.
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indicates that within metaphysics first and foremost the mutual relation
of experience and understanding must be made explicit. As we have seen,
Kant’s development in the 1760’s headed in this direction.
Because attraction is related to a mathematical formulation and to
experience, this force can be maintained as a true force in metaphysics. At
the same time there remains room within metaphysics for theories on empty
space and the actio in distans, making Kant “more metaphysical” on this
subject than Newton. These theories already appeared in Gedanken (AA I,
29) and are subsequently referred to on many occasions.27
Characteristic of these theories is Kant’s insistence on the actio in distans
for the benefit of cosmogony. Because Kant does not rely on substantial
forces he also does not need God’s omnipresence to guarantee this type of
action. The next step would be acknowledgement of empty space, because
interlaying particles are no longer necessary for the transference of impulses.
An ancillary advantage would be that it would not be possible to fully
determine movements the way it is possible in a space filled with particles.
Still, Kant does not unequivocally argue in favour of, or against empty space.
He goes no further than to say that empty space is not impossible (“nicht
widerlegt”, AA II, 288/8).
Kant expresses his ambivalence towards empty space by claiming that
space is relatively empty (AA I, 262n). Although there is interlaying matter
in the form of finely dispersed particles, these particles do not affect the
actions between the larger bodies. On the other hand, these particles do
represent the basis for the introduction of another original force: the force of
repulsion.
4.3 Repulsion
Together with the force of attraction Kant repeatedly mentions the force of
repulsion in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, as well as in subsequent works.
Both forces are equally original and universal (AA I, 234–235). Although
repulsion is not mathematically formulated, and its universal character is
not thus guaranteed, it does reveal itself in a number of phenomena, thus
rendering it an “unstreitiges Pha¨nomenon der Natur” (AA I, 265/5). These
phenomena are: the finest “Auflo¨sung der Materie, wie z. E. bei den Du¨nsten”
(AAI, 235/1–2), the “Elasticita¨t der Du¨nste”, the “Ausflusse starkriechender
Ko¨rper und der Ausbreitung aller geistigen Materien” (AA I, 265/3–4).
27AA I, 229, 262, 306, 335, 338, 339, 340, 342, 345; and AA II, 121, 142, 144, 145, 147.
Cf. MAN, AA IV, 511–512 and 543–544.
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In Allgemeine Naturgeschichte Kant describes the genesis, the structure
and the workings of the universe as the results of the influence exerted by
repulsion and attraction on the haze of dispersed primal matter. Attraction
in random clusters of primal matter, and the opposite actions in the form of
the repulsion of nebulas cause a steady movement of the heavenly bodies,
preventing total dispersal of all matter on the one hand and total coagulation
on the other. Together with the assumption of an extraordinarily huge
central body (AA I, 310–312) this leads to the description of the universe as
a dynamic-mechanical unity.
Kant remedies any undesirable naturalistic consequences of this model
by considering the primal matter, its characteristics and the forces as conse-
quences of God’s existence (AA I, 310). He considers the systematic unity
of the whole as something conceived in God’s mind (AA I, 331–334 and
Beweisgrund, AA II, 151–154).
Although it is necessary to assume the action of both forces, only the
force of attraction is sufficiently (i.e. systematically) explained. Before we
come to the deduction of the force of repulsion in the next section, we will
first examine the exact relation between the two forces.
In the preface of the Monadologia Kant states that, in relation to an
external entity, a (moving) force has either a repelling (repellens) effect or an
attracting (trahens) effect. Furthermore there is a specific, mutual relation
between both forces, because if only one of these forces were at work, the
result would be either total dispersal, or complete cohesion without extension.
The discussion concerning the correlation between both forces is therefore
related to the discussion concerning space.
The relational space between substances has already been previously
discussed, and now the focus is on the space that is occupied by substances
(monads) themselves.28 The force with which monads occupy a space is their
impenetrabilitas (AA I, 482). This force prevents other entities with which
they come into contact from occupying their space, and is also referred to as
the force of repulsion.
The exact dimensions of the space that is occupied by the monad (vol-
umen, limes extensionis) cannot be solely determined by this one force,
because the action of merely this force would lead to total dispersal. Only
in conjunction with the other internal force, i.e. attraction, are the exact
dimensions determined (AA I, 483). The spatial dimensions of a substance
can now be understood as the plane on which the actions of both internal
28AA I, 480. As regards problems concerning divisibility of space and monads, cf.
propositions VI and VII. Cf. Menzel, ‘Die Stellung der Mathematik . . . ’, 155–157.
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forces occur in equal but opposite measure. The actual existence of an ele-
ment or substance can thus be analyzed as the state of balance between two
antagonistic forces.
This state of balance or rest pertains to the internal relation of the forces.
It also pertains to the external relation if the relation between bodies is con-
sidered, and especially in the case of contact between these bodies (contactus,
AA I, 483). A moving force can move either in an attracting manner or in a
repelling manner. Contact occurs when during the approach of two bodies
towards each other the force of impenetrability is perceived (cum sentitur vis
impenetrabilitatis h.e. repulsionis, AA I, 483/28–29). Thus contact is defined
as the workings of action (approach) and reaction (repulsion) exerted by
different elements on each other.29 Is attraction not also experienced only
during the impediment of its action, i.e. as soon as pressure, collision or an
impulse is experienced? Kant’s explanation on the notio contactus will be
further examined in the following section.
With this internal relation between the forces (volume) and the external
relation between different monads (contact, co-existence) the presentation of
the force of repulsion for the benefit of cosmogony has been metaphysically
explained, but not yet sufficiently deduced. We will now take a look at the
deduction of the force of repulsion and the role that contact plays therein.
4.4 Repulsion, metaphysics and inner experience
According to Heimsoeth the introduction of real repugnance was based on the
experience of opposition, which can be traced back to a “Fundamentalfaktum”
from Newton’s natural philosophy: the actions of force and counterforce.
However, a reference to such a fact does not suffice when trying to establish
a deduction of the force of repulsion, and thus indirectly of real repugnance.
Other commentators have noticed the lack of such a deduction, but their re-
constructions are insufficient.30 The following deduction will make it possible
29Cf. Nova dilucidatio, AA I, 415/5–16; Neuer Lehrbegriff, AA II, 19/30–31, 23/30–31;
Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 179–180, 198–199; Tra¨ume, AA II, 322–323.
30Heimsoeth makes an appeal to later writings and MAN (Heimsoeth, ‘Chr. Wolffs Ontolo-
gie . . . ’, 57; and Heinz Heimsoeth, ‘Kants Erfahrung mit den Erfahrungswissenschaften’, in:
Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II. Methodenbegriffe der Erfahrungswissenschaften
und Gegensa¨tzlichkeiten spekulativer Weltkonzeption, Bonn, 1970, (Kantstudien, Erga¨nzung-
shefte 100), 1–85, 28–29). Bo¨hme & Bo¨hme have developed the psychologistic thesis that
material repulsion between bodies in nature is based on a physical experience, which is
actually a repressed inner experience. Their thesis is based on an unjust identification
of “internal” with “personal”, “mental”, and “mine”. In their approach the Kantian
metaphysical connotations of these notions are neglected (Hartmut Bo¨hme and Gernot
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to explain the thematization of real repugnance, and will cross-reference sev-
eral subjects that were previously examined. Kant’s emphasis on experience
will be the focal point throughout this process.
With this emphasis Kant expressly distances himself from rationalists who
lay a stronger claim to metaphysics than they are able to substantiate.31 The
appeal to experience therefore also shows that the deduction takes place in
the context of methodological considerations. Following on Newton’s scientific
method Kant presents the method of inner experience for metaphysics and
he applies it to our understanding of the nature of bodies (Deutlichkeit, AA
II, 286–290). He formulates his methodical guideline as follows:
suchet durch sichere innere Erfahrung, d.i. ein unmittelbares
augenscheinliches Bewußtsein, diejenige Merkmale auf, die gewiß
im Begriffe von irgend einer allgemeinen Beschaffenheit liegen,
und ob ihr gleich das ganze Wesen der Sache nicht kennet, so
ko¨nnt ihr euch doch derselben sicher bedienen, um vieles in dem
Dinge daraus herzuleiten.32
What is most noticeable is how this method again has its limitations
(“ob ihr gleich”). We will discuss this method and its relevance for the force
of repulsion by using Holzhey’s study. Holzhey emphasizes the correlation
with the external experience of Newton’s physics 33, but at the same time he
ascertains that external experience has bodies as its object, whereas inner
experience revolves around characteristics that are inherent in the concept of
a thing. According to Holzhey this appeal to inner experience (in conjunction
with the Einleitung in Deutlichkeit) firstly means that Kant recognizes no
authority other than the workings of one’s own cognitive abilities and one’s
own insight.34
Bo¨hme, Das Andere der Vernunft. Zur Entwicklung von Rationalita¨tsstrukturen am Beispiel
Kants, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983). Kaulbach does not address the metaphysical
background either and refers to the comparatively late Tra¨ume, Gegenden and Dissertation
(Friedrich Kaulbach, ‘Leibbewusstsein und Welterfahrung beim fru¨hen und spa¨ten Kant’,
Kantstudien, 54 (1963), 464–490, especially 465–474).
31Gedanken §19; Deutlichkeit, AA II, 288; Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbegriff . . . , 134–135.
32Deutlichkeit, AA II, 286. Kant compares his method to Newton’s mathematical method,
which is not suited for philosophy. The difference between both methods as presented by
Kant (Deutlichkeit, AA II, 278, 289, 290) is discussed in detail in Menzel, ‘Die Stellung der
Mathematik . . . ’, 172–183.
33Cf. Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbegriff . . . , 138, 143 (with a reference by Holzhey to
Kaulbach, ‘Die Entwicklung des Synthesis . . . ’, 65). Cf. Heimsoeth, ‘Kants Erfahrung . . . ’,
36. He is quoting the relevant description from Deutlichkeit omitting the phrase “sichere
innere Erfahrung”.
34Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbegriff . . . , 140. Kant had expressed this unambiguously in
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The second point of interest is the claim that one should not hinge on
dogmatic or mathematical definitions, but rather on an analysis of concepts.
After all, concepts come to one in a state of “immediate apparent conscious-
ness” and in as far as they come to one in such a state, the resulting experience
is also certain. In this experience the Merkmale, the characteristics which are
inherent in a specific concept, can be known. The interiority of experience is
predicated on a consciousness in which something is immediately imagined
and as such is apparent and certain.
However, this emphasis on immediate and apparent consciousness also
provides a too limited view of inner experience. It can be more aptly explained
in terms of the object of inner experience and the underlying metaphysics
of force. As we have seen in chapter 2, the difference between what is inner
or external is determined by the difference between the substantial and the
relational-substantial actions of force. The “inner” aspect of experience must
be viewed in this light, as it concerns an experience in which there is no
(spatial) relation to another force or substance, but rather merely the relation
of the object to the faculty from which it originated.
This is illustrated in §2.5 above and in Falsche Spitzfindigkeit (AA II,
57–61). The faculty from which concepts originate, is the capacity to judge.
As for the force that enables these judgements, Kant carefully hypothesizes
“daß diese Kraft oder Fa¨higkeit nichts anders sei als das Vermo¨gen des innern
Sinnes, d.i. seine eigene Vorstellungen zum Objecte seiner Gedanken zu
machen.” (AA II, 60). This force is internal, as it applies to nothing other
than its own conceptions. As a result, our thought is provided with objects
that are immediate (not mediated by something external) and self-evident.
inner experience is thus an activity of thought. It is the result of an action in
which a conception is made the object of a thought and can be conceived of in
experience. The most crucial elements of inner experience are thus, firstly, the
spontaneous moment (of action) that results in a conception and secondly
the fact that this conception can be made the object of thought (which
can possibly result in a new conception). This reflexivity of the capacity of
thought is crucial in the construction of inner experience.
The example that Kant provides in order to illustrate the method concerns
the discussion of the actio in distans, and represents the completion of what
was said about the force of repulsion in the Monadologia.35 As a starting
point he states “daß die meisten Newtonianer noch weiter als Newton gehen
the introduction to Gedanken (Vorrede V and VII). It is an encouragement to think, instead
of to reproduce what others have thought. The latter only yields historical knowledge,
while rational knowledge is what a philosopher is supposed to be after (AA II, 306).
35Cf. Falsche Spitzfindigkeit, AA II, 58/27–30.
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und behaupten, da die Ko¨rper einander auch in der Entfernung unmittelbar
(oder, wie sie es nennen, durch den leeren Raum) anziehen.” (AA II, 288/3–5;
cf. Gedanken, AA I, 164). Kant seems to be suggesting that these Newtonians
are correct in their assertion. Although it has not conclusively been proven,
is has also not been refuted in terms of metaphysics.36 Opponents of the
idea of actio in distans claim that immediate, mutual presence is the same
as contact. When the action of bodies is immediate and mutual they must
come into contact, and hence, action cannot occur both immediately and in
distans.
Kant, on the other hand, argues that actio in distans is not metaphysically
impossible. He claims that bodies that are at a distance from each other do
not touch. Next we must ask ourselves what constitutes “to touch”. Seemingly
(“durch das Urtheil der Augen”) I might suspect that two bodies touch, but I
can be sure only after observing a certain resistance of impenetrability. This
observed resistance originates from feeling. Using the conception of “touch”
“werde ich inne, daß, [. . . ] ich [. . . ] aus dem Widerstande der
Undurchdringlichkeit eines andern Ko¨rpers urtheile, daß ich ihn
beru¨hre. Denn ich finde, daß dieser Begriff urspru¨nglich aus dem
Gefu¨hl entspringt” (AA II, 288/11–14).
This analysis of the conception of “touch” illustrates that it is possible for
action to occur in distans, provided that this action does not occur by means
of touch, but rather by means of another force. Opponents of this theory
should in turn demonstrate that this is not possible or that the only possible
action is the action by means of touch or impenetrability.
On this point Kant argues in favour of a possible actio in distans (of
attraction) by tracing the force of repulsion back to and basing it on the
sensible experience of impenetrability. This is repeated in Tra¨ume (AA II,
322–323), where the general method suggested for metaphysics is directly
applied to the forces of attraction and repulsion. Inner experience is therefore
not a symptom of repression (like Bo¨hme & Bo¨hme would have it), but
rather the opposite: a revelation, i.e. a metaphysical analysis, the unfolding
and clarification of the content of a conception. As a metaphysical method,
such analysis is in contrast with the mathematical method.
It can be concluded that Kant compensates for the absence of a deduction
of the force of repulsion by means of a metaphysical unlocking of the (physical)
36The impossibility of actio in distans cannot be proven. In Tra¨ume (AA II, 351–352)
this negative aspect of knowledge is mentioned explicitly. This proof strategy plays a
significant role in KrV in the context of the polemical employment of reason.
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experience of impenetrability. This “empirical deduction” (inner analysis
of an external fact) suffices as a deduction, but of equal importance is the
fact that this deduction also demonstrates the dynamic relation between
repulsion and attraction. At the beginning of the second section of Negative
Gro¨ßen (AA II, 179) this relation was indicated as the relation between
negative magnitudes, but with this empirical deduction Kant now has an
argumentative basis with which to conceive of the relation between both
forces as a real opposition. Both forces are of a similar nature and can
therefore assume a state of rest when they are in real opposition to each
other (as was also discussed at the beginning of the second section of Negative
Gro¨ßen).
4.5 Conclusion: fundamental relations
Kant has offered a very short and precise description and explanation of
real opposition. Because it is concise, and particularly because it derives its
meaning from a metaphysical context, this conception can be used in a variety
of philosophical areas. In all of these areas the basic, or fundamental relations
are structured in accordance with the pattern of real opposition. Even the
relation between attraction and repulsion is evaluated in accordance with this
pattern. Once the force of attraction has been described and explained, there
has to be a real and opposite force (given the pattern of real opposition),
even though this real opposite is lacking the explanation that equals the
mathematical formulation of attraction. The metaphysical explanation of
(inner) experience fills this explanatory gap, and it also highlights importance
of metaphysics in Kant’s approach of philosophy.
Kant’s initial stance towards metaphysics is one of ambivalence; he has
reservations regarding its possibilities, but at the same time he acknowledges
the need for renewal. His own attempts at renewal are rationalistically
oriented but these do not lead to an one-sidedly mathematical approach of
philosophy. Particularly his treatment of the concepts of negative magnitude
and real repugnance illustrate how it is possible for mathematics to be of
use to metaphysics.
Kant’s interpretation of metaphysics revolves around the conception of
force. He subsequently links this metaphysics of force to the more traditional
substance ontology in which “force” indicates the special relation between
substance and accident. The workings of the human faculty of knowledge are
also viewed to be actions of force in this context; as a result, the study of the
principles of human knowledge can also be considered a part of metaphysics.
Because a strictly logical elaboration of metaphysics in this sense would
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involve certain limitations, Kant also reserves a role for experience within the
sphere of metaphysics. This was of great importance, in that it gave rise to
a (metaphysical) theory of action, as well as to the formulation of problems
regarding causality and synthesis. This subsequently makes it possible to
metaphysically thematize and explain not only logical but also real relations.
It is however essential to explicitly highlight the mutual relation between
experience on the one hand, and understanding/reason on the other hand.
This eventually occurs, by means of Gegenden, in KrV.
Within metaphysics, as interpreted in the aforementioned sense, a num-
ber of fundamental oppositions apply. These fundamental oppositions, or
relations, are fundamental relations, and the appeal to a force always plays a
significant role within each of the relations. The appeal to a force represents
the limit in terms of what is (either rationally or empirically) cognizable.
Beyond this limit lies the domain of irrationality, inconceivability, or igno-
rance.37
Parallel to the ontological opposition between being and non-being, Kant
presents the opposition between positive and negative truths. The epistemo-
logical principle that applies to these truths (the principle of identity) applies
as a dual principle and is based on the principle of contradiction (logical
repugnance). In terms of determination, a truth expresses the state of balance
between the position and the exclusion (of predicates). A characteristic aspect
of real repugnance is the fact that the opposition is in principle possible as a
state of balance (between opposing parts, although in actuality this state
is not required). On this real level, attraction and repulsion are viewed as
fundamental relations, or fundamental forces.38
As we saw before, in deducing the force of repulsion Kant appealed to an
analysis of experience. As a consequence this force cannot automatically be
held as a fundamental force. However, in the metaphysical explanation of an
experience, the experience itself is not questioned. The experience of repulsion
is founding, but cannot be founded by further (rational) argument. As such
the experience that is metaphysically made explicit is of a fundamental
character, and is comparable to the fundamental force. Kant draws a similar
conclusion towards the end of the Negative Gro¨ßen with regards to real
repugnance.39
37These are privative negations indicating the defects of knowledge, cf. Tra¨ume, AA II,
322/25–27, 323/6, 327/16, 358/32 and AA VIII, 139n.
38Attraction is explicitly referred to in this way in Beweisgrund (AA II, 137–138) and
Tra¨ume (AA II, 371). As to “fundamental forces” cf. Heimsoeth, Studien zur Philosophie
Immanuel Kants II . . . , 143–150.
39Cf. Neuer Lehrbegriff, AA II, 20/16; Negative Gro¨ßen, AA II, 178/20–22, 203/1–10;
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The fundamental relations are thematized against the background of
a conception of God, in view of which the real relations are (identical)
determinations or (repugnant) consequences of God. Later on, in KrV, the
metaphysical question is asked how such (repugnant) relations are possible.
The consequence of the answer to this question is that the conception of God
in KrV acquires the status of an ideal.
To paraphrase the famous phrase in Tra¨ume (AA II, 367/21–368/2),
the task of metaphysics is as yet limited to the study of the limitations of
human reason. In this regard the acknowledgement of fundamental relations
is a provisional milestone, even though the metaphysical way of thinking in
terms of fundamental relations offers a limited explanation. Ultimately this
is predicated on the distinction between “being” and “thinking”, as Kant
articulates it in a critical discussion with Crusius, and as is still mentioned
in KrV.
An important advantage of this distinction is that the possibility of free
action is not ruled out a priori. On the contrary, as briefly indicated at the
beginning of this chapter, in the regression of consecutive grounds the first
(necessary) ground is to be found in the exercise of free will (whether or
not that of God). At this stage in Kant’s development this limited claim to
metaphysical knowledge is already directly related to the field of practical
philosophy, as was illustrated in the dialogue featured in the Nova diluci-
datio. This is also illustrated in the “metaphysical dream”40 in which the
fundamental relations are transposed to the domain of practical philosophy.
Building on the distinction between the faculty of knowledge and feeling
(Deutlichkeit, AA II, 299), Kant, after a brief remark about the relation be-
tween particular and universal human reason, makes an attempt in Tra¨ume41
to understand the relation between “Eigenheit” and “Gemeinnu¨tzigkeit” as
a “conflict between two forces”. Based on this, one can understand how
personal will depends on universal will. Kant describes the moral feeling
as “diese in uns empfundene No¨tigung unseres Willens zur Einstimmung
mit dem allgemeinen Willen”. Kant illustrates this by means of an explicit
comparison to Newton’s gravity (AA II, 335). As a result systematic relations
(actions) on a practical level (i.e. within the domain of free will) also appear
to be attractive and repugnant.42 The relation between practical philosophy
Tra¨ume, AA II, 322/25–27, 323/29. 335/15, 358/18, 370/11–12 and 371/7–11; MAN, AA
IV, 513.
40Cf. Kant’s letter to Mendelssohn, april 8, 1766 (AA X, 69–73).
41AA II, 334–337. Cf. ook Beobachtungen, AA II, 215–219 and Holzhey, Kants Er-
fahrungsbegriff . . . , 193–196.
42Kant refers to Newton, but relies on Rousseau, cf. Josef Schmucker, Die Urspru¨nge
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and metaphysics, which Saner succinctly referred to with the term “political
thought”, might reside in the fact that the relations in both areas are the
same even though the things to which they apply are different.
It is as yet unclear how the relation between metaphysics and practical
philosophy should exactly be understood.43 Questions about the critical status
of practical philosophy and the primacy of theoretical and practical philosophy
aside, it can be said that in both domains actions are understood based on
the same opposite fundamental relations. Both in nature and on a practical
level the relations of attraction and repugnance provide the fundamental
pattern. On a logical level the same applies to the relation between identity
and contradiction. In these areas the most feasible explanation is given with
reference to a force, so that each of these areas can be said to have its
own metaphysics: metaphysics as the study of the principles of knowledge,
metaphysics of nature, and practical metaphysics.
In conclusion it can be stated that the study of the meanings of repug-
nance has shed light on a system of typically metaphysical subjects in Kant’s
earlier work, in which the specific relation between metaphysics and practical
philosophy is implied. Further study on the subject of repugnance (with
special attention to “relation”, “force”,“synthesis”, and experience) in the
Dissertation and KrV will serve as a central guideline for a more detailed
determination of the effect of the critical development on the relation between
metaphysics and practical philosophy. Not only can this contribute to a sys-
tematic interpretation of KrV, it can also explain the typically metaphysical
tenor and background of Kant’s philosophy.
der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflexionen, Meisenheim am Glan:
Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1961, (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Band XXIII),
161–173.
43Cf. Willem Perreijn, Kants ethiek tussen a priori en ervaring, Tilburg: Tilburg Univer-
sity Press, 1993, (dissertation Tilburg 1993), 48–63, and 186–207.

Chapter 5
The Dissertation of 1770
5.1 The dissertation of 1770
In the present chapter we will examine our topic of real repugnance in the
context of Kant’s Dissertation of 1770 which was written in four months
time to obtain the position of professor of logic and metaphysics at the
university of Ko¨nigsberg. The Dissertation was the last work that was
published by Kant before the publication of KrV eleven years later. This fact,
as well as the philosophical content of the Dissertation have posed serious
problems to readers of Kant’s work who want to determine the position of
the Dissertation in Kant’s philosophical development. On the one hand, the
Dissertation contains the doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time in a
form that clearly anticipates the Transcendental Aesthetic of KrV. Yet, on
the other hand, the Dissertation presents the doctrine of the usus intellectus
realis which definitely points in an uncritical direction.
As regards the position of the Dissertation in Kant’s philosophical Ent-
wicklungsgeschichte there are three interrelated issues at stake: what is the
importance of the antinomy for Kant’s development; in what way is the
antinomy related to the subjectivity of space and time (and to the tran-
scendental deduction); and to what extent does the Dissertation reflect
Kant’s philosophical standpoint anno 1770? I do not intend to answer these
questions in extenso, for it is not my aim to settle the matter of Kant’s
Entwicklungsgeschichte with respect to these issues.1 I will merely give brief
1Synoptic overviews and discussion of the Forschungslage on this point are offered by
Kreimendahl, Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , chapter II and by Baumanns, Kants Philosophie
der Erkenntnis . . . , chapter I. Much earlier Tonelli emphasized the point of the separation
between sensibility and understanding which is relevant with respect to the subjectivity of
space and time (cf. Giorgio Tonelli, ‘Die Umwa¨lzung von 1769 bei Kant’, Kant-Studien, 54
(1963), 369–375).
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information on the issues of the antinomy and the subjectivity of space and
time which are relevant to the Dissertation and to real repugnance. In the
context of sectio I (about the notion of the world in general) attention wil
be drawn to the antinomy. The subjectivity of space and time is an issue
in sectio III about the priciples of the form of the sensible world. Some
of the results from these sectiones will turn out to be relevant for Kant’s
methodological considerations in sectio V.2
The contents of the Dissertation do not necessarily reflect Kant’s philo-
sophical position at the time.3 It was written on the specific occasion of his
new academic position and it had to meet the requirement for his inaugura-
tion. On the other hand, it does contain the doctrine of the subjectivity of
space and time which is a significant element in Kant’s critical metaphysics.
Since this doctrine represents “the great light of 1769”4 the Dissertation
does represent Kant’s current philosophical views in this particular respect.
This typical feature of the Dissertation is relevant in relation to the
question about the importance of the antinomy for Kant’s philosophical
development. Although the composition of KrV may suggest something
different, the antinomy and antinomical thought constitute some of the most
original stages in Kant’s philosophical development. A remarkable amount of
reflections, which, according to Adickes, date back to the year 1769, indicate
that Kant constructed antinomies. According to R3976 the antinomy is even
a necessary result of a subjective law of reason:
Es ist nach dem subiectiven Gesetz der Vernunft nothwendig,
eine erste handlung anzunehmen, wodurch das u¨brige alles folge;
es ist aber eben so wohl nothwendig, einen Grund u¨berhaupt von
ieder handlung und also kein erstes anzunehmen. (R3976)
Although such explicit references to the antinomy do not occur in the
Dissertation, there are several implicit indications of antinomical thought
(e.g. in §1; the notion of dissensus; the first antinomy in §25).
2The Dissertation consists of 30 sections (§1–30) which are almost equally distributed
over five sectiones (I–V). Sectio V, containing §23–30, is quite extended in comparison
with the previous sectiones. The sections in sectio IV are comparatively short.
3Josef Schmucker, ‘Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der Inauguraldissertation
von 1770’, in: Akten des 4. internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Volume I, Mainz, 1974, 263–
282, 264–269 and Kreimendahl, Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 216, 224–225.
4R5037: “Das Jahr 69 gab mir großes Licht”. Cf. Josef Schmucker, ‘Was entzu¨ndete in
Kant das große Licht von 1769?’ Archiv fu¨r Geschichte der Philosophie, 58 (1976), 393–434,
393 and Kreimendahl, Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 195–196.
5Baumanns, Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis . . . , 46.
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Thus, the Dissertation does not represent an unequivocally independent
stage in Kant’s development. It contains the new doctrine of space and time
explicitly, although the issue that had been bothering Kant shortly before
(antinomy) is only present in an implicit manner. Moreover, the Dissertation
shows signs of philosophical “delay”, as Kreimendahl calls it.6
Apart from the historical question about the position of the Dissertation
in Kant’s œuvre the development of the antinomy and the introduction of
the subjectivity of space and time are also philosophically relevant insofar as
both issues are interrelated or even interdependent. From a systematic point
of view the theory of space and time as presented in the Dissertation (and
later on in KrV) offers a solution to the antinomy. Kreimendahl argues that
Kant’s discovery of the antinomy in the late 1760’s (presumably motivated by
reading Hume’s Treatise) caused him to develop a solution in the form of the
new theory of space and time in 1769.7 He also argues that, notwithstanding
the apparent absence of this systematic relation between both issues in
the Dissertation, the antinomy is the real topic of the Dissertation. Others
oppose the claim that the antinomy (in the sense of KrV) existed at all at
this moment, and maintain that the antinomy in its mature form could only
be conceived after the subjectivity of space and time had been discovered.
Considering the fact that there is no explicit reference in the Dissertation
to the systematic relation between the antinomy and the new theory of space
and time we will not elaborate on this point, nor on the question of Humean
influence. However, if we bear in mind the importance that Kant himself8
attached to the antinomy we will address the antinomy, or antinomical
thought in the Dissertation, as far as it is related to real opposition (see §5.4
below).
5.2 Logical opposition in the Dissertation
If Kant had used any Latin equivalent of the notion of real repugnancy
in the Dissertation he would have offered a direct starting point for our
investigation. Unfortunately, terms such as repugnantia realis, or oppositio
realis are absent. In the absence of such direct indications we must ask
whether there are any indirect clues indicating the presence of something like
real opposition in the Dissertation. Presumably, the notions of reluctantia
and repugnantia in §1 of the Dissertation are somehow related to our topic,
6Cf. “Progressive und retardierende Momente in der Dissertation” in: Kreimendahl,
Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 224–232.
7Kreimendahl, Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 5.
8Cf. his letter to Garve (1798) in AA XII, 257.
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but in accordance with the pattern offered in Negative Gro¨ßen we will start
by looking for its counterpart, sc. logical opposition.
Logical opposition is mentioned in the general sense of contradiction9 and
it also occurs in the more specific context of the principle of contradiction.10
This principle plays a significant part in Kant’s discussion of the second
species of subreptic axioms in the methodological and final sectio of the
Dissertation. This second class of subreptic axioms is discussed in §28 and it
contains an axiom affecting the cognition of quantity, and an axiom affecting
the cognition of qualities in general. He notes that the latter axiom arises
from the conversion of the principle of contradiction, which in this case is
presented as Quicquid simul est ac non est, est impossibile. Changing subject
and predicate in this principle yields the subreptic axiom which states that
omne impossibile simul est ac non est, s. involvit contradictionem (and also:
Quicquid est impossibile, sibi contradicit). In this case sensitive cognition
(involvere contradictionem) predicates something generally about an object of
reason (omne impossibile) and consequently, a concept of the intellect relating
to the possibile or impossibile is subjected to the conditions of sensitive
cognition (sc. relations of time).11 The conversion in itself does not constitute
a subreption; it merely specifies the conditions under which something is
sensitively cognisable. The subreption arises if these (subjective) conditions of
sensitive cognition are mistaken for general, intellectual cognition of objects
(§25). In terms of §4 one could say that in case of this subreption the
subjective conditions of knowledge of things as they appear are mistaken for
intellectual knowledge of things as they are, or even that they are mistaken
for the objective grounds of things as they are.
Kant’s general formula of this second species of subreptic axioms in
§26 (AA II, 413/24–26) may help to clarify his analysis of the principle
of contradiction in §28. This formula states that the sensitive condition of
knowledge is regarded as the condition of the possibility of the object. A
concept of the understanding, which in this case relates to the (im)possibile,
cannot be subjected to conditions of sensitive cognition in a general way.
Understanding only notices an impossibility when a contradiction occurs. If
it does not occur, i.e. if this condition is not satisfied, understanding cannot
make a judgement about impossibility. Thus formulated these restraints
9Cf. contradictio §1, n2 (AA II, 388/25); §28 (AA II, 416/18, 26, 29, 37); and also
repugnantia §28 (AA II, 416/32).
10Cf. principium contradictionis, §5 (AA II, 393/21); §14 (AA II, 401/14; 402/5); §23
(AA 411/3–4); §28 (AA II, 416/11).
11Cf. Dissertation §25 for an explication about the interrelations between subject–
predicate and concept of understanding–condition of sensitive cognition.
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are (subjective) conditions of judgements. However, if these conditions of
judgements are treated as objective, the absence of a contradiction is mistaken
for the objective possibility of something. As a result we would end up with yet
another principle: Quicquid non involvit contradictionem, ideo sit possibile.12
Kant’s example towards the end of §28 of this kind of argumentation
is very informative because it is perfectly in line with his earlier remarks
regarding forces and qualitates occultae. Moreover this example echoes the
observations, doubts and questions that had been made seven years earlier
in the final section of Negative Gro¨ßen. In his example (§28) Kant refers
to the invention of forces by minds inclined to chimaera. Absque obstaculo
repugnantiae, i.e. in the absence of contradiction, they invent forces at
pleasure.13 Since a force is a relation between something (substance A) and
something else (accidens B) its very possibility does not rest on the identity
of cause and caused or substance and accident. Its impossibility, therefore,
does not solely depend on contradiction either14, and the absence of such
contradiction, does not prove its possibility, like architectonic minds would
have it. A force cannot be accepted as possibile, unless it has been given in
experience.
12This is not the conversion of the principle of contradiction, but rather its negative
formulation. Thus Kant has presented three seemingly identical principles involving con-
tradiction:
1. Quicquid simul est ac non est, est impossibile. (principle of contradiction);
2. Omne impossibile simul est ac non est, s. involvit contradictionem. (conversion of
1);
3. Quicquid non involvit contradictionem, ideo sit possibile. (internal negation of 1).
Kant’s point is that these three are not equivalent and that they cannot be reduced to
one formula. On the contrary, if they are not properly distinguished, it is impossible to
recognise subreptions. The following principle, derived from 2 by internal negation, would
complete the list:
4. Omne possibile non involvit contradictionem (internal negation of 2).
13Repugnantia in this case means “contradiction”. According to Pimpinella, however,
this occurrence of repugnantia represents a case of Realrepugnanz, cf. Pietro Pimpinella,
‘Reluctantia subiectiva und repugnantia obiectiva in der Inauguraldissertation Kants’,
Aufkla¨rung , 5 (1990), 57–79, 75. This claim is not substantiated, and it is incompatible
with his claim on the same page that there is an analogy between Realrepugnanz and
reluctantia subjectiva. Regarding the invention of forces in relation to contradiction and
experience cf. KrV B347, and §6.6 below.
14In Negative Gro¨ßen this point was made more explicitly, when Kant insisted on the
fact that the logical relation between ground and effect was based on the rule of indentity,
whereas the real relation between ground and effect could not be understood in the same
manner.
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Contradiction and the principle of contradiction play a significant role in
Kant’s discussion of this specific subreptic axiom, which is only a part of more
general methodological considerations in the final sectio of the Dissertation
(§23–30). The main methodological prescription is presented in §24: one must
take care not to let principles of sensitive cognition transgress their limits
and affect what is intellectual. Although this entire final sectio is supposed to
present the methodology for metaphysics, Kant had devoted the major part
of §1 to similar methodological considerations. Apparently, it was necessary
to add a methodological comment as soon as he had presented the central
notion of his study. In our next section we will examine this methodological
comment from §1, especially because it contains the references to reluctantia
subjectiva and repugnantia objectiva.
5.3 Reluctantia subiectiva and repugnantia obiectiva
As has been noted, there are no explicit references to real repugnancy in the
Dissertation. Also the explicit philosophical doubts regarding cause and effect
Kant had expressed in Negative Gro¨ßen in the context of real repugnancy are
not mentioned in the Dissertation. This is not surprising. Kant pursued other
objectives in his Dissertation and although the context of real repugnancy
recurs in its methodological sectio an explicit reference is absent, presumably
since an adequate response to the doubts regarding cause and effect is still
lacking.
The notion itself may be absent, the issue of real repugnancy has not
entirely disappeared. I will argue that it is present in Kant’s discussion of
the relation between the sensitive and intellectual (and rational) faculty of
cognition, especially in his discussion of the case of discord between both
faculties (reluctantia subjectiva, Nichtu¨bereinstimmung). Again, the context
of this case is the methodological exposition in §1. So logical opposition as
well as a typical case of real repugnancy are discussed in a methodological
context.15
Contrary to the general description of an important part of methodology
in §23, i.e. contagium sensitivae cognitionis cum intellectuali, the main
methodological consideration of §1 seems to be suggesting just the opposite:
a conclusion on the part of sensitive cognition must not be mistaken for
intellectual knowledge.16 The general description in §24 on its turn seems to be
15With respect to the significance of Kant’s methodological considerations cf. Hinske,
Kants Weg . . . , 119–123; and Pimpinella, ‘Reluctantia subiectiva . . . ’, 60–61.
16As regards the translation of the phrase from §23 the English translators of the
Dissertation note that “Kant must mean: nempe intellectualis cognitionis cum sensitiva
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in line with the methodological considerations in §1. Against the background
of §1, however, a contagium sensitivae cognitionis cum intellectuali occurs in
an expression like “the impossibility to represent”. In this case the intellectual
notion is linked to and is easily mixed up with something that can only be
determined in accordance with the conditions of sensitive cognition (intuitive
representation in concreto). Grier offers a way out of this confusion: “Kant’s
point seems to be that insofar as the conditions of the intellect and sensuality
are conflated, certain ‘hybrid’ principles are produced that presume to yield
knowledge about objects generally, without taking into account whether the
objects in question are being considered as phaenomena or noumena.”17
Kreimendahl points out that the description of infection as presented in §23
is also present in his lectures on logic.18 This consideration is presented as
an example of the method of metaphysics.
Despite the suggestion contained in the title of §1 (sc. De notione mundi
generatim) the notion of the world seems more like a by-product of the
definitions of “analysis” and “synthesis”. In case of a substantial composite
analysis does not come to an end until a simple part (simplex ) is reached.
Synthesis, on the other hand, does not come to an end until a whole (totum)
is reached which is not a part. The concept of the world is added as an
example of the notion “a whole which is not a part”. In the exposition
following these definitions Kant discusses analysis and synthesis in relation
to the two-fold genesis of concepts out of the nature of our mind.
Given the parts, one can either conceive the composition of these parts
by means of an abstract concept of understanding, or one can represent the
concept (of something composite) in concreto by means of a distinct intuition.
In the former case the composition is based on the synthetic nature of the
general concept (or idea of understanding). In the latter case the composition
is based on a genetic synthesis, i.e. on a successive addition of part to part,
which is only possible under the condition of time.19
Then Kant explains the notion of totum in greater detail. Whereas a
composite merely requires a multitude of parts, a whole (totum) requires
the totality of parts. However, synthesis in case of a totality can only be
carried out if it can be done in a finite period of time. The case of the infinite
contagium” (cf. Immanuel Kant. Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770 , 407nx).
17Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001, 60–61.
18Kreimendahl, Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 246, especially note 121.
19This concludes Kant’s presentation of conceptual synthesis (on the part of understand-
ing) and intuitive synthesis (on the part of the sensitive faculty of cognition). He also
presents a case of analysis.
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(infinitum), however, shows that the synthetic progression from its parts to
the whole has no limit. Since this synthetic progression cannot be completed
within a finite period of time the infinite cannot be represented in accordance
with the laws of intuitive cognition, i.e. represented under the condition
of time. Hence, it is impossible to represent the infinite in its totality in
accordance with the requirements of intuitive cognition.20
Once Kant has developed his argument along this line, the final method-
ological point he is trying to make is quite simple. It consists of a conclusion
and a warning. Kant’s conclusion in view of methodology is that abstract
ideas received from the understanding very often cannot be converted into
intuitions so as to be represented in concreto. Thus, the concept of the
infinite—by virtue of the nature of its origin—cannot be represented in con-
creto. However, if it is impossible to represent an object of pure reason21 in
accordance with the laws of intuition, it does not follow that this object itself
is impossible. Hence, the concept of the infinite should not be dismissed, sim-
ply because its concrete representation is impossible. The warning is aimed at
those who easily confuse what is impossibile to represent (irrepraesentabile)
with what is just impossibile (impossibile).
The mind’s inability to represent abstract ideas in concreto is also de-
scribed in terms of a subjective reluctance (reluctantia subiectiva), which
indicates an incongruity at a subjective level (i.e. the level of mental, cog-
nitive faculties). If one fails to acknowledge the subjective character of this
incongruity, one may easily be inclined to take the (subjective) limits of the
human mind for limits of the very essence of things. In that case a subjective
reluctance is mistaken for an objective inconsistency (repugnantia obiectiva).
The examples of reluctantia and repugnantia help Kant to introduce the
distinction between “subjective” and “objective” in his methodology which
will be useful in sectio V of the Dissertation.22
Notwithstanding the similarity between the notions of repugnantia obiec-
20The case of impossible analysis, on the other hand, is based on the notion of quantum
continuum: the regression from this whole to the parts has no limits either.
21Cf. obiectum rationis purae (AA II, 389/3). Presumably Kant has the quantum contin-
uum and the infinitum in mind.
22Because the ideas of space and time, as formal principles of the sensible world, are
characterised as “subjective conditions”, and because the form of the intelligible world
has an objective ground, the distinction between “subjective” and “objective” may seem
to correspond to the distinction between sensibility and understanding; anything that is
related to, or derived from sensibility is subjective and anything related to or derived from
understanding is objective. This is, however, not the case. In §30, for example, the laws of
intellectual knowledge are also counted as subjective conditions. In KrV we find the same
ambiguity.
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tiva and (real) repugnancy, these notions are not synonymous. In fact, in the
methodological context of §1 repugnantia obiectiva is the technical term for
logical opposition.23 Reluctantia subiectiva, on the other hand, indicates a
case of real opposition.24 “Subjective reluctance” is a quite specific descrip-
tion of the origin of the incongruity between what is unrepresentable and
what is impossibile. Kant also refers to this reluctance by the more general
term of dissensus (discord25) between the sensitive and intellectual faculty. I
will argue that in the Dissertation the issue of real repugnancy turns up again
in the form of dissensus. Not only does Kant’s discussion of dissensus show
remarkable similarities with his discussion of real repugnancy in Negative
Gro¨ßen, but dissensus also indicates a kind of relation and pattern that is
typical for real repugnancy.
Subjective reluctance, as a specific case of dissensus, is introduced in
the same way as real opposition in Negative Gro¨ßen. It is presented in close
connection with, but at the same time as something quite different from
logical opposition (repugnantia obiectiva). We cannot understand what this
reluctance is about, if we don’t understand its logical counterpart. Apart
from this superficial similarity there is a more systematic correspondence if
we focus on the meaning of dissensus itself.
Dissensus between the sensitive and intellectual faculties indicates the
incongruity or discord between what can be thought in accordance with
the laws of the intellect on the one hand, and what can be represented in
concreto in accordance with the laws of intuitive cognition on the other hand.
Surely, the nature of this discord is not logical. Both moments involved in
this relation are not logically opposed. They do not function in a mutually
exclusive, autonomous and contradictory way. On the contrary, the mind
may be incapable of representing abstract ideas, notwithstanding the fact
that it is aimed at doing so. If the mind itself intends to bridge the gap
between both faculties, what exactly is the nature of their interrelation?
Firstly, there is a relation between understanding and sensibility in the
sense that sensitive cognitions are subordinated to other sensitive cognitions
by the usus intellectus logicus in accordance with the principle of contra-
diction and the laws of logic (§5). Once Kant has mentioned this relation,
the remainder of §5 is devoted to the warning against mistaking sensitive
cognitions for intellectual cognitions once they have been subjected to the
logical operations of understanding. The logical operation, however, does
23Pimpinella, ‘Reluctantia subiectiva . . . ’, 73, 74-76.
24Pimpinella, ‘Reluctantia subiectiva . . . ’, 75.
25In the context of real repugnancy I prefer “discord” instead of the expression “lack of
accord”, which is the phrase adopted by the English translators of the Dissertation.
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not alter the origin of these cognitions, no matter how extensive this use
may have been. The logical use of understanding is a clear indication of an
interdependent relation between the faculties.
Secondly, the least one could say is that both faculties are related whenever
and insofar as a kind of cognition affects the opposed kind of cognition.26
Kant’s main example in this respect is the affection of the intellectual by
what is originally sensitive. Kant’s methodological efforts in sectio V offer
an analytic exposition of the systematic errors in this respect.27 However
erroneus a relation of this kind may be, the error as such is still something
in the same sense as the result of real opposition is something. An error is
not something impossibile, or a nihil negativum.
The least we may conclude from this is that both faculties are somehow
related, and that dissensus does not point to the exclusive separation of both.
Kant’s warnings in view of this relation are directed against not distinguishing
them properly, and against assuming a wrong interrelation. Section V as well
as the elenctic purpose of the concepts of understanding propagated in §9
are meant to preserve the distinction.
Apart from the logical use of understanding, and the erroneus ways
both faculties may be linked, there are other, rather indirect indications
of relations between both faculties. The human mind is not capable of
intellectual intuition since our intuition is bound to a formal ground (space
and time) which is the condition of sensitive cognition (§10). In the beginning
of §10, however, symbolic cognition is presented as an alternative to provide
for our lack of intellectual intuition. Presumably, symbolic cognition is capable
of bridging the gap between sensitivity and understanding. In addition,
there is a link between understanding and experience (§5), in so far as
experience is reflective cognition resulting from the comparison of appearances
in accordance with the logical use of understanding.
The evidence presented in support of the claim that dissensus has a
structure that corresponds to the pattern of real repugnancy may be cir-
cumstantial, but at least it shows the problematic interrelation between the
elements involved in this discord. It points out the intuitive shortcomings of
26The case of according cognitive faculties seems to be suggested in §1 of the Dissertation:
concrete representation of something abstract and intellectual.
27The methodological considerations in §1, however, are less systematic and they seem
to be directed against errors which are due to inattention. The example of “impossible
representation” could also be interpreted to represent a case of the affection of sensitive
cognition by something that originates in the intellect. The notion of impossibility is
abstracted from laws inherent in the mind and it is based on the nature of understanding
(§8). To apply this notion, which is intended for objective application, to a subjective state
of mind.
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our mind in case of abstract notions and it demonstrates that there is a sys-
temacy upon which erroneus interrelations are based. Most importantly, this
problematic character also seems to stress the need to adjust both cognitive
functions so as to guarantee optimal results: no errors, real knowledge. This
need for adjustment, as well as the reality of errors, together with the link
between reluctantia subiectiva and logical opposition, and the link between
sensitive cognition and the logical use of understanding, are characteristic of
dissensus, but, what is more, each point shows similarity to the characteristics
of real opposition. Finally, dissensus and real opposition share to a large
extent the same context; in the Dissertation the context is methodological28,
which is also the context of considerable parts of the discussion in Negative
Gro¨ßen.
In the discussion about Kant’s philosophical development the question
about the position of the Dissertation in his œuvre plays a significant role.
In this respect the question about the function of the antinomy at this stage
of his thought is of special importance. In the following section we will not,
however, try to answer this question, but we will rather limit the discussion
to the relation between dissensus and the antinomy, because this relation is
what’s relevant in the context of real opposition.
5.4 Dissensus and antinomy
According to Hinske dissensus represents the second stage in the develop-
ment of what he calls the Antinomienproblematik.29 This stage is followed
by the critical stage; the antinomy within reason itself. Hinske offers the
following decriptions of dissensus: “ ‘dissensus’ bestimmter Gesetze”, and
“ ‘dissensus’ [. . . ], das Neben- und Gegeneinander von verschiedenen Gesetzen
der menschlichen Erkenntnis”.30 Hinske’s suggestion that discord relates to
cognitive laws may have been prompted by the need to present this stage as
the immediate precursor of the critical conception of the antinomy. Thus, dis-
sensus only seems to be a rudimentary stage of the antinomy in the sense of
a “Widerstreit der Gesetze (Antinomie) der Vernunft” (KrV, B434). Kant’s
own formulation in the Dissertation, however, points out that dissensus
relates to the cognitive faculties (“dissensus inter facultatem sensitivam et
intelectualem”, AA II, 389).
28The distinction according to §8 belongs to a propaedeutic science which is preparatory
to metaphysics proper (cf. also §23).
29Hinske, Kants Weg . . . , 109.
30Hinske, Kants Weg . . . , 108, 109.
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Schmucker criticised Hinske for comparing dissensus with the antinomy.31
According to him, dissensus is not another word for the antinomy, but it is
rather the fundamental principle for the solution of the antinomy.32 This is
also Kreimendahl’s view on dissensus and in addition to the claim that discord
is the key to the solution, he maintains that the antinomy is even the guiding
theme (“Leitthema”) of the Dissertation.33 Problems in connection with
the latter claim are discussed in great detail.34 Nevertheless, Kreimendahl’s
far-reaching, and sometimes controversial35 conclusions are focussed on the
discussion about the antinomy. It is important not to be distracted in this
direction. We should rather focus our attention on dissensus itself if we
want to examine its precise nature. This examination must not primarily
be carried out in the somewhat anachronistic context of the antinomy, but
rather from a methodological perspective on the matter. Not only is this
perspective typical for the way Kant himself deals with the matter in the
Dissertation, but it also offers a view that makes it possible to include KrV in
the discussion without running the risk of falling into the trap of anachronism.
It is not the antinomy that links the Dissertation directly to KrV, but it is
the methodological context that connects both works, as well as it connects
both issues.
From the previous section it is clear that the framework of the Disser-
tation is methodological; beginning (§1) and end (§23–30) contain major
methodological considerations. Dissensus is introduced in this methodolog-
ical context, since it constitutes the basic element of the methodology as
it is presented in this final part of the Dissertation (§23–30).36 The main
31Schmucker, ‘Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung . . . ’, 275. Nevertheless,
Schmucker does not pay attention to Hinske’s insufficient reading of dissensus. Else-
where he referred to dissensus as “Nichtu¨bereinstimmung zwischen der intellektuellen
und der sinnlichen Erkenntnis”(cf. Schmucker, ‘Was entzu¨ndete in Kant . . . ’, 425, italics
WvdK).
32Schmucker, ‘Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung . . . ’, 275 Cf. Kreimendahl,
Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 233.
33Kreimendahl, Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 241.
34Kreimendahl, Kant—Der Durchbruch . . . , 241–252.
35Kreimendahl’s starting point, a Humean impuls of the development of the antinomy
problem, as well as the claim is strongly criticised by Brandt in his review of Kreimendahl’s
study (cf. Reinhard Brandt, ‘Review of: L. Kreimendahl, Kant—der Durchbruch von 1769,
Ko¨ln 1990’, Kant-Studien, 83 (1992), 100–111).
36Especially §23 is interesting in relation to Hinske’s claim that dissensus does not
show the typical feature of the critical antinomy; a conflict (of laws) within reason itself.
Hinske may be right, but on the other hand Kant shows remarkable awareness of the
self-referential problem that is involved in his project of gaining knowledge (methodology)
about knowledge (metaphysics). Towards the end of §23 this project is depicted as a
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methodological warning—not to let the principles of sensitive cognition affect
the intellectual—is based on this dissensus and on the recognition that this
discord must be upheld in order to be able to make progress in the field
of metaphysics. Neglect of this discord entails error, a vitium subreptionis,
or even an axioma subreptionis. The subsequent analysis of the different
subreptic axioms offers various descriptions of the basic mistake: mistak-
ing the condition of sensitive cognition for something objective (§25) and
intellectual (§24n); mistaking the subjective conditions of judgement for
objective conditions (§28); the transfer of subjective conditions to objects.
The suggestion in these descriptions that subjective conditions are conditions
of sensibility by definition is not right. In the final §30 Kant points out that
there are also mistakes that are based on subjective grounds in the sense of
the laws of intellectual cognition. On this account, Kant’s methodology is
aimed at observing the incongruity of both faculties in order not to mistake
something subjective for something that is objective.
The corresponding methodological considerations in KrV are presented
in the introduction of the Transcendental Dialectic. Dialectic, according to
Kant, must not be understood in the sense of the organon of logic (as the
ancients would have it, KrV, B85-86), in which case it would be a logic of
illusion, but rather as a critique of dialectical illusion. This illusion is the
result of some kind of error, and since neither the senses by themselves, nor
understanding by itself can fall into error, it follows
daß der Irrtum nur durch den unbemerkten Einfluß der Sinnlich-
keit auf den Verstand bewirkt werde, wodurch es geschieht, daß
die subjektiven Gru¨nde des Urteils mit den objektiven zusammen-
fließen, und diese von ihrer Bestimmung abweichend machen37
In dialectical illusion something subjective is presented under the guise of
“Sisyphean task”. In the title of KrV this awareness is reflected in a more promising and
self-assured way.
37KrV, B350. Kant continues this text by comparing this influence and the resulting
deviation to forces exerted on a body in motion. This body would continue to move in a
straight line and in the same direction, but if influenced in another direction it would
be directed into curvilinear motion. In line with this analogy erroneus judgement is the
diagonal between the two lines representing the actions of sensibility and understanding.
The graphic representation of this comparison shows judgement J, determined by
objective grounds o to move into direction o, but influenced by subjective grounds s
which cause it to be deviated into an erroneus direction e (at moment t, to be precise).
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something objective.38 This conflation of subjective and objective grounds is
the distinctive mark of illusion in several other of Kant’s statements about
the issue.39
There is a great similarity between these statements, the terms in which
they are put on the one hand, and the phrases in the Dissertation about
errors in metaphysics on the other.40 What is more, in both cases error
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There would be no deviation if s would point in the same direction as o, or if it would
point in the opposite direction of o (in the latter case the length of s should not exceed the
length of o).
38Again there seems to be a suggestion that “subjective” refers to the influence from
the part of sensibility only, but some subjective grounds are to be found in reason:
“Der transzendentale Schein dagegen ho¨rt gleichwohl nicht auf [. . . ]. Die Ursache davon
ist diese: daß in unserer Vernunft (subjektiv als ein menschliches Erkenntnisvermo¨gens
betrachtet) Grundregeln und Maximen ihres Gebrauch liegen . . . gehalten wird.” (KrV,
B353). There also seem to be two accounts of illusion: illusion as the result of the conflation
of the subjective and the objective, and illusion as the result of sensibility’s influence on
understanding. Grier offers an evaluation of two different accounts of the source of illusion:
sensibility on the one hand, and reason on the other (Grier, Kant’s Doctrine . . . , 102–117).
She argues that both accounts do not have to be incompatible. I think the account of
illusion in terms of mistaking the subjective for something objective offers an approach
that makes it possible to discuss (in the context of the Transcendental Dialectic) both
kinds of illusion.
39For example: “Denn wir haben es mit einer natu¨rlichen und unvermeidlichen Illusion
zu tun, die selbst auf subjektiven Grundsa¨tzen beruht, und sie als objektive unterschiebt”
(KrV, B354); “Man kann alle Schein darin setzen: daß die subjektive Bedingung des
Denkens vor die Erkenntnis des Objekts gehalten wird.” (KrB, A396); and in the context
of the apagogic method of proof Kant maintains that this method is only permitted in
those sciences “wo es unmo¨glich ist, das Subjektive unserer Vorstellungen dem Objektiven,
na¨mlich der Erkentnis desjenigen, was am Gegenstande ist, unterzuschieben.” (KrV, B819).
Several times this conflation is also referred to as “(transzendentale) Subreption” (KrV,
A402, B537, 611, 647, 820).
40Cf. for example “Irrtum” (error, AA II, 389/1); “Blendwerk” (KrV, B88, A384, B352,
354, 739) and praestigiae (AA II, 412/5 and 413/20); “subjektive Gru¨nde des Urteils”
(KrV, B350) and subjectivas iudicandi conditiones (AA II, 416/29–30). The similarity
between Kant’s position in the Dissertation and the introduction of the Transcendental
Dialectic is also mentioned in Grier, Kant’s Doctrine . . . , 105–106.
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is presented as something that is natural, inevitable, and inherent to the
employment of our cognitive faculties.41 In both cases Kant’s efforts are
aimed at identifying the source of error in order to prevent error.42 In both
cases Kant’s analysis of illusion and error depends on a systematic analysis
of judgement and an evaluation of argumentative structures. In this method-
ological context the critical antinomy enters on the scene in full regalia. It is
this context that connects dissensus and the antinomy. The latter is only
one variety of the several kinds of error that, according to Kant, are based
on the neglect of dissensus, and on the syllogistic structure of dialectical
reasoning (KrV, B377–389).
In chapter 7 and 8 we will examine the relation between real opposition and
the antinomy more closely. The neglect of dissensus entails a situation that
is comparable to antinomical thought. Although real repugnance is not men-
tioned expressis verbis, the issue turns up in a methodological context in the
discussion of this dissensus between conflicting faculties of knowledge. Real
opposition provides a viable pattern to establish and maintain the relation
of dissensus between both opposing faculties. As long as this dissensus is
preserved, the functioning of either faculty is protected against interference
by the functioning of the opposing faculty.
41It is not just bunglers and sophists (KrV, B354), and the incautious (AA II, 389/9)
that are prone to errors and illusory knowledge. Kant recognises in the Dissertation (AA
II, 411/24) and in KrV (B354) that some illusions have a systematic basis in our mind.
42Cf. “sollicite cavendum esse, ne . . . ” (AA II, 411/29); “alle Warnungen der Kritik”
(KrV, B352); “und zugleich zu verhu¨ten” (KrV, B354) and “das Negative der Unterweisung”
(KrV, B737).

Chapter 6
Real Repugnance in KrV
6.1 Real repugnance in KrV?
In 1763 Kant concluded his essay on negative magnitude announcing to
publish at some time in the future his thoughts and considerations regarding
the nature of our knowledge of cause and effect. With the publication of
KrV this promise is fulfilled. Yet, there is very little prima facie evidence in
KrV that real repugnance was a moving force in its development. It seems
strange that KrV, being an answer to questions raised in Negative Gro¨ßen,
contains very few and seemingly casual references to real repugnance. The
emphatic introduction in Negative Gro¨ßen contrasts sharply with the fact
that it is barely mentioned in KrV. The reason for this is twofold. The nature
of the problem seems to have altered in the course of Kant’s philosophical
endeavours; real opposition has become part of a larger, more encompassing
project, which caused it to disappear from view. Secondly, as has been shown
in the previous chapter, real opposition in so far as it remained present at
all, sc. as a pattern, played a role in a methodological context. Despite the
unmistakingly methodological tenor of KrV Kant’s main line of thought seems
to be concerned with the exposition of his philosophical point. Therefore,
references to real opposition and allusions to the pattern in a methodological
context may have been pushed into the background. If the argument in
the previous chapter is followed, and the significance of real opposition is
mainly methodological, it is not surprising that the notion and issue of real
opposition are not put in the forefront of KrV. Let us first have a look at
the extent to which the notion of real opposition as well as closely related
expressions are still present in KrV.
The notion Realrepugnanz itself does not occur in KrV. We find, however,
the German synonym “reale Widerstreit” at B329, and “kein Widerstreit
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zwischen den Realita¨ten” at B320, and we find a related phrase like “realiter
entgegengesetzt” (B291n). At B288 the question that Kant had formulated
towards the end of Negative Gro¨ßen1 is repeated in practically the same
words:
Wie [. . . ] darum, weil etwas ist, etwas anderes sein mu¨sse, mithin
wie etwas u¨berhaupt Ursache sein ko¨nne [. . . ], la¨ßt sich gar nicht
aus bloßen Begriffen einsehen.”
The latter part of this phrase also echoes the points Kant had made back in
1763:
Ich lasse mich auch durch die Wo¨rter Ursache und Wirkung,
Kraft und Handlung nicht abspeisen. (AA II, 203)
Reference to concepts, such as effect, cause, force and action, are of little
avail, if we want an explanation of the relation between a concept and a
thing (sc. an effect, or a state that is caused by something else). In terms of
KrV: we always need an exhibition of the objective reality of a pure concept
of understanding (e.g. “cause” at KrV, B288).
Apparently, there are just a few random references to real opposition. If
we have a closer look at the exact position of the references in KrV we find
that two of them (sc. “realiter entgegengesetzt” and the question “Wie darum,
weil etwas ist . . . ”) occur in the “General note on the system of the principles”
which is entirely a B-addition (B288–294). The other references mentioned
occur in the final part of the Transcendental Analytic consisting of the
chapter on phaenomena and noumena and the appendix on the amphiboly.2
The following list shows in which part of KrV explicit references to real
opposition and closely related phrases occur:
• “Allgemeine Anmerkung zum System . . . ” (KrV, B288–294):
1Cf. AA II, 202: “wie soll ich es verstehen, daß, weil Etwas ist, etwas anders sei?”. At
AA II, 203 Kant also asked: “wie darum, weil etwas ist, etwas anders aufgehoben werde”.
2Malter and Hess discuss the question to what part of KrV exactly the appendix belongs.
For Malter it is an indispensable, conclusive part of the Transcendental Analytic that
deals with the employment of understanding. It is not the transition to the Transcendental
Dialectic (Rudolf Malter, ‘Reflexionsbegriffe. Gedanken zu einer schwierigen Begriffsgattung
und zu einem unausgefu¨hrten Lehrstu¨ck der Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, Philosophia
naturalis, 19 (1982), 125–150, 126–127, 131–132). Hess maintains that the appendix,
located on the breaking point between Analytic and Dialectic, is of crucial importance to
the Transcendental Logic as a whole (Heinz-Ju¨rgen Hess, ‘Zu Kants Leibniz-Kritik in der
‘Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe’ ’, in: Ingeborg Heidemann and Wolfgang Ritzel, editors,
Beitra¨ge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781–1981, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter,
1981, 200–232, 205).
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– “Wie [. . . ] darum, weil etwas ist [. . . ]” (KrV, B288);
– “nicht realiter [. . . ] entgegengesetzt” (KrV, B290n).
• “Von der Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe . . . ” (KrV, B316–324):
– “zwischen den Realita¨ten kein Widerstreit” (KrV, B320).
• “Anmerkung zur Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe” (KrV, B324–346):
– “der reale Widerstreit” (KrV, B329);
– “den [Widerstreit] des wechselseitigen Abbruchs [. . . ], da ein
Realgrund die Wirkung des andern aufhebt” (KrV, B330);
– “Bedingungen [. . . ], die einen Widerstreit, der freilich nicht logisch
ist, na¨mlich aus lauter Positivem ein Zero = 0 mo¨glich machen”
(KrV, B338).
• “Tafel des Nichts” (KrV, B346–349):
– “nihil privativum” (KrV, B347);
– “nihil negativum” (KrV, B348).
The nihil privativum/negativum mentioned in the “Tafel des Nichts” are
listed here to indicate that the context of occurrences of real opposition in
KrV is the same as in Negative Gro¨ßen: the specification of different kinds
of nothing. The nihil privativum in the table conforms to the traditional
use of the term, sc. “Mangel (defectus, absentia)” (AA II, 177–178). It is
not a reference to real opposition and the nihil privativum, repraesentabile
(AA II, 172). The nihil negativum does correspond to the nihil negativum
irrepraesentabile in Negative Gro¨ßen (AA, II, 171). In the final two sections
of this chapter we will see in what sense the issue of real opposition is still
present in this Kantian view on nothing.
From this list it is clear that real opposition did not disappear from
Kant’s view altogether. It even reappears in the B-addition called “General
Note . . . ”. Apparently, references to real opposition were considered to be
the appropriate means to formulate an additional, concluding section about
the system of the principles. It does not occur expressis verbis in the section
on phaenomena and noumena, which was thoroughly revised in the B-edition,
but it occupies a prominent position in the sections on the amphiboly and the
remainder of the Transcendental Analytic (sc. KrV, B336–349). Presumably,
real opposition is particularly relevant once the Analytic is coming to an end,
and the Transcendental Dialectic is about to begin. Its significance relates to
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the transition from true, objectively real knowledge to illusory knowledge of
reason.
Following Kant’s approach in Negative Gro¨ßen we will make the ex-
amination of logical opposition and the principle of contradiction in the
next section to be the benchmark for our assessment of real repugnance
in KrV. As we shall see in the course of this examination the questions in
relation to real opposition are dealt with in the larger, critical context of the
synthetic nature of knowledge. Once this context has been presented in the
sections on synthesis and original synthesis, we will discuss the occurrences
of real repugnance in KrV and try to ascertain the critical significance of
real opposition.
6.2 Logical opposition
In line with Kant’s discussion in Negative Gro¨ßen logical opposition in
KrV is presented, together with the principle of contradiction, against the
background of a theory of judgement.3 Non-contradiction is a universal,
albeit negative condition of all our judgements (i.e. if the content of our
knowledge expressed in judgements is not taken into consideration). A self-
contradictory judgement is null and void (KrV, B189). Correspondingly, the
principle of contradiction is a universal, albeit negative criterion of truth (of
knowledge in general, i.e. irrespective of the content). Knowledge containing
a contradiction is completely cancelled and invalidated.4
The principle also allows of a positive use: it is the universal and com-
3Logical opposition refers to a relation between predicate and thing, or to a relation
between judgements. According to Michael Wolff each case can be reduced to the other. His
discussion of logical opposition is based on Kant’s description of the analytical opposition
(KrV, B532), and it is presented in close connection to dialectical and real opposition, cf.
Wolff, Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Eine Studie . . . , 40–44.
4“Der Satz nun: Keinem Dinge kommt ein Pra¨dikat zu, welches ihm widerspricht, heißt
der Satz der Widerspruch und ist ein [. . . ] negatives Kriterium aller Wahrheit, geho¨rt aber
auch darum bloß in die Logik, weil er von Erkenntnissen bloß als Erkenntnissen u¨berhaupt
unangesehen ihres Inhalts gilt, und sagt: daß der Widerspruch sie ga¨nzlich vernichte und
aufhebe.” (KrV, B190). Notwithstanding this close link between principle and concept
of contradiction, the fact remains that contradiction qua principle is different form the
concept. Wolff offers an evaluation of the concept, and inevitably has to deal with the
principle as well. His analysis that the formulation of the principle itself is an analytical
judgement, is relevant with respect to understanding the Kantian conceptions of formal
and transcendental logic, cf. Michael Wolff, ‘Der Begriff des Widerspruchs in der ‘Kritik der
reinen Vernunft’. Zum Verha¨ltnis von formaler und transzendentaler Logik’, in: Burkhard
Tuschling, editor, Probleme der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, Berlin/New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 1984, (Klaus Reich zum 75.Geburtstag/Kant-Tagung Marburg 1981), 178–202.
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pletely sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge. The truth of any analytic
judgement, whether it be affirmative or negative, can always be adequately
known in accordance with the principle of contradiction (KrV, B190). The
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements determines the appli-
cability of contradiction as a criterion of truth in the proces of generating
knowledge. This distinction was important enough to be the subject of a
separate section in the introduction of KrV (B10–14).
The distinction is based on two possible relations between subject term
and predicate term in a judgement. Either the predicate term is contained
in the subject term, or it is not. In the former case the judgement is analytic
(e.g. “Alle Ko¨rper sind ausgedehnt.”), in the latter it is synthetic, like in
“Alle Ko¨rper sind schwer.” (or the judgement is false).5
On account of the analytic relation between subject term and predicate
term, the principle of contradiction suffices to acknowledge the truth or
falsehood of an analytic judgement, or, as Kant puts it in the introduction,
to become conscious of the necessity of the judgement.6 Application of the
principle of contradiction is not exclusively restricted to analytic judgement.
A synthetic judgement can also be discerned in accordance with the principle
of contradiction, but only if another synthetic judgement is presupposed
(KrV, B14); its synthetic nature remains unaccounted for.7 Hence, there
must be something else (than non-contradiction) to account for the relation
between subject term and predicate term in a synthetic judgement. In many
cases it is experience that performs this role:
Es ist also die Erfahrung, worauf sich die Mo¨glichkeit der Syn-
thesis des Pra¨dikats der Schwere mit dem Begriffe des Ko¨rpers
gru¨ndet, weil beide [. . . ] als Teil eines Ganzen, na¨mlich der Er-
fahrung [. . . ] zu einander [. . . ] geho¨ren. (KrV, B12)
This appeal to experience, however, does not answer two important questions.
What constitutes experience as a synthetic whole, and how do we account for
synthetic judgements, which have no source in experience? All our knowledge
may begin with experience, but it is not true that it all arises out of experience
(KrV, B1). Some of our knowledge is independent of experience, and in that
case it is a priori knowledge (KrV, B2–3). Especially synthetic knowledge a
priori cannot be accounted for with the help of an appeal to experience, nor
5KrV, B10–11.
6Cf. KrV, B12. At KrV, B532 the opposition between contradictories is called an
“analytical opposition”.
7In other words, the principle of contradiction applies to analytic relations between
terms contained in different synthetic judgements.
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with the help of the principle of contradiction. The general problem of KrV,
therefore, is the question “How are a priori synthetic judgements possible?”
(KrV, B19), which is in fact a more technical way of putting the second
question just mentioned. We will come back to both of these questions later
on.
Taking logical opposition, and the function of the principle of contradic-
tion as our guidelines, we can see that the specific issue of real opposition
has been replaced by the more general question about a priori synthesis.8
Kant’s intentions in KrV are still unmistakingly rational, since necessity and
universality (KrV, B3) are the conditions for answering this question. This
claim to rationality is also reflected in the title of KrV. Yet, Kant knows
how to avert the danger of a hyper rational or rationalistic perspective by
limiting the applicability of the principle of contradiction, and by allowing
experience a significant role in the genesis of knowledge. The uncritical use
of contradiction Kant had condemned in §28 of the Dissertation (see §5.2
above) is repeated at KrV, B270 and B347.9
The shift in attention from real opposition to synthesis, in relation to a
methodological significance of the pattern of real repugnance are the subjects
of the next two sections.
6.3 Synthesis
The initial question “How am I to understand the fact that, because something
is, something else is?” (AA II, 202) has turned into a specific instance of the
question about the possibility of a priori synthesis (of judgements). Likewise,
questions into the synthetic nature of concepts such as “cause” and “effect”
have become part of this philosophical project. An answer to the question
of a priori synthesis in KrV has to take into account the fact that in the
Dissertation Kant had proclaimed the separation between sensibility and
8As has been noted Realrepugnanz has disappeared. Verknu¨pfung, Verbindung,
Beziehung, Verha¨ltniß (AA II, 202–203) have been replaced by Synthesis, and sometimes
Verbindung (KrV, B129) and Verha¨ltniß (KrV, B193).
9Cf. KrV, B270: “eine besondere Grundkraft unseres Gemu¨ts [. . . ] oder [. . . ] ein
Vermo¨gen desselben, mit andern Menschen in Gemeinschaft der Gedanken zu stehen [. . . ]
das sind Begriffe, deren Mo¨glichkeit ganz grundlos ist, weil sie nicht auf Erfahrung und
deren bekannte Gesetze gegru¨ndet werden kann, und ohne sie eine willku¨rliche Gedan-
kenverbindung ist, die, ob sie zwar keinen Widerspruch entha¨lt, doch kein Anspruch auf
objektive Realita¨t [. . . ] machen kann.” KrV, B347: “ein Begriff ohne Gegenstand, wie die
Noumena [. . . ] oder wie etwa gewisse neue Grundkra¨fte, die man sich denkt, zwar ohne
Widerspruch, aber auch ohne Beispiel aus der Erfahrung gedacht werden”. Cf. also B624n
where the same point is made in the context of God’s existence.
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understanding. Therefore, he has to identify a synthetic moment in either
faculty. The matter is complicated since Kant also assigns (like he had done
before) a significant role to experience, which represents, in terms of KrV,
the synthetic a posteriori. This position of experience is easier to understand
once we have addressed the synthetic aspects of both faculties. In line with
the construction of KrV we will first turn to the Transcendental Aesthetic
to identify a priori synthesis on the part of sensibility.
It is important to make a reservation with respect to the use of “syn-
thesis” in the context of sensibility. Synthesis is primarily an act of the
understanding.10 Synthesis, in the sense of a connection of a manifold, always
requires the spontaneity of understanding (KrV, B102–103). Sensibility, as
the receptive faculty of our mind, cannot be spontaneous by definition. Yet,
according to the conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic11 space and time
also represent two factors that are required for the solution of the synthetic
a priori.
The specific characteristics of space (and time) are presented in what
Kant calls a metaphysical exposition (KrV, B38–40) and a transcendental
exposition (KrV, B40–41). The former is a clear representation of what
belongs to a concept insofar as it contains what is exhibited by the concept,
as something that is given a priori (KrV, B38). The transcendental exposition
is the explanation of a concept as a principle from which the possibility of a
priori synthetic knowledge can be understood (KrV, B40).
In the metaphysical exposition Kant argues 1) that space is not an
empirical concept, but a pure representation since outer appearance and
experience are dependent on a representation of space (and it is not the
representation that is dependent on outer appearance); 2) that space is a
necessary, a priori representation which is the condition of the possibility
of (outer) appearances (since it is not possible to represent the absence of
space, whereas we can quite well think of the absence of objects in space);
3) that space is not a concept, but a single, pure intuition (if we speak of
several spaces, we mean that they are parts of the same unique space; space
is essentially one); and 4) that space is an infinite given magnitude.
In the transcendental exposition Kant maintains that the possibility of
10Cf. KrV, B102–103, 130; and Hansgeorg Hoppe, Synthesis bei Kant. Das Problem der
Verbindung von Vorstellungen und ihrer Gegenstandsbeziehung in der ’Kritik der reinen
Vernunft’, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983, (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie,
Band 19), 113–114. Because synthesis is something intellectual Kaulbach limited his
exposition of the idea of synthesis to understanding and transcendental apperception, cf
Kaulbach, ‘Die Entwicklung des Synthesis . . . ’, 84–89.
11KrV, B73, which is the last page of a B-addition (sc. B66–73) to the Aesthetic.
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geometry, as synthetic a priori knowledge, is only intelligible if we assume
that it is conditioned by the a priori subjective form of intuition (i.e. space).
On the basis of both these expositions Kant concludes that space is not a
property of things in themselves, nor does it represent things in their mutual
relations, but space is nothing but the subjective condition of sensibility,
that necessarily and a priori precedes all intuitions of objects.
This answers Kant’s questions from the beginning of the metaphysical
exposition, which are quite similar to those raised in the Dissertation.12 As
regards time Kant follows a similar line of argument and he comes to similar
conclusions (KrV, B46–53).
The a priori synthetic moment with respect to sensibility is located in
the synthetic nature of space and time as subjective, a priori conditions.
Kant has also repeatedly stressed that space and time are pure intuitions,
not concepts. Still, he also refers to the concepts of space and time several
times.13 The intuitive character is relevant as long as the question about the
(a priori) origin of knowledge and experience is considered. Kant’s references
to the concepts of space and time are made in the context of a critique of
knowledge. The concepts of space and time belong to the (meta-) language
that is needed to present the results of Kant’s analysis of the origins of
knowledge, i.e they are part of the vocabulary of transcendental philosophy
or transcendental knowledge.14
What about synthesis in case of understanding? Compared to the negative
characterisation of understanding in the Dissertation (§3) Kant presents a
clearly positive notion of understanding in KrV.15 It is the power, or the
capacity of producing representations, it is the spontaneity of knowledge (KrV,
12KrV, B37–38: “Was sind nun Raum und Zeit? Sind es wirkliche Wesen? Sind es zwar
nur Bestimmungen, oder auch Verha¨ltnisse der Dinge, aber doch solche, welche ihnen
auch an sich zukommen wu¨rden, wenn sie auch nicht angeschaut wu¨rden, oder sind sie
solche, die nur an der Form der Anschauung allein haften, und mithin an der subjektiven
Beschaffenheit unseres Gemu¨ts”. The latter option (“oder sind sie . . . ?”) is rhetorical.
Compare this to the refutation of options in §15 of the Dissertation: “Spatium non est
aliquid obiectivi et realis, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio; sed subiectivum et
ideale et a natura mentis stabili lege proficiscens veluti schema omnia omnino externe
sensa sibi coordinandi.”
13Cf. KrV, B38: “wollen wir zuerst den Begriff des Raumes ero¨rtern”; B39: “der allgemeine
Begriff von Ra¨umen u¨berhaupt”; B120: “die Begriffe des Raumes und der Zeit” (cf. also
B121–122); B195 “der Raum und die Zeit, so rein diese Begriffe auch von allem Empirischen
sind”.
14Cf. KrV, B80–81.
15Although the negative explanation of understanding is still mentioned at B92: “Der
Verstand wurde oben bloß negativ erkla¨rt: durch ein nichtsinnliches Erkenntnisvermo¨gen.
[. . . ] Also ist der Verstand kein Vermo¨gen der Anschauung.”
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B75). Understanding is capable of gaining knowledge of objects by means
of concepts (whereas sensibility is only capable of receiving representations,
KrV, B74–75). Concepts are grounded in the spontaneity of thought, and,
more specifically, in functions. A function is “the unity of the act of bringing
various representations under one common representation”.16 This bringing
together of various elements (which are not related analytically) is the specific
feature of understanding and is called “synthesis”. As has been noted above,
synthesis in this sense is something that belongs primarily to understanding.
Synthesis is provided by the understanding but the object of synthesis is
supplied by sensibility: sc. a spatio-temporal manifold of sensibility:
die Spontaneita¨t unseres Denkens erfordert es, daß dieses Man-
nigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise durchgegangen, aufgenommen,
und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu machen.
Diese Handlung nenne ich Synthesis.17
On the basis of the various logical functions of understanding in judge-
ments (KrV, B95–101) Kant deduces specific forms of synthesis. This synthesis
is pure, insofar as the underlying manifold is given a priori, as in case of
the spatio-temporal manifold. Pure synthesis of the a priori manifold does
not yield knowledge. The understanding requires that this synthesis is given
unity, is brought to concepts (B104–105). This unity is based on the same
function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgement
(in accordance with the logical function of understanding), but in this case
understanding supplies contents to its judgements because the manifold of
intuition is represented as a synthetic, conceptual unity. The representations
of this synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition are called “pure concepts of
the understanding” (KrV, B105) or “all originally pure concepts of synthesis”
(KrV, B106).
The synthetic aspects in both faculties have been identified: space and
time are a priori intuitions, pure and subjective forms of sensibility; the pure
concepts of understanding provide conceptual unity to a manifold stemming
from sensibility. Not surprisingly, “cause” and “effect” are such concepts.
16KrV, B93. This spontaneous, and active aspect is characteristic of understanding.
Correspondingly, the proper function of understanding, sc. thinking, is described in terms
of Handlung (action, act), cf. also KrV, B81: “Begriffe [. . . ] als Handlungen des reinen
Denkens”. Thinking itself is also described in terms of “action”: “Das Denken ist die
Handlung, gegebene Anschauung auf einen Gegenstand zu beziehen.” (B304). Gerhardt
merely deals with actio/Handlung in the context of causality and with respect to moral
actions. He does not address the actions of our cognitive faculties at a transcendental level.
Cf. Gerhardt, ‘Handlung als Verha¨ltnis . . . ’.
17KrV, B102. Cf. KrV, B145.
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The initial questions in Negative Gro¨ßen about the explanatory value of
these concepts have been answered now that these concepts turn out to be
both pure, and a priori as well as synthetic in nature.
6.4 Original synthesis
Once Kant has identified the synthetic moments in both faculties, he has ipso
facto made the beginning of the answer to another question that has remained
implicit. Is there any interrelation or connection between both faculties
once their separation has been proclaimed? Due to the (logically) negative
characterisation of understanding in the Dissertation (§3) it was difficult to
see how both could be connected again. Kant made a suggestion when he
maintained that the usus intellectus logicus also applies to sensitive knowledge,
but the result of this usus always remains sensitive and the representation of
things as they are, is always intellectual.18 According to KrV, however, the
synthetic moments of both faculties seem to be connected as matter and form
(of experience). Yet, the precise interrelation between the “zwei Sta¨mme der
menschlichen Erkenntnis” (KrV, B29), or the “zwei Grundquellen des Gemu¨ts”
(KrV, B74) remains unknown to us (KrV, B29). A systematic account of
their interrelation, however, is offered in the transcendental deduction of the
pure concepts of understanding.
Kant may have identified synthetic moments in either faculty, sc. space,
time and concepts, it is not clear what all of these moments have in common.
He tries to clarify this point, by means of a critical explanation of the
possibility of synthesis, or combination in general (Verbindung u¨berhaupt,
B129). This explanation marks the beginning of section 2 of the deduction of
pure concepts at KrV, B129. “Synthesis” is the general title that indicates the
combination of a manifold. Combination is always an act of understanding.19
The combination of the manifold of intuition cannot come to us through
the senses, because this manifold originates in the receptivity of our mind.
Combination, on the other hand, is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of
representation.20 Even the combination of a conceptual manifold requires
some act of understanding that precedes any conceptual unity. At this point
(KrV, B131) Kant will not allow the reader to make a mistake here. The
18Moreover, the separation did not affect the possibility of acces to real knowledge, which
was warranted by the usus intellectus realis.
19Verstandeshandlung or Actus seiner [sc. des Subjekts] Selbstta¨tigkeit. (KrV, B130).
20“ein Actus der Spontaneita¨t der Vorstellungsskraft” (KrV, B130). Cf. B104: “Die
Synthesis u¨berhaupt ist [. . . ] die bloße Wirkung der Einbildungskraft, einer blinden,
obgleich unentbehrlichen Funktion der Seele”.
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category of unity, presented at B106, is not what grounds combination,
and it is not this synthesis in general he is looking for. Any category itself
presupposes unity, because it is grounded upon a logical function in which
combination is already thought. So there must be an a priori unity preceding
any concept of combination:
Die Kategorie setzt also schon Verbindung voraus. Also mu¨ssen
wir diese Einheit [. . . ] noch ho¨her suchen, na¨mlich in demjenigen,
was selbst den Grund der Einheit verschiedener Begriffe in Urtei-
len, mithin der Mo¨glichkeit des Verstandes [. . . ] entha¨lt. (KrV,
B131)
The title of the next section of KrV gives a clear indication of the nature
of this a priori ground of unity: the original-synthetic unity of apperception
(KrV, B131, 135, 136). The representation of this unity is introduced right
at the beginning of the section, sc. “Das: Ich denke”. The unity is also
referred to as “original combination” (KrV, B133), “pure apperception”,
“original apperception” (all KrV, B132), or “self-consciousness generating the
representation I think”21.
Kant stresses the specific quality of this original-synthetic unity by adding
the qualification that this unity is the “transcendental unity of consciousness”
(KrV, B132). Descriptions of this unity belong to the meta-language of
transcendental philosophy. The original unity is from a different, sc. a higher
order than all other kinds of unity that are dependent on it. It is not just some
higher order that this unity belongs to; it is the highest, the supreme point
from which all employment of understanding, all logic and transcendental
philosophy is dependent (in the literal sense of the word):
so ist die synthetisch Einheit der Apperzeption der ho¨chste Punkt,
an dem man allen Verstandesgebrauch, selbst die ganze Logik,
und, nach ihr, die Tranzendentalphilosophie, heften muß, ja dieses
Vermo¨gen ist der Verstand selbst (KrV, B134n).
So synthesis at the level of sensibility, as well as synthesis on the part of
understanding presuppose a unity or synthesis from which they are dependent,
and without which their a priori synthetic nature cannot be understood.
21KrV, B132. Cf. B137: “den Actus der Apperzeption, Ich denke” Later on, in the
Transcendental Dialectic (KrV, B399, 406), the “I think” is referred to as a concept, or
rather judgement, which should be counted as belonging to the table of categories, since it
is the “vehicle of all concepts in general and therefore also of the transcendental concepts”
and which serves to introduce all our thoughts as belonging to consciousness.
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This grounding unity is the original-synthetic unity of apperception, and it
is precisely the point where both faculties meet.22
Locating this common ground of both faculties, however, is merely the
result of yet another issue that Kant intended to solve by means of the
transcendental deduction, an issue that had been bothering him for a long
time23: the relation between representation and object. In fact, it is the first
issue that is addressed in the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic (KrV,
B33) and it is a recurrent theme throughout the Transcendental Analytic.24
Kant’s critical terms to refer to this relation are objektive Gu¨ltigkeit, and
objektive Realita¨t.25 The relation between representation and object, or
between knowledge and object, is objectively valid, if the relation is necessary
and universal (i.e. a priori). Kant criticises Hume and Locke for an empirical
derivation (induction) of universality.26 Hume’s approach can only show what
different cases of repeated association have in common but this derivation
would only yield comparative universality, and subjective necessity. In his
alternative approach to the problem, sc. a transcendental deduction, Kant
intends to expose the a priori foundations of experience. In what way does the
deduction prove objective validity, or, in other words, in what way does the
original unity of apperception warrant the objective validity of knowledge?
As to the relation between object and representation Kant maintains
that all thought must directly or indirectly relate to intuitions (KrV, B33).
However, there is only one case in which there is an immediate link between
the two: when the faculty of representation is affected by an object, the
result of which is called Empfindung (sensation; KrV, B34). An intuition that
is related to an object through sensation is called empirische Anschauung
(empirical intuition). The (undetermined) object of empirical intuition is
called Erscheinung (appearance)(KrV, B34).
At KrV, B124 the same question is approached from another, more
systematic perspective: there are only two cases in which (synthetic) repre-
sentation and object are necessarily related. Either the object must make
22Baumanns, Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis . . . , chapter ii (especially 75–78).
23Cf. his letter to Marcus Herz (february 21st, 1772): “auf welchem Grunde beruhet die
Beziehung desienigen, was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand?” (AA X,
130).
24At KrV, B124 Kant presents the argument about the connection between synthetic
representation and object in practically the same arrangement as he did in the letter to
Herz just mentioned.
25Cf. KrV, B44, 51–53, 117, 141, 194, 197, A128. Bxxvin mentions the equivalence of
objektive Gu¨ltigkeit and reale Mo¨glichkeit.
26Hume is mentioned in this context at KrV, B5 and 127; Locke at B127 and 882. The
problem of empirical derivation is also discussed at KrV, A111.
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the representation possible (in which case the relation is empirical), or the
representation must make the object possible.27 In the latter case
ist doch die Vorstellung in Ansehung des Gegenstandes alsdenn
a priori bestimmend, wenn durch sie allein es mo¨glich ist, etwas
als einen Gegenstand zu erkennen. (KrV, B125)
This general description of the a priori determinant relation also applies to
the specific conditions of knowledge: intuition (through which the object is
given) and concept (through which it is thought). Knowledge is objectively
valid if the object of knowledge conforms to the a priori conditions of intuition
and concept (i.e. space, time, pure concepts) and to the a priori condition of
experience as a systematice whole (i.e. original apperception). This makes
Kant’s solution to the question of objective validity quite simple; a relation is
objectively valid insofar as the object has been made possible by the (a priori)
representation. According to this approach there is nothing in the object
that has not been determined by the representation. Likewise, the objective
validity of the categories, which is the main concern of the deduction, is
based on the fact that they are a priori determinant of experience. They are
objectively valid insofar as they make experience possible: “Die Mo¨glichkeit
der Erfahrung ist also das, was allen unsern Erkenntnissen a priori objektive
Realita¨t gibt.” (KrV, B195).28
Now that we have identified the synthetic moments (pertaining to sensi-
bility, understanding, original apperception), in connection to the question of
objective validity, we are able to address the questions that were asked in §6.2:
27Cf. also KrV, B166: “Nun sind nur zwei Wege, auf welchen eine nothwendige U¨berein-
stimmung der Erfahrung mit den Begriffen von ihren Gegensta¨nden gedacht werden kann:
entweder die Erfahrung macht diese Begriffe, oder diese Begriffe machen die Erfahrung
mo¨glich.”
28In the B-introduction at Bxvi and Bxxiin Kant labelled his methodology in this respect
a Uma¨nderung der Denkart. “Hitherto”, he states at Bxv “it has been assumed that all
our knowledge must conform to objects.” Kant, however, makes the assumption that
objects must conform to our knowledge, which is precisely the assumption underlying
his analysis of objective validity. This Uma¨nderung is commonly referred to as Kant’s
Copernican Revolution in metaphysics, since Copernicus proposed a similar change of
perspective in cosmology. Kant himself mentions “revolution” twice, but only in relation to
geometry/mathematics and natural science (KrV, Bxvi, xxii). He wants his own proposal
to be regarded as a hypothesis (KrV, Bxxiin). The analogy between the Copernican and
Kantian change in perspective is complicated. Copernicus assumed a sun-centered planetary
system instead of a firmament revolving around the earth. The result of Kant’s hypothesis,
however, is antropocentric; objects must be directed towards us. “Revolution” in this
context is ambiguous, since the revolutiones in the title of Copernicus’s De revolutionibus
orbium coelestium refer to planetary orbits.
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“What constitutes experience as a synthetic whole?” and “How are a priori
synthetic judgements possible?”. On the basis of synthesis and objective
validity it is not difficult to understand Kant’s own phrases in answer to
these questions. Kant concluded the B-deduction with a “Brief outline of
this deduction” (KrV, B168–169), which is brief indeed, as compared to
the “Summary representation . . . ” that concluded the A-deduction (KrV,
A128–130). The brief outline states that the deduction is
die Darstellung der reinen Verstandesbegriffe [. . . ] als Prinzipien
der Mo¨glichkeit der Erfahrung, dieser aber, als Bestimmung der
Erscheinungen in Raum und Zeit u¨berhaupt,—endlich dieser aus
dem Prinzip der urspru¨nglichen synthetischen Einheit der Ap-
perzeption, als der Form des Verstandes in Beziehung auf Raum
und Zeit, als urspru¨ngliche Formen der Sinnlichkeit.
Sometimes one may want to blame Kant for too much wordiness, but in this
outline there is no redundancy at all. It contains the necessary and sufficient
notions to define the deduction. The concentrated style and accumulation
of technical terms make it sound like a spell. It is necessary to follow the
grammatical structure of this staccato formula very closely in order to
decipher its meaning. This main structure is: “The deduction is the exposition
of A as B, of B as C, and finally of C as D”. Thus, the deduction is
the exposition of the pure concepts of understanding as principles of the
possibility of experience. Subsequently, it is the exposition of (the possibility
of) experience29 as the determination of appearances in space and time in
general. Finally, it is the exposition of this determination, following from
the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception, as the form
of understanding in relation to space and time (being the original forms of
sensibility).
Most importantly, the original synthetic unity is presented as the point
were the form of understanding is related to the forms of sensibility. In
the A-deduction this interrelation is also mentioned (“dieses Verha¨ltnis des
Verstandes zur Sinnlichkeit”, KrV, A128). After the separation of sensibility
and understanding in the Dissertation and the beginning of KrV, the tran-
scendental deduction has offered an account of the systematic connection
between both faculties. What had been separated before, has been linked
together again. This account itself, however, does not represent knowledge
29In Kemp Smith’s translation the first occurrence of dieser is taken to be referring to
Prinzipien: “the principles being here taken as the determination of appearances in space
and time in general”. Pure concepts as principles of experience are not the determination
of appearances; they are rather determinant with regard to experience.
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in the regular sense of the word; it is transcendental knowledge (KrV, B25,
80). It is by no means an objectively valid representation of something; “I
think” does not express self-knowledge.
The same elements, arranged in a sophisticated way, are used in the
formulation of the highest principle of all synthetic judgements (KrV, B193–
198). According to §6.2 experience grounded the possibility of the synthesis
between two concepts (subject and predicate) that were not analytically
related. In the section on the highest principle Kant maintains that a third
something30 is necessary to account for the synthesis of two concepts. This
third something is the possibility of experience. This possibility is based upon
the various kinds of a priori synthesis of a manifold (space, time, concept,
apperception). And thus:
Auf solche Weise sind synthetische Urteile a priori mo¨glich, wenn
wir die formalen Bedingungen der Anschauung a priori, die Syn-
thesis der Einbildungskraft, und die notwendige Einheit derselben
in einer transzendentalen Apperzeption, auf ein mo¨gliches Erfah-
rungserkenntnis u¨berhaupt beziehen (KrV, B197)
Thus we can say, Kant concludes this passage, that the conditions of the
possibility of experience in general are also conditions of the possibility of the
objects of experience, and therefore, they (the conditions of the possibility
of experience) have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgement.31
As a consequence of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements, i.e.
the possibility of experience, the critical conception of “thing” (Gegenstand,
Objekt, Sache) has become very specific. In the context of syntheticity and
experience the meaning of “thing” has been limited to “object of possible
experience”. The objective validity of our knowledge is warranted only for
objects that have been made possible by the a priori conditions of that very
same knowledge: sc. objects in the sense of “appearance”. These are objects
insofar as they have conformed to the constitution of our faculties (as a result
of Kant’s Uma¨nderung der Denkart). It makes sense, however, to allow for
other objects as well. This argument is presented in the B-introduction (KrV,
Bxxiv–xxx).
30Cf. KrV, B194: “so ist ein Drittes no¨tig”; cf. also “ein Drittes” (B177); “kein Drittes”
(B195); “das Dritte” (B315); “ein drittes [. . . ] Erkenntnis” (B760); “ein Drittes, na¨mlich
mo¨gliche Erfahrung” (B794).
31Cf. KrV, A111 and B799 for almost identical formulations. The quotation and Kant’s
conclusion are the explanation of the principle of all synthetic judgements: “ein jeder
Gegenstand steht unter den nothwendigen Bedingungen der synthetischen Einheit des
Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung in einer mo¨glichen Erfahrung.” (KrV, B197).
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In this part of the introduction Kant maintains that at first glance the
result of the Critique is merely negative: speculative reason cannot go beyond
the limits of sensibility, and its use is limited to the objects of experience.
Speculative reason also has the tendency to apply the principles beyond
the domain of sensibility, thereby stretching its limits and threatening the
(pure) practical employment of reason. If we are convinced that there is an
absolutely necessary practical use of reason, then Critique may well have a
positive value insofar as it removes all obstacles that stand in the way of the
latter employment of reason. Critique must protect practical reason from
speculative opposition. Bearing in mind Kant’s confession “Ich mußte also
das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen”(KrV, Bxxx),
his defense of practical reason may not come as a surprise. What is striking
though, is the fact that the nature of critique and the connection between
practical and speculative reason is described in the language of Negative
Gro¨ßen, i.e. the terminology of real opposition. Note such phrases as “ein
Hindernis aufheben”,32 “vernichten”, “wider Gegenwirkung sichern” and
“nicht in Widerspruch” in the following quotation:
Daher ist eine Kritik, welche die erstere [sc. speculativer Gebrauch
der Vernunft] einschra¨nkt, so fern zwar negativ, aber, indem sie
dadurch zugleich ein Hindernis, welches den letzteren Gebrauch
[sc. praktischer Gebrauch der Vernunft] einschra¨nkt, oder gar
zu vernichten droht, aufhebt, in der Tat von positivem und sehr
wichtigem Nutzen, so bald man u¨berzeugt wird, daß es einen
schlechterdings notwendigen praktischen Gebrauch (den mora-
lischen) der Vernunft gebe, in welchem sie sich unvermeidlich
u¨ber die Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit erweitert, dazu sie zwar von
der spekulativen keiner Beihu¨lfe bedarf, dennoch aber wider ihre
Gegenwirkung gesichert sein muß, um nicht in Widerspruch mit
sich selbst zu geraten. (KrV, Bxxv)
A critical relation between the speculative and the practical employment
of reason is a relation that is structured according to the pattern of real
opposition. This pattern rules out—by definition—the possibility of self-
contradiction. Critique must keep employment of both kinds of reason in
balance. Each has to be protected against influences from the other part.
Neither speculative, nor practical reason can prevail, for this would inevitably
32As to “Hindernis” cf. also MS, AA VI, 231 (introduction to Rechtslehre §D): “Der
Widerstand, der dem Hindernisse einer Wirkung entgegengesetzt wird, ist eine Befo¨rderung
dieser Wirkung und stimmt mit ihr zusammen.”
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result in a contradiction. The critical equilibrium, on the other hand, seems
to be a stable compound of something positive and negative.
It is in this context of critique, practical and speculative reason that Kant
invokes the twofold sense of “object”: namely as appearance and as thing
in itself (KrV, Bxxvii). Possible knowledge may be limited to objects as
appearances, this does not exclude the possibility that things in themselves
can be the object of our thought: “denken kann ich, was ich ich will, wenn
ich mir nur nicht selbst widerspreche”(KrV, Bxxvin). Objects as things in
themselves are the objects of the practical employment of reason.33 Kant’s
examples are freedom, God and the immortality of the soul (KrV, Bxxix–xxx).
Judging by Kant’s own terminology, real opposition seems to be reap-
pearing in the context of the twofold sense of “object”, the interdependence
of speculative and practical reason, and the nature of critique. In the next
section we will examine this point in greater detail. For now, it is important
to note that once the philosophical problem of the synthetic a priori (and
of real opposition) has been solved, real opposition turns up again in the
form of a pattern of thought that is used to understand, to structure, and
even to adjust different kinds of opposition that Kant is confronted with in
the course of developing his critical answer regarding the synthetic a priori.
Kant’s terminology may be circumstantial evidence in this respect, but there
are more indications pointing directly in this direction. When we look at the
steps that were taken in the present and previous section we can see that
there are two, or rather three points where real opposition functions as a
pattern of thought to structure opposed elements.
Firstly, in KrV sensibility and understanding are related in such a way
that they are not mutually exclusive, as would have been the case if they had
been related as contradictories. Each faculty functions in its own right, but
each is also dependent on the other. Neither faculty can function properly if
it is not related to the other. They are necessarily related:
Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe
sind blind. Daher ist es ebenso notwendig, seine Begriffe sinnlich
zu machen (d.i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung bei-
zufu¨gen), als, seine Anschauungen sich versta¨ndlich zu machen
(d.i. sie unter Begriffe zu bringen).34
33This explains why Kant mentioned the case of a representation making possible the
existence of an object by means of the will at KrV, B125.
34Cf. KrV, B75. Cf. also KrV, B314: “Verstand und Sinnlichkeit ko¨nnen bei uns nur in
Verbindung Gegensta¨nde bestimmen. Wenn wir zie trennen, so haben wir Anschauungen
ohne Begriffe, oder Begriffe ohne Anschauungen”.
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Secondly, they may be mutually dependent, but they remain separate
faculties. Their interconnection, qua connection, is of a different order. It is
the highest point, the original synthetic unity from which both are dependent.
This unity bears the marks of a real opposition. It is a unity made up of
two positive (“real”) moments that are opposed. They are not opposed as
contradictories, because the result of their opposition is not an impossibility,
but something real (sc. possible experience).
Thirdly, once it has been acknowledged that possible experience is the
proper domain of speculative reason critical reason has ipso facto determined
the proper field of practical reason. These different functions of reason are
related as negative magnitudes: they are real and opposed. Again, their
interrelation is arranged according to the pattern of real opposition. The
functioning of either kind of reason annihilates the proper functioning of the
other. Critique intends to prevent this annihilation. It is there to make sure
that either kind of employment can function properly without damaging the
proper function of the opposite kind of employment. Critique keeps them
balanced.
So the right employment of speculative reason is restricted to what is
possible within the limits of sensibility. The right employment of practical
reason only begins beyond these same limits. Practical reason must be
safeguarded against non-sensible aspirations form the part of speculative
reason. Speculative reason on the other hand, must be protected against non-
moral aspirations from the part of practical reason. This interrelation between
speculative and practical reason seems to be a fine example of the second rule
of real repugnance (cf. AA II, 177): “Allenthalben, wo ein positiver Grund ist
und die Folge ist gleichwohl Zero, da ist eine Realentgegensetzung”. There is
a positive ground, sc. the speculative pursuit of reason into the realm of the
super-sensible. There is also a negative, i.e. an opposite striving of practical
reason. Critique functions as a restraint to both kinds of employment. The
result of this restraint is a “balance of powers”, a state of affairs that is both
the foundation of metaphysics as a science, as well as the basis of a moral
philosophy that is not grafted onto experience.
The point of unity between sensibility and understanding (original syn-
thesis), as well as the critical interrelation between speculative and practical
reason show remarkable resemblances with real opposition. Real opposition
offers the pattern that is needed to structure the interrelation of opposite
and non-contradictory elements so as to yield a real effect.
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In §6.1 above we concluded that real opposition had not disappeared from
Kant’s view altogether. It occurs in the chapter about phaenomena and
noumena, in the appendix on the amphiboly and it even reappears in the
B-addition to the system of principles. Hence, explicit references to real
repugnancy only occur in the final stages of the Transcendental Analytic.
This remarkable situation will be the topic of the present section. What is
the significance of the occurrence and reappearance of real repugnancy at
this stage of KrV?
The B-text of the “General Note . . . ” (KrV, B288–294) consists of
four paragraphs. There are two short concluding paragraphs, the first of
which maintains that the note is noteworthy in view of both the refutation
of idealism and the limits of the possibility of self-knowledge. The final
paragraph consists of a conclusion about the principles of pure understanding
(sc. that they are nothing but the a priori principles of the possibility of
experience) that resembles the principle of synthetic judgements at KrV,
B197. The major part of the note is divided into two equally seized paragraphs
that have comparable opening words: “Es ist etwas sehr Bemerkungswu¨rdiges”
(KrV, B288), and “Noch merkwu¨rdiger aber ist” (KrV, B291). What is so
remarkable, or noteworthy?
In the first place it is remarkable that we always need an intuition to show
the objective reality of a pure concept of understanding. This means that
concepts alone never suffice to understand something about objects. How
something can be a cause, cannot be understood on the basis of concepts
only. In this context, as has been mentioned earlier in §6.1, Kant relies on
the example and terminology of real opposition.
Secondly, what is even more remarkable, we always need outer intuitions
to demonstrate the objective reality (KrV, B291). If we want to demonstrate
the objective reality of the concept of causality, we need an intuitive repre-
sentation of alteration. The intuition of the movement of a point in space
is a representation that would qualify for this purpose. The possibility of
alteration or change (i.e. the possibility of something being a cause) can
only be understood, if there is a corresponding intuition of alteration. Un-
derstanding alone can never comprehend the possibility of alteration. The
case of causality is only one example that is discussed in this paragraph.
Inherence and community, the other two categories from the class of Relation,
are also discussed. With reference to the latter category, Leibniz is criticised
for the fact that he only employed reason in his attempt to understand the
possibility of community. Community between substances, however, cannot
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be understood on the basis of their existence only. Understanding this com-
munity requires something more, and that is why, according to Kant, Leibniz
had to resort to divine mediating intervention. Kant himself invokes the
condition outer intuition: possible community of substances (as appearances)
can be conceived under the a priori condition of outer relations, i.e. under
the condition of outer intuition or representation in space.
Kant’s critique of Leibniz at this point (KrV, B293) explains why Kant’s
remarks in the “General Note . . . ” are “noteworthy” at all. Rationalistic
philosophers, perhaps even adherents of a critique of pure reason would
not expect sensible intuition to play a decisive role in this respect. What is
noteworthy for readers of KrV is the fact that the “General Note . . . ” seems
to be the first explicit text in KrV where the necessary relation between
concept and intuition is argued for. Prior to KrV, B288 there are several
instances where Kant mentions the relation and interdependency between
concept and intuition (e.g. KrV, B74–75). He does not, however, mention
supporting arguments so explicitly until the B-addition of the “General Note
. . . ”.35
Two other explicit references to real opposition occur in the third, and
closing chapter of the Transcendental Analytic: “Von dem Grunde der Un-
terscheidung aller Gegensta¨nde u¨berhaupt in phaenomena and noumena”,
more specifically in the appendix about the amphiboly and the note to the
amphiboly. The occurrence of opposition between realities at KrV, B320–321
needs to be quoted almost in its entirety, for it contains an important argu-
ment and it is instructing to see that Kant makes his point in the language
of Negative Gro¨ßen:
Wenn Realita¨t nur durch den reinen Verstand vorgestellt wird
(realitas noumenon), so la¨ßt sich zwischen den Realita¨ten kein
Widerstreit denken, d.i. ein solches Verha¨ltnis, da sie in einem
Subjekt verbunden einander ihre Folge aufheben, und 3− 3 = 0
sei. Dagegen kann das Reale in der Erscheinung (realitas phae-
nomenon) unter einander allerdings im Widerstreit sein, [. . . ]
wie zwei bewegende Kra¨fte in derselben geraden Linie, [. . . ] oder
auch ein Vergnu¨gen, was dem Schmerze die Waage ha¨lt.
Once Kant has started to mention real opposition, the example of opposed
35This is the claim of Brook & McRobert (cf. Andrew Brook and Jennifer McRobert,
‘Kant’s Attack on the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’, (1998) 〈URL: http:
//www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoBroo.htm〉). In their view, however, the “General
Note . . . ” only represents an “obscure anticipation” of the actual argument at KrV,
B320–321.
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forces, as well as the example of pleasure counterbalancing pain follows as a
matter of course. More importantly, this appeal to real opposition contains a
somewhat hidden argument. If reality is presented by pure understanding only,
real opposition would be unconceivable. The implicit assumption underlying
this statement is that real opposition must be conceivable. Apparently, the
“facticity” of real repugnancy cannot be neglected. Therefore, reality must
be presented in a phaenomenal sense, i.e. as appearance. Real repugnance is
the testcase to remind us that a purely logical, or rationalistic approach to
knowledge is not sufficient, experience must be taken into account.36
Likewise, real opposition is invoked in the note to the amphiboly (sc. at
KrV, B328–330). Again, Kant makes an extensive appeal to cases of real
opposition (in nature, in case of forces, and in case of good and evil) in
order to expose the shortcomings of rationalism (“the Leibnizian-Wolffian
system” at KrV, B329), and in order to point out the necessity of the sensible
conditions of knowledge.
So for the third time in a row Leibniz is the object of Kant’s criticism
as soon as real opposition is mentioned. A philosophical system that could
not stand the test of a proper account of real opposition was, in Kant’s view,
defective. In the note to the amphiboly this point is made in the context of
an elaborate critique of Leibniz’s “intellectual system of the world” (KrV,
B326). The fundamental mistake of this system was, that is was just that:
an intellectual system that could not properly account for the conditions
of sensible intuition. Consequently, there is in this intellectual system no
distinction between things in themselves and appearances. In Kant’s words:
Leibniz nam die Erscheinungen als Dinge an sich selbst, mithin
fu¨r Intelligibilia, d.i. Gegensta¨nde des reinen Verstandes (KrV,
B320)
This observation is repeated several times in the appendix on the amphiboly.
Kant devoted the major part of the appendix to a critique of Leibniz’s
philosophy. In fact, critique of Leibniz seems to be the guiding thread,
since it has been initiated in the “General note . . . ” at B293, but what is
the purpose of such an extensive critique of Leibniz at this point of KrV?
Kant’s critique deals with very few details of the Leibnizian-Wolffian system,
it does not refer to any bibliographic source and it is not systematically
constructed but rather follows Kant’s own classification of the concepts
36Kant’s appeal to real opposition, forces, and pain and pleasure, at this point is even
called a decisive argument for the need of sensible intuitions, cf. Brook and McRobert,
‘Kant’s Attack . . . ’.
104 Real Repugnance in KrV
of reflection.37 This has caused Parkinson38 to disqualify parts of Kant’s
critique as misinterpretations of Leibniz. However, the question whether
Kant’s account of Leibniz’s philosophy is accurate or not seems te be missing
the point. It is not Kant’s intention to discuss and ascertain the achievements
of rationalistic philosophy. Leibniz is more like the right sparring partner to
test the strength of his own critical approach to knowledge. Hess concludes
that Kant’s critique of Leibniz has “die Funktion eines Negativ-Beispiels
oder einer Kontraposition [. . . ] um an ihr die eigene philosophische Position
um so deutlicher hervortreten zu lassen”.39 Kant offers a reconstruction of
Leibniz’s philosophy so as to be able to present his own critical philosophy
as the solution to problems that are inherent to a rationalistic philosophy.
It goes without saying that this reconstruction is not always accurate, but
accuracy and adequate interpretation are not what Kant is aiming at in the
first place. Rather, the reconstruction is meant to be the straw man of Kant’s
own argument, even at the cost of misinterpretation. It is no coincidence that
Kant chose Leibniz as his adversary in this respect. It offered exactly the right
opportunity to make his own point. Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy was still
a dominant current in Kant’s time. If critical philosophy could remedy the
flaws of rationalism, he would have gained a significant strategic advantage,
sc. superiority over mainstream philosophy. Moreover, it offered Kant the
opportunity to get even with part of his own philosophical background.
Kant’s critique of Leibniz was primarily aimed at drawing attention to
the crucial issue of his own critical approach. What did he criticise Leibniz
for and what is this crucial issue that needs emphasis at this point of KrV?
As is clear in the quotation above, Kant blamed Leibniz for taking appear-
ances for things in themselves. Elsewhere he blamed Leibniz for regarding
appearances as representations of things in themselves (KrV, B326), and
for “intellectualising appearances” (KrV, B327), and for a disregard of the
37A systematic analysis of these concepts themselves seems to be overshadowed by Kant’s
polemical intention, cf. Peter Reuter, Kants Theorie der Reflexionsbegriffe. Eine Unter-
suchung zum Amphiboliekapitel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Wu¨rzburg: Ko¨nigshausen
& Neumann, 1989, (Epistemata: Reihe Philosophie, Band 56; also dissertation Bonn 1988),
148. The notion of reflection in the broader context of Kant’s work is treated in Max Liedtke,
‘Der Begriff der Reflexion bei Kant’, Archiv fu¨r Geschichte der Philosophie, 48 (1966),
207–216. Malter’s attempt (Malter, ‘Reflexionsbegriffe . . . ’) is a significant contribution
to this systematic analysis. The main thesis of his contribution is that the concepts of
reflection are relevant in view of the concrete formation of judgements, especially as far as
the subjective side of this formation is concerned.
38G. H. R. Parkinson, ‘Kant as a Critic of Leibniz. The Amphiboly of Concepts of
Reflection’, Revue internationale de philosophie, 35 (1981), 302–314.
39Hess, ‘Zu Kants Leibniz-Kritik . . . ’, 222.
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sensitive origin of part of our knowledge (KrV, B336). In the “Note to the
amphiboly . . . ” this kind of mistake is called “transcendental amphiboly”:
the confounding of the object of pure understanding with appearance (KrV,
B326). So Leibniz is blamed for having committed transcendental amphiboly.
In other words, he failed to acknowledge the twofold sense of “object” that
we discussed in §6.4. Mistakes like this can be remedied by transcendental
reflection and the explanation of this state of mind seems to be the main
purpose of the entire appendix. Yet, most of what is said about (the concepts
of) reflection, amphiboly and Leibniz serves to emphasise some of Kant’s
own critical results gained thus far, and it serves to draw some conclusions
that need to be presented at this point of KrV.
The main, critical result that needs to be emphasised at this point of KrV is
the twofold sense of “object”. It enables Kant to underline closely related
issues (the separation as well as the separate funtioning of sensibility and
understanding; the primary importance of sensibility), but it also enables him
to define or demarcate the scope of the operations of sensibility and under-
standing.40 In other words, by means of the two senses of “object” he can find
a conclusive answer to the question regarding the cognitive possibilities of
understanding and sensibility; understanding can only be used empirically. If
we follow this line, it is also clear why real opposition reappears in these final,
and seemingly quite different parts of the Transcendental Analytic. The two
different senses of “object” in relation to the possible uses of understanding
constitute the issue that all concluding parts have in common.
In the “General Note . . . ” Kant maintained that the applicability of
pure concepts of understanding is necessarily dependent on corresponding
outer intuitions. The phaenomena chapter presents an extensive evaluation of
the distinction between appearance (Erscheinung, phaenomenon) and thing
in itself (Ding an sich, noumenon).41 In the appendix Kant discusses the
amphiboly, which is a “confounding of an object of pure understanding with
appearance” (KrV, B326), and which is a result of a confusion of the empirical
with the transcendental employment of reason (KrV, B316). The appendix
40Cf. KrV, B296–298 where Kant describes the determination of the limits of under-
standing in terms of self-determination.
41KrV, A248–249: “Erscheinungen, so fern sie als Gegensta¨nde nach der Einheit der
Kategorien gedacht werden, heißen Phaenomena. Wenn ich aber Dinge annehme, die bloß
Gegensta¨nde des Verstandes sind, [. . . ] so wu¨rden dergleichen Dinge Noumena (intelligibilia)
heißen.” Cf. KrV, B 310: “Der Begriff eines Noumenon, d.i. eines Dinges, welches gar nicht
als Gegenstand der Sinne, sondern als ein Ding an sich selbst (lediglich durch einen reinen
Verstand) gedacht werden soll, ist gar nicht widersprechend.”
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concludes with a summarising exposition about the noumenon. Once the
meanings of “object” and “noumenon” have been explained, Kant concludes
the Transcendental Analytic with the table of nothing which completes the
exposition about “object” in terms of the “Gegenstand u¨berhaupt [. . . ]
unausgemacht, ob er etwas oder nichts sei”(KrV, B346).
On the basis of this general point of view we will now try to evaluate
the closing parts of the Transcendental Analytic in greater detail in order
to understand the significance and consequences of occurrences of real re-
pugnance in KrV, B288–349. In the “General Note . . . ” the occurrence of
real repugnance marks the point that the employment of understanding
with regard to objectively valid knowledge is always dependent on (outer)
intuition. Understanding is necessarily related to sensibility. Kant’s critique
of Leibniz is initiated at this point in the B-edition of KrV (KrV, B293).
The phaenomena chapter (KrV, B294–315), that does not contain direct
references to real opposition, discusses the possibility of the employment
of understanding that is not dependent on outer intuitions but rather on
non-sensible, i.e. intellectual intuitions. Kant denies this possibility of tran-
scendental employment of understanding; our faculty of knowledge is not
capable of intellectual intuition, and therefore our knowledge is limited to
things as they appear, not as they are in themselves. Kant’s phrase to indicate
this limited applicability of understanding is that transcendental employment
of (concepts of) understanding is not admitted, because there is only an
empirical employment of understanding. This had already been shown in
previous parts of the Transcendental Analytic: the most the understanding
can achieve a priori is to anticipate the form of a possible experience in
general (KrV, B303).
According to the title of the appendix on the amphiboly, a confusion of the
empirical with the transcendental employment is the cause of amphiboly.42
Kant’s critique of Leibniz in the Appendix and the following “Note . . . ”
showed that the confusion is caused once appearances are mistaken for
things in themselves. More in particular, this mistake is presented as the
result of an approach in which the necessary relation between understanding
and sensibility is neglected and objects are only treated as objects for
the understanding. Transcendental reflection is presented as the means to
42The B-revision of the phaenomena chapter contains an announcement of this confu-
sion: “Gleich anfangs aber zeigt sich hier eine Zweideutigkeit, welche großen Mißverstand
veranlassen kann: daß, da der Verstand, wenn er einen Gegenstand in einer Beziehung bloß
Pha¨nomen nennt, er sich zugleich außer dieser Beziehung noch eine Vorstellung von einem
Gegenstande an sich selbst macht . . . ” (KrV, B307–308).
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avoid this.43 Insofar as the critique of Leibniz, in line with the results of
the phaenomena chapter, implies only a limited, empirical employment of
understanding, the purpose of the twofold sense of “object” seems to be
lost. There is no point in making a distinction between appearance and
thing in itself, if you only need appearances for your theory of knowledge,
and if understanding is not allowed to deal with its objects as things in
themselves. Doesn’t that make the latter kind of object redundant altogether?
The phaenomena chapter as well as the second part of the “Note . . . ” (KrV,
B336–346) contains the answer to this question, that will be addressed in
the next section.
If we summarise the arguments I have been putting forward thus far, we
can see that it is not just a lucky coincidence that real repugnance turns
up at this point in KrV. Reference to real opposition enables Kant to stress
and discuss the main achievements of the previous parts of KrV, but it
also enables him to do something more; bringing those achievements to a
conclusion.
Firstly, in the “General note . . . ” the necessary relation between pure
concept and outer intuition is argued for in the immediate context of the
issue of real repugnance. In the phaenomena chapter Kant maintains that
there is only an empirical employment of understanding. Understanding and
its concepts can only be used in relation to what has been given under the
conditions of sensibility.
Secondly, instances of real opposition in the texts on the amphiboly are
brought forward to indicate serious shortcomings of a dogmatic-rationalistic
approach (resulting from the confusion of the empirical with the transcenden-
tal employment of reason). A theory that fails to acknowledge real opposition,
i.e. a theory that fails to account for experience, has ipso facto failed to
recognise the distinction between objects of sensibility (appearances) and
objects of understanding (things in themselves). This failure causes either
the intellectualisation of appearances, or the sensification of concepts (KrV,
B327), but in both cases sensibility and understanding are not sufficiently
distinguished.
6.6 The noumenon as a limiting concept
As a consequence of the fact that understanding has no transcendental em-
ployment, Kant maintains that understanding—independent of the subjective
43KrV, B319: “Die transzendentale U¨berlegung ist eine Pflicht, von der sich niemand
lossagen kann, wenn er a priori etwas u¨ber Dinge urteilen will.”, cf. KrV, B317, 325–326.
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conditions of sensible intuition—has no determinate or determinable object
(KrV, B304). One could argue that in the absence of sensible intuition it
might be possible to supply understanding with another kind of intuition
lest thoughts would remain empty. On the basis of non-sensible intuition
the transcendental employment of understanding would still be an option.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence whatsoever, that humans are capable of
non-sensible, intellectual intuition.44 Hence, noumena in the sense of things
in themselves, and as objects of understanding have to be rejected. This
seems to be confirming the conjecture in the previous section; it does not
make sense to maintain the twofold sense of “object”, if the noumenon is
rejected at a later stage. In Kant’s view, however, the concept of a noumenon
is not redundant. The reason for this is quite simple. According to Kant
the term noumenon has two meanings, a positive and negative one. It is
the noumenon in the positive sense that cannot be allowed. On the other
hand, the negative meaning of the noumenon45, is something that is not
only admissable46, but even inevitable and indispensable.47 It seems as if
Kant has found a scholastic answer to the threat that the twofold sense of
“object” is meaningless. Just add another distinction that has an element
which is invulnerable to the objections raised. So if the noumenon is redun-
dant in our theory of knowledge, we simply have to distinguish between the
noumenon insofar as it is redundant (noumenon in the positive sense) and the
noumenon insofar as it is not redundant, but useful and even indispensable.
The introduction of the noumenon in the negative sense, however, has an
important systematic function. It is the exposition of this function that seems
to be Kant’s main critical objective towards the end of the Transcendental
Analytic.
With the conception of the noumenon in the negative sense Kant takes a
crucial step in the process of answering two questions that were raised in the
first paragraph of the phaenomena chapter (KrV, B295): can we be satisfied
with the critical results of the Transcendental Analytic, and, secondly, by
44KrV, B304: “Durch eine reine Kategorie nun, in welcher von aller Bedingung der
sinnlichen Anschauung, als der einzigen, die uns mo¨glich ist, abstrahiert wird . . . ”; KrV,
A252: “daß die sinnliche Anschauung die einzige mo¨gliche Anschauung [. . . ] vor uns sei”.
45KrV, B307: “ein Ding [. . . ], so fern es nicht Objekt unserer sinnlichen Anschauung ist,
[. . . ] ist [. . . ] ein Noumenon im negativen Verstande.”
46KrV, B342: “so mu¨ßen Noumena in dieser bloß negativen Bedeutung allerdings zuge-
lassen werden”.
47KrV, B311: “Der Begriff eines Noumeni, bloß problematisch genommen, bleibt [. . . ]
nicht allein zula¨ssig, sondern [. . . ] unvermeidlich”. (B344: “Der Begriff des Noumenon ist
[. . . ] die unvermeidlich mit der Einschra¨nkung unserer Sinnlichkeit zusammenha¨ngende
Aufgabe”.
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what title do we possess this domain of critical knowledge (a title that must
protect us against hostile claims)? It is obvious that we can and shall never
be satisfied if the outcome of the Transcendental Analytic is all there is to
know. Right from the very first sentence of KrV Kant has made clear that
human reason is burdened by questions which it is not able to ignore, but
which it is also not able to answer.48 Understanding will also unavoidably
and constantly try to overstep the limits of its own domain (sc. of empirical
employment). If we cannot help doing this, is there a safe and legitimate way
of doing it? The title by which we possess our land of truth (KrV, B294)
is the principle that the a priori inventory of understanding can only be
employed in view of possible experience, i.e. in relation to sensible intuitions.
Notwithstanding its a priori nature, understanding cannot transcend the
limits of sensibility, cannot expand knowledge beyond the domain of possible
experience, and yet, as we have just seen, it constantly tries to do so. With
a negative conception of the noumenon Kant has introduced a notion that
can meet with both of these seemingly opposed requirements (limitation and
transgression).
Firstly, the negative conception of the noumenon leaves room for under-
standing to venture beyond the limits of possible experience, although the
results of this operation are not to be counted as knowledge (but rather as
belief, for instance). The transcendental employment of reason, however, is
still ruled out, since noumena in a positive sense are not allowed.
Secondly, the empirical employment has gained substantial support, once
the second sense of “object” (sc. thing in itself) has received a more specific
interpretation in terms of the negative noumenon. The noumenon in the
negative sense seems to have important relevance in addition to what has
been achieved thus far. Right after the distinction between a noumenon in
the negative and positive sense, Kant maintains (at KrV, B307) that:
Die Lehre von der Sinnlichkeit ist nun zugleich die Lehre von
den Noumenen im negativen Verstande, d.i. von Dingen, die der
Verstand sich ohne diese Beziehung auf unsere Anschauungsart,
mithin nicht bloß als Erscheinungen, sondern als Dinge an sich
selbst denken muß
At KrV, B310–311 Kant refers to the fact that the concept of a noumenon is
merely a limiting concept (Grenzbegriff ), intended to curb the pretensions of
sensibility; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility. This undifferenti-
48KrV, Avii. Cf. also KrV, B296: “so scheint es uns doch nicht genug, sich bloß dasjenige
vortragen zu lassen, was wahr ist, sondern, was man zu wissen begehrt.”
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ated use of the term “noumenon”49 is pointing out the exact position and
function of the noumenon. This noumenon is marking the point of contact
between sensibility and understanding, in an effort to restrain the application
of either faculty within its proper limits. The examples of Leibniz and Locke
at KrV, B327 show what happens when either understanding or sensibility is
not restrained. On Kant’s part there is no hidden agenda in this respect. He
has no secret intentions of pushing back the frontiers either of sensibility, or
of understanding. The construction of the noumenon in the negative sense
enables understanding to determine the limits of its own employment (KrV,
B297) and without it, this employment would have to remain restricted to
an empirical employment only. In this case understanding could never be
assured of its claims and possessions and sooner or later it would become
prey to mistakes and illusions (KrV, B297).
Kant considers this noumenon once again in the final part of the “Note
. . . ”, sc. KrV, B336–346, which is identical to the text in KrV, A280–289.50
Towards the end, immediately preceding the “Table of nothing”, the signifi-
cant points are mentioned again, but some further qualifications are added.
We cannot extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions
of sensibility, and therefore noumena are no objects, but rather problematic
concepts of objects. What is also problematic is the understanding for which,
and the intuition by means of which such a noumenon can be objective.
Because objects beyond the field of sensibility cannot be given to our under-
standing, the latter faculty may be allowed to extend further than the field
of sensibility and possible experience, but only in a problematic way (KrV,
B310). Thus, the concept of a noumenon is a task (Aufgabe)51 unavoidably
bound up with the limitation of sensibility.
Kant explains in greater detail what he means by “problematic concept”.
A problematic concept like “noumenon” is
49Differentiation did not occur until the B-addition (B307), whereas the undifferentiated
use was already present in KrV, A255 (=B310–311).
50This part of KrV, B was not altered, although the precise distinction between the
positive and negative sense of the noumenon (KrV, B307), which is a revision of the
ambiguous A-text (KrV, A252), would have been sufficient reason to be more precise
with respect to noumena in a purely negative sense (KrV, B342=A286). As objects of
non-sensible intuition they would rather have to be identified, according B307, as noumena
in the positive sense, cf. Marcus Willaschek, ‘Phaenomena/Noumena und die Amphibolie
der Reflexionsbegriffe’, in: G. Mohr and M. Willaschek, editors, Immanuel Kant. Kritik
der reinen Vernunft, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998, (Klassiker Auslegen, Band 17/18),
325–351, 336–337. The purpose of this negative noumenon (in the sense of the object of
non-sensible intuition (KrV, B342), however, is in line with the preceding B-revision.
51KrV, B344. Further on in KrV this is described in terms of “transcendental idea” and
“concept of reason”.
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die Vorstellung eines Dinges, von dem wir weder sagen ko¨nnen,
daß es mo¨glich, noch daß es unmo¨glich sei52
This characteristic was mentioned earlier in the first edition of KrV when
the noumenon was described as an empty thought that nonetheless does not
contain a contradiction (KrV, A252–253). One could easily be tempted to
draw all kinds of conclusions from this absence of contradiction; something
is possible as long as there is no contradiction involved. Kant had rejected
exactly this approach in the Dissertation.53 The Transcendental Analytic
has provided sufficient arguments for him to maintain that contradiction is
relevant in case of analytic judgements but as far as synthetic judgements
are concerned objective reality is warranted only in case of phaenomena, not
in the case of noumena.
The noumenon in this negative sense, together with the references to
fundamental forces and the lack of contradiction which have become com-
monplace in this respect, is mentioned once again in the final pages of the
Transcendental Analytic, sc. the “Table of nothing”. More precisely, Kant
mentions both the noumenon in the negative sense (which is not impossible),
as well as the noumenon in the positive sense (which is not possible) as exam-
ples of “nothing”, an empty concept without object (KrV, B348). The concept
is empty, because it is lacking a corresponding intuition, and consequently it
is lacking objective reality: in terms of knowledge it is nothing. It cannot be
reckoned among possibilities, although it must not be declared impossible
either. For the latter reason it may still be an ens rationis, which is the
phrase Kant added to this description of the noumenon (KrV, B347–348).54
The limiting function of this noumenon, as well as the fact that it is
nothing in a certain respect explains why the table of nothing concludes this
part of the Analytic. The specification of the different senses of “nothing”
52KrV, B343. The fact that something is not impossible, leaves room to think about
certain things in a practical perspective. In this context “noumenon” (KrV, B569) and
“problem” (KrV, B830) are mentioned in relation to transcendental freedom. It is no
coincidence that these expressions turn up again in KpV, A4 (“nur problematisch, als nicht
unmo¨glich”), cf. also KpV, A55, 95).
53We discussed this in §5.2 (p. 71) and §6.2 (p.88) above.
54Interestingly, not every such noumenon is to be counted among the entia rationis either.
New fundamental forces, for example, may be invented without any contradiction, but if
they are not supported by any example of experience they are not to be counted as possible.
Note that Kant’s argument about fundamental forces, contradiction and experience is the
same as the one he presented in §28 of the Dissertation (cf. p. 71 above). At KrV, B302
the confounding of the logical possibility of a concept with the transcendental possibility
of a thing is explained in terms of a vitium subreptionis (“unterschieben”) reminding us of
the Dissertation as well.
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has a limiting function.55 This overview of “nothing” is a result of Kant’s
introductory remark. According to Kant, the division between what is possible
and what is not possible, which is the customary beginning of transcendental
philosophy, presupposes a concept to be divided: the concept of an object in
general (taken problematically), undecided whether it is something or nothing
(KrV, B343, 347). While possibility and impossibility are categories, Kant
has focussed his attention on the object in general. In the Transcendental
Aesthetic and Analytic it has been decided in what sense the object in
general can be said to represent something. In the table of nothing Kant
shows in what sense the object can be said to be nothing. It shows which
cases of synthesis between concept and intuition fail if there is not something
objective involved. Every failure amounts to nothing. A noumenon in the
negative sense seems to be the only kind of nothing that makes sense. It
cannot be reckoned among the possibilities (of experience), but it cannot be
reckoned among the impossibilities either. It belongs to a different order, and
therefore, as an object of reason, it may prove to be useful in the remainder
of KrV. A noumenon in this sense offers an escape from the limitations
imposed on sensibility and understanding which may be relevant in view of
the practical employment of reason.
6.7 Nothing is left
Real repugnance may have prompted Kant’s critical investigations into the
relations between things, as well as relations between concept and object,
the issue itself almost disappeared from the critical stage. In KrV it is hardly
mentioned and it seems to play a minor role only. In the preceding sections I
have been trying to show that real repugnance has not disappeared completely
and that it is not insignificant in some specific respects. Furthermore, the
pattern of real opposition remains present, after the initial problems of real
opposition have been resolved. The pattern of real opposition is also present
in the concept of a noumenon in the negative sense, as we shall see in the
present section.
Not only was the conception of the negative noumenon developed in close
connection to occurrences of real repugnance, the conceptual structure of
this notion also resembles its pattern. In what sense exactly is the noumenon
55Cf. Rebecca Paimann, ‘Kants Tafel des Nichts in ihrer Bedeutung fu¨r die Kritik der
reinen Vernunft’, in: Volker Gerhardt, editor, Kant und die Berliner Aufkla¨rung. Akten
des IX. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses, Volume 2, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter,
2001, 791–800.
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in the negative sense structured after the pattern of real opposition? How
does it show the characteristics of real repugnancy?
Firstly, the fact that it is called “negative” does not indicate a lack56
of something. It rather indicates that “noumenon” has a meaning that is
determined negatively, sc. in opposition to the meaning of “phaenomena” on
the one hand and the meaning of “positive noumena” on the other. This
negative determination, does not imply that it is lacking reality in some
sense, like the nihil privativum in the “Table of nothing”.
Secondly, the negative noumenon, like real opposition, represents an
opposition that is categorically different from contradiction. Several times
Kant makes explicit reference to the fact that contradiction is absent in case
of the negative noumenon. It represents an alternative to contradictories
which is neither possible, nor impossible (KrV, B343, 347). Therefore, it is
allso different from the nihil negativum.
Thirdly, the real repugnant nature of the noumenon in the negative sense
is most clearly displayed in its function as a limiting concept. As a limiting
concept it serves to confirm and secure the position of sensibility on the
one hand, and to indicate the problematic extension of the employment of
understanding on the other. Understanding is thus provided with “negative
Erweiterung” (KrV, B312) which is also explained in terms of real opposition
and negative magnitudes: understanding is limitative with respect to sensi-
bility, and negative extension (of understanding) equals limitation. Hence
the noumenon indicates nothing; it is neither something objectively real that
can be given in possible experience, nor something that can be represented
in intellectual intuition. It is nothing to the extent that it is the balanced
result of opposite activities.
This noumenon represents the point where sensibility and understanding
meet. It represents the union of opposites, and since it is limiting with respect
to both faculties it must be from a completely different order than either
of these.57 The noumenon, as a limiting concept, is an expression of the
mutual interconnection, the union between sensibility and understanding so
as to contain the proper functioning of either faculty within its limits, but
qua concept it doesn’t belong to either faculty. It belongs to the vocabulary
of critical reason and transcendental philosophy. From the point of view of
knowledge this noumenon amounts to nothing, an empty concept without
56Although the description “nicht Objekt unserer sinnlichen Anschauung” (KrV, B307)
may seem to be pointing in this direction.
57If this noumenon would belong to the field of sensibility it would be prone to Kant’s
own critique of Locke; if the noumenon would belong to the field of understanding it would
be the noumenon in the positive meaning.
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object. The most we can say is that it leaves us with a problem which
remains unresolved, and which offers the opportunity for practical reason to
be employed in accordance with its proper destination: making things real.
This noumenon represents yet another point of unity between sensibility
and understanding in addition to the ones already mentioned in §6.4: the
original synthetic unity of apperception, critique as the balanced equilibrium
of speculative and practical reason. There seems to be a characteristic
procedure that Kant is following. Problems that are caused by distinctions
made are solved by showing that there is a higher unity from which the
distinction is dependent. This higher unity shares the characteristics of real
opposition. It unites what has been opposed.
Once the original problems in relation to real opposition have been solved,
the pattern of real opposition has not disappeared but turns up again, in the
concept of a negative noumenon. This reappearance, however, takes place at
another level, the meta-level of critical knowledge. Hence, the solution of the
issues related to real repugnance at object level of knowledge can only be
reached at the cost of the reappearance of (the structural pattern of) real
opposition at the meta-level of critical knowledge. If this would summarize
the results achieved thus far, it does not seem to be very much. In fact, it is
nothing. From the point of view of knowledge and speculative reason there
is nothing beyond the sphere of sensibility and the empirical employment of
understanding. As far as knowledge is concerned, there is nothing beyond
the analytic of truth. However, from the opposite point of view, i.e. from the
point of view of practical reason, all that has been achieved in the analytic of
truth amounts to nothing, because it does not help determine our practical
employment of reason. All that is left at this stage is nothing.
Chapter 7
The Legal Metaphor
7.1 Plus ultra
In the preceding chapter we have argued that real repugnance as it was
presented in Negative Gro¨ßen had become part of a more encompassing
problem, sc. the question of the possibility of the synthetic a priori. Kant’s
critical answer to this question also implied the resolution of the issues
that had been related to real opposition back in 1763. It turned out that
particular parts of Kant’s solution of the synthetic a priori were constructed
according to the pattern of real opposition; original synthetic unity, the
interrelation between speculative and practical reason, and the negative
noumenon. Explicit occurrence and even the reappearance of real opposition
towards the end of the Transcendental Analytic served to emphasise the
results of Kant’s critical approach, so as to mark the difference with rational-
istic and empiristic alternatives. With reference to the conclusion in chapter
5 we can see that also in KrV real opposition offers a pattern for dealing
with methodological questions; certain critical, conceptual constructions of
methodological importance follow this pattern.
If real opposition offers a framework for the construction of critical phi-
losophy, we may well wonder whether real opposition has any methodological
significance after the Transcendental Analytic. What, if anything, could be
the contribution of real opposition once critical reason leaves the firm ground
of the island of truth to embark on a journey upon an ocean that offers
no shelter and security, but only illusions and endless adventures?1 This is
1KrV, B294; cf. also the reference to the Pillars of Hercules and the ocean at KrV, A395–
396. Hume is the source of this allusion to seamanship, cf. Willi Goetschel, Constituting
Critique. Kant’s Writing as Critical Praxis, Durham & London: Duke University Press,
1994, (translation of: Goetschel, Willi, Kant als Schriftsteller, Wien: Passagen Verlag 1990),
133–136 (Goetschel is referring to K. Wright in this regard).
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the obvious question if we follow our line of thought in accordance with the
lay-out and contents of KrV. There is, however, a more compelling reason
to pursue our argument in this direction. While leaving the firm ground of
truth, while entering the Transcendental Dialectic we also seem to be losing
an indispensable fixed point of reference: possible experience.2 In the absence
of a reliable touchstone it seems uncertain how critical reason must proceed.
Kant’s strategy to deal with this omission is to develop a self-conception of
reason. Since there is no (external) point of reference, which leaves critical
reason incomparable to anything else, reason is only concerned with itself
and this characteristic of self-reference can only be expressed by making
comparisons. For this reason Kant employs figures of speech throughout KrV.
Figurative speech appears to be the proper means to describe the under-
takings of critical reason, which is lacking reference to anything else than
itself. By means of figurative speech reason can be compared to something
else (albeit fictiously, or merely on account of a superficial resemblance)
thereby counterbalancing the risk that self-reference makes the conception of
reason viciously circular or empty. In this context real opposition, or rather
a construction of real opposites, occupies a prominent position. The question
at the beginning of this paragraph, “What, if anything . . . ?”, is rhetorical. At
the methodological level of critical reason the pattern of real opposition offers
a useful guideline to describe the efforts and achievements of critique. As was
pointed out in the previous chapter some central, critical notions showed the
characteristics of real opposition, but in the following two chapters we will
examine to what extent the pattern is present in Kant’s figurative speech,
notably in its most significant representative: the legal metaphor.
7.2 The legal metaphor
Right at the beginning of the first introduction to KrV Kant describes the
institution which judges all claims and pretensions of reason as a tribunal
(Gerichtshof ).3 Although Kant acknowledges that examples and illustrations
like this are needed for an intuitively clear presentation of the contents of
KrV he presents the text of his major philosophical work in a “dry, purely
scholastic fashion” in order not to enlarge it beyond the extensive proportions
it had already reached.4 Nevertheless, many illustrations or metaphors, the
2Significantly, towards the end of the Transcendental Analytic the two conceptions of
“object” had to account for the facticity of real opposition.
3Cf. KrV, Axi. Gerichtshof also occurs at B529, 697, 768, 779, 815.
4Cf. KrV Axvii–xviii. Cf. also B293 where Kant explains why examples are omitted:
“um Weitla¨ufigkeit zu vermeiden”.
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proper means to bring about this intuitive clearness, are present throughout
KrV. There is also a great variety in Kant’s use of metaphor. For example,
one could refer to predominant metaphors drawn from: politics (KrV, Aix,
Bxxv, B372), military science and warfare (KrV, B450–451, B779–780, B783–
784), seamanship (KrV, B294–295, A395–396), architecture (KrV, B735–736,
B784, B862–863), flying (KrV, B9, B878). With reference to the studies of
Eucken and Tarbet these metaphors can be characterized as illustrative5; they
perform “nur die Rolle eines Begleiters”6, or an “important supporting role”.7
To some of these, however, a more substantial role may be attributed, because
Kant continuously employs them to characterise his own philosophical method.
Thus they become “treue Diener besonderer prinzipieller U¨berzeugungen
und methodologischer Richtungen”.8 Tarbet deals with them as “metaphors
of analogy” and the most telling are those taken from science (physics,
chemistry, mathematics, astronomy).9
Special attention should be given to metaphorical use of legal discourse,
which permeates the entire KrV to an extent that is unparalleled by any
other metaphor. Following Tarbet I will use the term “legal metaphor” as
the common denominator of all instances of legal discourse.10 In line with
Ishikawa’s studies the German term “das Gerichtshof-Modell” would be
an appropriate notion. Several authors have underlined the importance of
the legal metaphor. More than a century ago, in 1881, Vaihinger remarked:
“Dieses bild des Processes liegt der ganzen Kritik zu Grunde”.11 He continues
by pointing to the most important aspects of this image in KrV: the tribunal,
the lawbook, the parties involved, the object of dispute, witnesses, documents
and proof, and the records of the lawsuit. Rudolph Eucken stated that Kant’s
far-reaching and radical application of the idea of right is characteristic of his
theoretical enterprise and Eucken also acknowledged the importance of the
5David W. Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason’, Journal
of the History of Philosophy , VI (1968), 257–270, 257.
6Rudolph Eucken, ‘U¨ber Bilder und Gleichnisse bei Kant’, in: Beitra¨ge zur Einfu¨hrung
in die Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipzig: Verlag der Du¨rr’schen Buchhandlung, 19062,
(First published in Zeitschrift fu¨r Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 83, 161–193),
55–82, 57.
7Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor . . . ’, 257.
8Eucken, ‘U¨ber Bilder und Gleichnisse . . . ’, 57.
9Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor . . . ’, 263; cf. Eucken, ‘U¨ber Bilder und Gleichnisse
. . . ’, 66–68.
10Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor . . . ’, 265; cf. Eucken, ‘U¨ber Bilder und Gleichnisse
. . . ’, 73 and Saner, Kants Weg vom Krieg . . . , 279.
11Hans Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (erster Band),
Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Spemann, 1881, 107. Cf. also Saner, Kants Weg vom Krieg . . . ,
239, 278–279.
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legal metaphor in other writings of Kant.12 As far as the metaphor itself is
concerned Tarbet claimed that it is the “metaphor around which the entire
work [sc. KrV] is constructed” and that “There is justice in calling the legal
metaphor the main structural metaphor of the Critique”.13 More recently,
Henrich has pointed to the methodological and argumentative structure
of the legal metaphor: “The Critique is not just permeated by juridical
metaphors and terminology. Its major doctrines are related to one another by
means of the theory of legal disputes presented by Pu¨tter and Achenwall.”14
In support of the claim that KrV is a political work O’Neill maintains
that “a series of connected political and juridical metaphors constitute the
deep structure of the Critique of Pure Reason.”15 In view of a survey of
Kant’s philosophy of right Ku¨sters underlines the plausibility of the juridical
character of Kant’s concept of reason, but he does not seem to be able to
appreciate its significance because he does not recognise the proper function
of metaphor: “Es besteht die Gefahr einer vorschnellen Analogisierung und
damit implizit einer Fehldeutung”.16 However, even greater problems arise if
an evaluation of the metaphorical or analogical character is postponed.
Although there seems to be considerable agreement as to the extent and
the methodological importance of the legal metaphor, a systematic account
of the legal metaphor as a whole is still lacking. The main purpose of this
chapter is to provide this account. Therefore we will focus on particular
instances of legal discourse in KrV (notably, the question “Quid iuris?”,
the ius praetensum, the antinomy, and the polemical employment of reason)
against the background of relevant secondary sources. To complete this
12Eucken, ‘U¨ber Bilder und Gleichnisse . . . ’, 77-78, cf. Eve W. Stoddard, ‘Reason on
Trial. Legal Metaphors in the Critique of Pure Reason’, Philosophy and Literature, 12
(1988), 245–260, 245, 248
13Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor . . . ’, 265, 270.
14Dieter Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of
the First Critique’, in: E. Fo¨rster, editor, Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. The Three
Critiques and the Opus Postumum, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, 29–46. The
legal metaphor in KrV has also come to the attention of philosophers from outside the field
of strict Kant scholarship, cf. Jacques Derrida, Du droit a` la philosophie, Paris: Galile´e,
1990, 89-102; Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard, Het enthousiasme. Kants kritiek van de geschiedenis,
Kampen/Kapellen: Kok Agora/DNB/Pelckmans, 1991, (translation of: Lyotard, Jean-
Franc¸ois, L’enthousiasme: la critique kantienne de l’histoire, Paris: Editions Galile´e, 1986,
I (34–46)
15Onora O’Neill, ‘Reason and politics in the Kantian enterprise’, in: Constructions of
Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994 (19891), 3–27, 4, cf. also 14–20.
16Gerd-Walter Ku¨sters, Kants Rechtsphilosophie, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 1988, (Ertra¨ge der Forschung, Band 256), 31.
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account it is necessary to make additional remarks regarding certain aspects
of the metaphor that have been neglected in the literature on KrV, so as to
make possible a reconstruction of the metaphor in its entirety. This will be
done in the sections on transcendental judgement, on the paralogisms, the
proofs of God’s existence and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. The
result will be a comprehensive overview of the legal metaphor throughout
KrV. To substantiate the claim that this metaphor has a significant structural
and methodological function within the critical project of KrV, the Kantian
meaning and characteristics of “metaphor” will have to be determined in the
next section.
7.3 Kant on analogy
In the previous section “metaphor” referred to illustrations and figurative
speech in quite a general way. The present section presents a short overview of
“metaphor” in the Kantian sense of the word. According to Nuyen “It seems
reasonable to suggest that what Kant calls ‘symbol’ we call ‘metaphor’.”17
A symbol, according to Kant, is an intuition that is (indirectly) related to a
concept (KU, B256). To be sure, this is only one of several possible relations
between concept and intuition. Right at the beginning of the Transcendental
Logic in KrV we find the well-known formula about the necessary relation
between intuitions and concepts:
Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe
sind blind. Daher ist es eben so notwendig, seine Begriffe sinn-
lich zu machen (d.i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung
beizufu¨gen), als seine Anschauungen versta¨ndlich zu machen (d.i.
sie unter Begriffe zu bringen).18
In fact, this statement implies that it should be possible to provide a cor-
responding intuition to every concept and vice versa. If not, the knowledge
expressed in the concept (or intuition) lacks aesthetic, intuitive clarity (or
logical, discursive clarity) and should not be regarded as knowledge at all.
The process of providing intuitions that correspond to given concepts, is
what Kant calls proving or showing the reality of our concepts.19 There is a
17A. T. Nuyen, ‘The Kantian Theory of Metaphor’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, 22 (1989),
95–109, 98.
18KrV, B75. Here Kant elaborates on the distinction between intuitive and discursive
knowledge, cf. KrV, Axvii–xviii, B33, 74, 92–93, 376–377; KU, B256n.
19“Die Realita¨t unserer Begriffe darzutun werden immer Anschauungen erfordert.” (KU,
B254). As to “proving” and “showing”, cf. also KU, B240. In §6.4 this was discussed in
terms of objective reality of concepts.
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particular kind of intuition corresponding to every kind of concept. If the
concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples.20 In the case of
pure concepts of understanding they are called schemata (see §7.5 below). In
the case of a concept of reason, however, it is not possible to provide for the
corresponding intuition, since by definition such a concept cannot be linked
to something sensible. It is a concept “den nur die Vernunft denken, und dem
keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann”.21 In view of theoretical
knowledge the reality of such a concept cannot be shown. However, one may
symbolically link a concept of reason to an intuition, in which case the latter
is called a symbol of that concept. Thus, a symbol shows the reality of a
concept by means of an analogy.22
Kant’s example of a symbol is the living body representing the monarchial
state.23 A living body symbolises a monarchial state not because there are
similarities between both objects, but because there is an analogy between
the way we reflect on the object of intuition (a living body) an the way we
reflect on a monarchial state. More precisely, the rules guiding our reflection
upon a living body are analogous to those guiding our reflection in case of a
monarchial state which makes it possible to represent this state symbolically
by a living body. To some extent philosophical language in general is symbolic.
In this respect Kant points to notions such as “ground” and “substance”
(KU, B257).
Apart from schema and symbol there is yet another relation between
intuition and concept which might be regarded as the reverse of symbolisation.
An aesthetic idea is a representation to which there is no adequate concept
(KU, B193, 240). Nuyen24 argues that the process of providing such a concept
20Several elaborate studies deal with the meaning and significance of “example”, “symbol”
and “schema” in Kant’s philosophy, cf. Ingeborg Heidemann, ‘Die Funktion des Beispiels in
der kritischen Philosophie’, in: F. Kaulbach and J. Ritter, editors, Kritik und Metaphysik,
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1966, 21–39; Gu¨nther Buck, ‘Kant’s Lehre vom Exempel’,
Archiv fu¨r Begriffsgeschichte, XI (1967), 148–183; and Onora O’Neill, ‘The power of exam-
ple’, in: Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994 (19891), (previously published in Philosophy 61 (1986),
5–29), 165–186.
21KU, B255. Cf. also: “Vernunftidee . . . , welche . . . ein Begriff ist, dem keine Anschauung
(Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft) ada¨quat sein kann.” (KU, B193) and: “Eine Vernunftidee
kann nie Erkenntnis werden, weil sie einem Begriff (vom U¨bersinnlichen) entha¨lt, dem
niemals eine Anschauung angemessen gegeben werden kann.” (KU, B240). Cf. also KrV,
B384–385.
22And therefore, Kant states that “Alle Anschauungen, die man Begriffen a priori
unterlegt, sind also entweder Schemate oder Symbole” (KU, B256).
23KU, B257–258; cf. also Nuyen, ‘The Kantian Theory of Metaphor’, 96–98
24Nuyen, ‘The Kantian Theory of Metaphor’, 100–105.
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may be compared to symbolisation. The difference between symbolising an
idea of reason and symbolising an aesthetic idea is that the former process is
“objective”, and the latter is “subjective”.25
In Prolegomena §58 knowledge involving symbols is referred to as knowl-
edge by analogy (“Erkenntniß nach der Analogie”). This kind of knowledge
enables us to transcend the limits of possible experience, without running the
risk of getting caught up in a dialectical, illusory situation.26 In KrV (B222)
“analogy” is defined in a philosophical sense by comparing it to “analogy” in
mathematics.27 In mathematics analogy is the equality of two quantitative
relations. It is constitutive in regard of the objects (magnitudes) involved.
Thus, the analogy of relations ((3 : 4) = (6 : x)) allows us to construct the
fourth quantity (x = 8). In philosophy, however, analogy is the equality of
two qualitative relations, which does not allow us to construct the missing
member, but which only enables us to determine the relation in respect of a
fourth member, which is not known and remains unknown. The analogy in
this case is regulative; it serves as a rule of thinking28, not as a constitutive
principle. In Prolegomena (§58) Kant gives a definition of analogy: “eine
vollkommene A¨hnlichkeit zweier Verha¨ltnisse zwischen ganz una¨hnlichen
Dingen”. And he continues in a footnote that we may, for example, deter-
mine the relation between the unknown loving God (x) and the well-being
of the human species (c), if, by analogy, we compare this relation to the
relation between the happiness of children (a) and parental love (b). Thus,
the analogy (a : b) = (c : x) does not determine object x in any sense, but
it expresses the analogy or complete similarity between both relations. In
addition, Kant determines this relation with the help of the category of
causality. Thus, analogy allows us to think of relations involving objects that
cannot be objects of possible experience, such as God or the situation of
mankind as a whole. On the basis of analogy and of the regulative application
of “causality”29 such objects are treated as if they were objects of possible
25Nuyen, ‘The Kantian Theory of Metaphor’, 101. Cf. KU, B198, 242.
26Knowledge by analogy, inference by analogy or analogous reasoning is also a major
characteristic of legal reasoning, especially in the case of the precept to treat similar cases
similarly. By means of judgement (see §7.5 and 7.6 below) a judge has to determine whether
cases are similar or not, i.e. whether there is an analogy between different cases.
27In fact “analogy” has its origins in mathematics. For this and general information
about analogy cf. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, ‘Analogie’, in: Gert Ueding, editor, Historisches
Wo¨rterbuch der Rhetorik, Volume Band I, Tu¨bingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1992, column
498–514.
28KrV, B222–223 Cf. KU, B448n.
29The reference to “causality” occurs also in the example of the despotic state and the
hand mill: “Denn, zwischen einem despotischen Staate und einer Handmu¨hle ist zwar keine
122 The Legal Metaphor
experience.
Apparently, a critique of pure reason is in need of symbols or metaphors
since “pure reason” and “critique” are abstract notions lacking intuitive
clarity. This lack of clarity would seriously hamper or even prevent any
sensible discussion on the subject. The great variety and abundance of
metaphors in KrV express Kant’s awareness of the necessity to supply for
this clarity. If we take “metaphor”, like Nuyen, in the sense of “symbol”, then
the pithy statement that the critique of pure reason is the true tribunal”30
is an expression of the fact that the critique can be symbolised by the image
of the tribunal. This general function, symbolising the critique of reason,
would account for the pervasive presence and predominance of the legal
metaphor throughout KrV. In its entirety it is indispensable to characterise
and carry out the project of a critique of reason. As a symbol it serves to
generate knowledge (about pure reason) by analogy. The analogy, in this
case, consists of the similarity between the way we think about a tribunal
and its proceedings, on the one hand, and the way we think about reason
and its critique, on the other hand. Because of this similarity we are entitled
to determine what we do not know (legitimate claims of knowledge), on the
basis of what we actually do know (legitimate actions in front of a tribunal).
The various constituent parts of the analogy, the systematic relations between
these parts and the extent to which the analogy applies will be examined
and determined in the following sections.
7.4 The questions Quid facti? and Quid iuris?
Apart from occasionally used terms like “Anspruch”, “Besitz”, “Anmaßung”,
which apparently stem from a juridical context, the first systematic account
of a legal metaphor is to be found right at the beginning of the chapter on the
deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. Strangely enough Stoddard
does not even mention the well-known distinction between quid facti and
quid iuris, although she claims that “legal language plays a major role in
A¨hnlichkeit, wohl aber zwischen der Regel, u¨ber beide und ihre Kausalita¨t zu reflektieren.”
(KU, B256; italics WvdK). Cf. also KU, B448n. Kant also describes and exemplifies
knowledge by analogy in Religion (AA VI, 64n.); and in: Preisschrift u¨ber die Fortschritte
der Metaphysik, AA XX, 279–280.
30KrV, B779. Cf. KrV, Axi, B529, 697, 768, 815. Cf. G. Bien on the more general points
of agreement between philosophy and a juridical procedure (Gu¨nther Bien, ‘Das Gescha¨ft
der Philosophie, am Modell des juristischen Prozesses erla¨utert’, in: Landgrebe L., editor,
9.Deutscher Kongress fu¨r Philosophie Du¨sseldorf 1969. Philosophie und Wissenschaft,
Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1972, 55–77).
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this section”.31 The beginning of this section, introducing the quaestiones
facti et iuris, runs as follows:
Die Rechtslehrer, wenn sie von Befugnissen und Anmaßungen
reden, unterscheiden in einem Rechtshandel die Frage u¨ber das,
was Rechtens ist (quid iuris), von der, die die Tatsache angeht
(quid facti), und indem sie von beiden Beweis fordern, so nennen
sie den ersteren, der die Befugnis, oder auch den Rechtsanspruch
dartun soll, die Deduktion. (KrV, B116).
It is important to see that answers to both questions require some kind
of proof (“indem sie von beiden Beweis fordern”) legitimizing a certain
competence to use (philosophical) concepts. The problem Kant faces here,
is the case in which there is no legal title to be found in experience, since
the concepts in question are “marked out for pure a priori employment, in
complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed
always demands a deduction.” (KrV, B117). In line with Kant’s project of
transcendental philosophy the quaestio iuris regarding pure concepts may be
paraphrased as the search not just for any legitimization, but for the ground
for legitimization “u¨berhaupt”. The search carried out in the transcendental
deduction results in this very concise dictum about the “I think”:
Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten ko¨nnen.
(KrV, B131)
The representation “I think” itself is an act of spontaneity and is also called
“pure apperception”, “original apperception” or “transcendental unity of
self-consciousness” (KrV, B132, cf. §6.4 above).
Kaulbach suggested a specific reading of this “I think” in relation to the
juridical physiognomy of theoretical reason.32 Instances of juridical discourse,
like this one, do not have just a “metaphorical function”. Kaulbach assumes:
“daß sich in ihnen vielmehr die Figuren gedanklichen Handelns darstellen,
die den tranzendental-philosophischen Ansatz von seinem Ursprung her
31Stoddard, ‘Reason on Trial . . . ’, 254. Cf. also David Roland Doublet, Die Vernunft
als Rechtsinstanz. Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft als Reflexionsprozeß der Vernunft,
Oslo/Paderborn: Solum Forlag/Scho¨ningh, 1989, (dissertation Bergen), 65. He recognizes
the importance of juridical discourse in this respect. He assigns judicial authority to reason,
but the purpose of his examination of KrV is rather to determine the viewpoint and process
of reflection, which constitutes this authority, than to pay systematic attention to (the
relation between) the legal metaphor and critique.
32Friedrich Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverha¨ltnis im Vernunftbegriff
Kants und der Bezug zwischen Recht und Gesellschaft’, in: F. Kaulbach and W. Krawietz,
editors, Recht und Gesellschaft, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1978, 263–286.
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eigentu¨mlich sind.” Both theoretical and practical reason share a “common
root” which may serve as the reason why examples from the field of practical
reason (i.e. the legal metaphor) perform a function at the level of theoretical
reason. This “common root” is described as:
die transzendentaljuridische Konstellation zwischen der Person als
dem Herrn der Sache und dieser als dem Tra¨ger von Brauchbarkeit
und Verfu¨gbarkeit sowie zwischen den in ihrer Herrschaft u¨ber
die Sachen einander anerkennenden Personen33
By “transzendental(juridisch)” Kaulbach means “daß die Konstellation
erstens die Bedingung der Mo¨glichkeit fu¨r das Recht der Person auf gebrauch
der Sache darstellt und daß sie zweitens eine auch in der theoretischen Ver-
nunft eigentu¨mliche Selbstgesetzgebung des Denkens—hier des praktischen
Denkens—einschließt”.34 On the one hand Kaulbach describes the implica-
tions of this root for Kant’s philosophy of right, but he also draws conclusions
regarding theoretical reason:
Das in die theoretische Vernunft eingehende transzendentaljuridi-
sche Grundverha¨ltnis erweist meine Stellung als die der Freiheit
gegenu¨ber der Gegensta¨ndlichkeit der Gegensta¨nde. Erkennbar-
keit ist eine Art von theoretischer Verfu¨gbarkeit u¨ber die Ge-
gensta¨nde. ‘Ich denke’ setzt nur die Sache in ein transzendentales
Verha¨ltnis, damit die Ausu¨bung der Erkenntnishandlungen an
ihr mo¨glich wird.35
He also maintains that “I want” in practical philosophy equals “I think” in
theoretical philosophy.36 In addition he states that “I think” also represents
some kind of decision, by means of which I declare representations of the
object (Gegenstand) to be mine.
In the sense of Kaulbach’s analysis “I think” is the decision which
makes possible the theoretical availability of objects, which is based on
the transcendental-juridical root and which justifies the applicability of the
categories that constitute knowledge of objects.37
33Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverha¨ltnis . . . ’, 268 (cf. also 277). Other
phrases characterising this root are: “eine gemeinsame und identische Wurzel von Erkennt-
nisvernunft und Rechtsvernunft”(265); “Konstellation”(269); “Grundverha¨ltnis”(277); and
“transzendentaljuridische Wurzel”(278).
34Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverha¨ltnis . . . ’, 268.
35Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverha¨ltnis . . . ’, 279.
36Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverha¨ltnis . . . ’, 278, cf. also 280.
37Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverha¨ltnis . . . ’, 279–280.
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Kaulbach’s reconstruction of the function of “I think” seems to be con-
firmed in a more recent article by Henrich on Kant’s notion of a deduction.38
In this article Henrich points to the historical background that enables us
to determine the function of the deduction in KrV. Deductions or the use
of deduction writings (Deduktionsschriften) were common juridical practice
in The Holy Roman Empire between the fourteenth and nineteenth century.
They served to justify claims which were the object of legal controversies.
Apart from these deduction writings there were also methodological studies
on the best way to write a deduction. Henrich compares Kant’s composition
of the transcendental deduction to the genre of the Deduktionsschriften.39
Theorists of natural law (Wolff, Pu¨tter, Achenwall) distinguished innate
(absolute) rights from acquired (hypothetical) rights which originate in a fact
or action, and they maintained that only in the case of the latter a deduction
could be provided. This deduction justifies the claim to the possession or
usage of something by tracing it back to its origin. Thus, the argumentative
structure of a deduction would have to relate a claim to an original fact, so
as to make clear the legitimacy of the claim (cf. KrV, B285–286).
Henrich40 links this methodological notion and the argumentative struc-
ture to the epistemological notion of the origin of knowledge in KrV. The
deduction of the pure concepts of understanding is intended to discover an
origin which would account for the legitimacy of their usage. This factual
origin is the “I think”: “the unity of apperception is the origin of the system of
the categories and the point of departure for the deduction of the legitimacy
of their usage.”41
Although the “I think” is a fact42, it is not to be confused with the fact
of an empirical deduction and the quaestio facti. An original fact grounds
legitimacy,43 whereas an approach in accordance with the Quid facti? merely
38Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction . . . ’. In footnote 4 of this article (at p. 252)
he makes a quite astonishing remark about an earlier article which initiated a debate on
the transcendental deduction that is still going on: “When I wrote the paper [sc. “The
Proof Structure of the Transcendental Deduction” of 1969], I had no idea what a deduction
consists in”.
39Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction . . . ’, 33–34.
40Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction . . . ’, 35–37, 39–40.
41Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction . . . ’, 45.
42“Fact” in the sense of “action” (Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction . . . ’, 35), cf.
“ein Actus seiner Selbstta¨tigkeit [. . . ] Man wird hier leicht gewahr, daß diese Handlung
urspru¨nglich einig, [. . . ] sein mu¨sse” (KrV, B130).
43Henrich refers to “original acquisition” (cf. MS in: AA VI, 258–260 regarding the
distinction facto, pacto, lege). Ishikawa also argues that the question Quid facti?, against
this background of natural law, is relevant in view of the transcendental deduction. Cf.
Ishikawa, ‘Zum Gerichtshof-Modell der Kategorien-Deduktion’.
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yields a physiology of understanding.44 There is yet another sense of the
unity of apperception which makes it possible to link the methodological
notion of a deduction to Kant’s other philosophical deductions, especially
the deduction of the concepts “space” and “time” and the deduction in
the second Critique.45 Because this “I think” in the second sense has the
property of accompanying every case of reflection, it holds a central position
in our system of knowledge, a position which may count as “original” with
respect to the various fields which are subject to reflection. Henrich’s analysis
of “reflection” supports this claim of the general methodological role of a
deduction.
Apart from Henrich’s claim about the relevance of the historical theory
of legal disputes for KrV, he also refers to the methodological importance
of Kant’s constant references to the juridical paradigm and to juridical
procedures.
7.5 Transcendental judgement
To my knowledge there is no secondary literature on Kant’s work explicitly
dealing with the second book of the Transcendental Analytic (viz. The
Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement, KrV, B169–349), in the context of
the legal metaphor. However, if this metaphor is the main methodological
paradigm and argumentative structure of KrV, the introduction and first
chapter of this book (KrV, B171–187) seem to be crucial for a coherent
reading of KrV in terms of the legal metaphor.
Kant describes the proper function of judgement in relation to the function
of understanding:
Wenn der Verstand u¨berhaupt als das Vermo¨gen der Regeln er-
kla¨rt wird, so ist Urteilskraft das Vermo¨gen unter Regeln zu
subsumieren, d.i. zu unterscheiden, ob etwas unter einer gegebe-
nen Regel (casus datae legis) stehe, oder nicht. (KrV, B171)
If we regard the concepts of understanding as “rules”, transcendental judge-
ment has to distinguish whether empirical intuitions stand under the cate-
gories or not. Adequate subsumption under the categories is also called the
application of categories to appearances (KrV, B176–177) and the subsump-
tion of an object under a concept (KrV, B176). Transcendental judgement
itself stands under no rule, but it is a “particular talent which can be prac-
tised only” (KrV, B172). However, there are particular conditions making the
44Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction . . . ’, 35–37.
45Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction . . . ’, 30, 37, 45.
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proper employment of judgement possible. These conditions are transcenden-
tal schemata, which serve as justifications for the application of categories.
Thus, Kant secures the legitimate (cf. an expression like “befugt sein” at
KrV, B188) use of transcendental judgement like he did in the case of the
transcendental deduction.
The function of judgement corresponds to one of the most important
activities of a judge, namely determining whether, and if so, to what extent a
given case stands under a certain rule or law.46 Both activities consist in the
application of rules. Kant refers to juridical terminology “casus datae legis”
(KrV, B171), and mentions the example of a judge.47 In both cases this
application of rules itself is not guided by rules, simply because there are no
such rules. This lack of meta-rules, so to speak, is exactly what characterises
judgement. Therefore, transcendental judgement cannot be taught; it can
only be practised. The result of a correct application of judgement is what
Kant calls an example, or concrete representation of something abstract. The
great benefit of examples or exemplary applications is the fact that they
sharpen the faculty of judgement (KrV, B173–174). Hence, the function of
examples in case of the faculty of judgement is comparable to the function
of jurisprudence in case of jurisdiction. Because there are no general rules to
guide and determine the application of judgement, schemata, examples or
jurisprudence serve as guidelines. They also serve the educational purpose to
“train” the exercise of judgement: “Dieses ist auch der einige und große Nutzen
der Beispiele: daß sie die Urteilskraft scha¨rfen”, and “So sind Beispiele der
Ga¨ngelwagen der Urteilskraft”.48
Thus we can see that knowledge by analogy is in fact the result of the
employment of judgement and it is at the same time the concrete example
(the legal metaphor) of something abstract (pure reason) serving to instruct
and train the faculty of judgement, a faculty which is indispensable in any
exercise of the faculty of knowledge in general. If the legal metaphor is an
appropriate image to represent the critique of pure reason, thereby compen-
sating the lack of any other means to represent or express what this critique
is about, it would be a token of Kant’s own “mature judgement”. The legal
metaphor, if consistently developed in the rest of KrV as an instructive exam-
ple for judgement, would also provide a framework to determine what rules
46In fact, determining whether a case stands under a law or not is a preliminary, but
necessary activity in order to decide whether a claim should be allowed or declared
inadmissable.
47“Richter” at KrV, B173. Other occurrences of “Richter” are: KrV, Axv, xxi, Bxiii, 27,
452, 558, 617, 767, 780, 817.
48KrV, B173–174, cf. KrV, B789.
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could possibly qualify as valid rules whenver the rules governing experience
are no longer applicable, i.e as soon as the field of possible experience is
transcended.49
7.6 An example of judgement: ius praetensum in R3357
The claim in the previous section about the important role of judgement
can be supported by an article by Hans Kiefner in which he maintains that
Kant’s use of metaphors taken from civil law is not insignificant, because
his knowledge of contemporary Prussian civil law (“Zivilrecht”) and civil
procedural law (“Zivilproceßrecht”) was quite precise and sophisticated, and
because he knew how to apply this knowledge in a philosophical context.50
This claim is founded upon an extensive analysis of Reflexion 3357 (AA XVI,
797) which is compared to legal practices in Kant’s time.51
For our present purpose two specific features of this Reflexion need our
attention, for, according to Kant, the judge performs two distinct activities:
Der Richter soll 1. als inquirent analytisch verfahren [. . . ] 2. als
Richter muß er synthetisch verfahren” (R3357).
Both activities, however, require judgement in the sense of subsumption or
comparison of the data involved. In this case these data are: the law or right
that has been appealed to, and the facts relevant to this law. On this basis
the judge can (synthetically) make a decision.
As to the first, analytic activity of the judge, Kiefner maintains that this
is in fact an answer to a quaestio facti.52 In order to determine what is the
49Of course, the relation between judgement, schema and example also points to the
relevance of Kant’s KU which deals with reflective judgement (as distinguished from
determining judgement in KrV). We need to adopt the standpoint of reflection in order
to figure out what rules apply when determining whether Kant adopted the appropriate
metaphor. Lyotard (in: Lyotard, Het enthousiasme . . . , I (34–46)) discusses this relevance
by pointing to the analogy between critique and politics and by mentioning the tribunal
and the judge.
50Hans Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum. Preußisches Zivil- und Zivilprozeßrecht, richterliche
Methode und Naturrecht im Spiegel einer Reflexion Kants zur Logik’, in: F. Kaulbach and
W. Krawietz, editors, Recht und Gesellschaft, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1978, 287–318.
51Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 289–290, 294–298, 304–305. On the basis of this analysis
and comparison Kiefner offers a reconstruction of a legal case which at least resembles the
one Kant is referring to in R3357. The details of Kiefner’s reconstruction need not bother
us here. He stresses that it has been “ ‘erfunden’. Sie entha¨lt aber in ihrem verfahrens- und
materiellrechtlichen Grundgefu¨ge, auf das allein es ankommt, nichts, was nicht auch Kants
Reflexion, im Kontext des zeitgeno¨ssischen Zivil- und Zivilproceßrechts gelesen, entha¨lt.”
(Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 299).
52Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 300.
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case (the relevant facts) it should be clear to the judge what is required to
make up a relevant whole of facts given the law under consideration (ius
praetensum). In other words, he has to determine what has to be presupposed
in order to make up a case at all, given some law
Also muß er doch das ius praetensum vorher erwa¨gen, um a priori
zu bestimmen, was dazu erforderlich ist. [. . . ] Dies muß vorher
allgemein beym Richter ausgemacht seyn (R3357).53
Thus, the judge has to determine which aspects of the law in general are
relevant in the present case. These relevant aspects are called momenta in iure,
constituting the juridical “fact” (“der rechtliche/gesetzliche Tatbestand”).54
According to Kiefner this is the first application of judgement.55
In view of these momenta in iure the parties involved have to supply
factual evidence in support of their claims, and the judge has to examine
to what extent these momenta in facto are relevant to the momenta in
iure, in other words: with regard to all possible facts (varia facti) he has
to determine which particular facts matter in the present case. Therefore,
to every momentum in iure there has to be a corresponding momentum in
facto. This requires subsumption of momenta facti under momenta in iure
in view of all varia facti.56 Thus the judge determines what is the case:
Unter den Tatbestand ist dann der konkrete Sachverhalt zu sub-
sumieren, der sich aus den ‘momenta in facto’ zusammensetzt.
Genauer: Fu¨r jedes momentum in iure muß sich ein ihm entspre-
chendes momentum in facto feststellen lassen.57
Taken together the momenta in facto constitute an idea facti, a picture or
representation of what is the case.58
Thus far the method of inquiry has been analytic. Now that it is clear
which law applies and what is the case, the judge proceeds to a synthetic
activity: passing judgement, i.e. determining the concrete consequences of
the application of the law (in general) to this specific case (idea facti), which
again requires subsumption.59 The proper function of judgement is thus
53Still a prior consideration would have had to determine whether the case was admissable
or not. Kant was aware of the need to do so in court (cf. R454), but does not deal with it
here (Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 301–302).
54Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 302, 313.
55Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 313.
56Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 302–303, 305–306.
57Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 302-303.
58Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 309, 313.
59Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 307–308, 314–317.
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exemplified in the task of a judge as described in R3357 and as summarised
by Kiefner as the mediation between what is empirical and what is right.60
On the basis of his reconstruction and his analysis of R3357 Kiefner
concludes that Kant knew very well what he was talking about when he
referred to the judge and the lawsuit. In the course of interpreting Kant’s
use of juridical argumentation one has to take into account that one is not
dealing with meaningless metaphors.61
7.7 Transcendental Dialectic—paralogisms
Two basic elements have been dealt with in the preceding examination of
the legal metaphor in the Transcendental Analytic: 1) the transcendental de-
duction of the categories and 2) their application by means of transcendental
judgement. As far as these elements justify claims of knowledge they can
only do so if “knowledge” is understood in the sense of “possible experience”.
The categories are constitutive to experience. They are the rules that all
rational endeavours have to comply with if claims of knowledge are to be
valid. Notwithstanding this example of “philosophical legislation” (KrV,
B867) or “constitution”62 reason has a natural disposition to break these
laws and to extend knowledge beyond the limits of (possible) experience.
This disposition is called “metaphysics” (KrV, Avii, B21). Especially claims
regarding the objects of what is called the metaphysica specialis, the soul,
the world, and the existence of God, will thus inevitably lead to dialectical
illusions. The Transcendental Dialectic of KrV is aimed at discovering the
illusory features of this kind of metaphysical knowledge.
While exposing the dialectic of pure reason Kant himself cannot fall back
on the pretension of having better knowledge of the soul, the world and
God’s existence, for any claim about these objects is transcendent and its
validity can never be determined. Kant’s purpose, therefore, is to discredit
the claims and arguments of rational psychology, cosmology and theology.
To do so, he employs a specific argumentative strategy. The importance
of the legal metaphor in the Transcendental Dialectic consists in the fact
that it supplies typically juridical modes of argumentation which are used
in the course of assessing the validity of the proofs supporting the claims
60Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 313–314.
61Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 317: “dass es sich bei der Verwendung zivilprozessualer
Vorstellungen in nicht rechtsphilosophischen Texten nur um wenig aussagekra¨ftige Meta-
phern handelt, kann man danach nicht annehmen. Dies wird man bei der Interpretation aller
Stellen, in denen Kant sich zivilprozessualer Argumentation bedient, beachten mu¨ssen.”
62Friedrich Stenzler, Die Verfassung der Vernunft, Berlin: Publica, 1984, ch. III–iii.
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of the metaphysica specialis. In the present section we will examine Kant’s
evaluation of paralogisms. In the next two sections his argumentation in case
of antinomy and proofs for God’s existence will be addressed.
As to the paralogisms chapter one should carefully distinguish the KrV,
A-version (A341–405) from the KrV, B-version (B399–432).63 The A-version
presents each paralogism and its critical evaluation according to the table of
the categories (A 344–345 = B402–403, 406). The end of the chapter is quite
an extensive “Consideration of Pure Psychology as a whole, in view of these
Paralogisms” (A381–405). All four critical evaluations of the paralogisms
maintain that the “I” as a thinking being cannot be dealt with in the
same way as sensual objects and concepts are dealt with. Any such attempt
will necessarily fail, since the conditions of possible experience are thereby
transcended.64 Apart from these material considerations Kant makes formal
or methodological remarks in the “Consideration of Pure Psychology . . . ”.
Only “the sobriety of a critique, at once strict and just” will prevent reason
from dogmatic illusions about thinking subjects (A 395). The methodological
sense of critical objection is indicated in Kant’s description of “critical
objection” as something directed against the proof of a proposition:
Der kritische Einwurf, weil er den Satz in seinem Werte oder
Unwerte unangetastet la¨ßt, und nur den Beweis anficht, bedarf gar
nicht, den Gegenstand besser zu kennen, oder sich einer besseren
Kenntnis desselben anzumaßen; er zeigt nur, daß die Behauptung
grundlos, nicht, daß sie unrichtig sei.65
Kant’s awareness of the methodological strength of critical objection
seems to have been the most important reason for the substantial reduction
of the paralogisms chapter in the B-edition.66 For, if we assume Kant had
written down the paralogisms chapter in the A-version before he started
63Detailed discussion of this point is offered by Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ‘Kant’s Paral-
ogismen’, Kant-Studien, 84 (1993), 408–425. The beginning of the chapter (A341–348)
remained unaltered in the second edition (B399–406). However, the remaining 58 pages of
the A-version were cut back to 26 pages (B406–432).
64However, a crucial reservation should be made here. One is allowed to claim the
substantiality of the soul in the idea (as opposed to real substantiality) (KrV, A350–351) in
view of practical employment (A365, B166n, B431–432). The same applies to the existence
of God (KrV, B662).
65KrV, A388. At A389 Kant goes on: “Der kritische [Einwurf] ist allein von der Art,
daß, indem er bloß zeigt, man nehme zum Behuf seiner Behauptung etwas an, was nichtig
und bloß eingebildet ist, die Theorie stu¨rzt, dadurch, daß sie ihr die angemaßte Grundlage
entzieht, ohne sonst etwas u¨ber die Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes ausmachen zu wollen.”
Cf. “Beweisart” in KrV, Bxxxixn.
66The method of critical objection resembles the strategy of “Verfahrenskritik” mentioned
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writing the texts of the following chapters, which clearly elaborate on this
conception of critique, critical objection and practical interest, his later
work on the B-version of the paralogisms could benefit a great deal from the
methodology of critique. This is exactly what seems to be the case, for not only
did Kant restrict his material considerations to a brief summary (B406–413)
and a refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof (B413–422), but he also phrased his
methodological remarks in closer connection to the transcendental doctrine of
method (§7.10). For example, he refers to rational psychology as a discipline,
setting limits to speculative reason in view of the practical employment of
reason (B421, B430–431; cf. B769) and he mentions the practical advantage
of critique (B424–425). My claim in this respect would be that the B-version
could be cut down to more than half the size, since the function of critical
objections (in relation to practical employment) could be emphasized more
easily, because it had been dealt with more extensively in subsequent parts
of KrV (A). The considerations concerning the philosophical content of the
paralogisms did not deserve the attention drawn to them in the A-version
and so the argumentative strategy, which had already been prepared in
the A-version, could be stressed at the expense of material qualifications.
Emphasis on the mode of argumentation confirms an evaluation of Kant’s
arguments in terms of the legal metaphor, for, as we shall see, the method
of critical objection (as presented in the chapter on the discipline of pure
reason) is typically juridical.
7.8 Transcendental Dialectic—antinomy
The chapter on the antinomy of pure reason presents a clear and crucial
example of the legal metaphor: the image of a tribunal, or “das Gerichtshof-
Modell” (Ishikawa). Its occurrence at this point in the KrV need not come as
a surprise. Transcendental Analytic provided the basic (a priori) concepts and
principles of the legislation of reason (B350), on which basis an assessment
of the validity and legitimacy of the pretensions of reason is possible. Once
legislation has taken place reason is able to employ a judiciary function.
Both these perspectives on reason are present in the antinomy chapter,
but attention shall be focused on the judiciary function. The presence of
many references to juridical discourse point to an increasing significance
of the legal metaphor: granting a fair hearing and doing justice (“Geho¨r
und Gerechtigkeit”) to the arguments for the counterposition (KrV, B434);
by L. Ga¨be in an unpublished dissertation (Marburg 1954). This strategy as well as the
reference to Ga¨be is mentioned in Horstmann, ‘Kant’s Paralogismen’, 410–411.
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“Verlegenheit der Richter bei Rechtsha¨ndeln” (B452); legislation (B452);
“Advokatenbeweis” (B458; cf. R3474); pretensions and legal claims (B490–
491); contested rights (B493); the jury in a trial (B504); knowledge of right
and wrong (B504–505); tribunal of reason (B529); rightly (“mit Recht”)
(B529, 539); pretension of reason and the judge (B558).
A more specific indication for the image of the tribunal is the description
of the antinomy itself: the conflict of (the laws of pure) reason.67 This is also
called “antithetic” (B433) and “the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly
dogmatic knowledge (thesis cum antithesi) in which no one assertion can
establish superiority over another.” (B448). Confronted with an antinomical
situation there seem to be three options to overcome a deadlock: 1) dogmatic
assertion (thesis), 2) sceptical denial (antithesis) and, eventually, refusal
to take the antinomy seriously resulting in indifference with regard to its
outcome, and 3) critical evaluation of both thesis and antithesis by means
of the sceptical method.68 The first two options mark the “death of sound
philosophy” (KrV, B434) since they are not compatible with the purpose
and need of reason, i.e. unity, and the application of the laws of reason. Kant
propagates the third option of critical evaluation like he had already done
in the paralogisms chapter. “The critical path alone” (B884) is “a path to
certainty” (B449) that brings reason and its conflict to a conclusion.
In case of the antinomy this method of evaluation is described as the
sceptical method, which is altogether very different from scepticism (B451,
514, 791–792, 797) and sceptical refusal mentioned above.
Diese Methode, einem Streite der Behauptungen zuzusehen, oder
vielmehr ihn selbst zu veranlassen, [. . . ] kann man die skeptische
Methode nennen. Sie ist vom Skeptizismus ga¨nzlich unterschieden
[. . . ] Denn die skeptische Methode geht auf Gewißheit, dadurch,
daß sie, in einem solchen, auf beide Seiten redlichgemeinten und
67KrV, B434–435. Stenzler (Stenzler, Die Verfassung der Vernunft , ch. III–v) deals with
the antinomy as the lawsuit of reason. The dialectical illusion of the antinomy is inevitable
and necessary since it originates in a natural inclination of reason to unify knowledge of
understanding (experience). Antinomy arises because of the need to unify knowledge (by
reason and by means of ideas) on the basis of the rules of understanding. However, this
unity will be either too small for reason (due to the conditions of empirical knowledge) or
too large for understanding (due to the conditions of rational knowledge), which is exactly
the conflict in question.
68KrV, B434, 451–452. These three options remind us of dogmatic, sceptical and crit-
ical objections at KrV, A388 and of the very beginning of KrV where Kant depicts the
“prehistory” of reason: despotic dogmatism, anarchist and nomadic scepticism, and indiffer-
ence (KrV, Avii–xi). The dogmatic approach in (speculative) philosophy is refuted (KrV,
B740–766) just as is unsatisfactory sceptical indifference (KrV, B786–797).
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mit Verstande gefu¨hrten Streit, den Punkt des Mißversta¨ndnisses
zu entdecken sucht, um, wie weise Gesetzgeber tun, aus der Ver-
legenheit der Richter bei Rechtsha¨ndeln fu¨r sich selbst Belehrung
[. . . ] zu ziehen. (KrV, B451–452)
It is clear that in Kant’s own opinion antinomy and the sceptical method
are linked to legal practice. According to Ishikawa69 the sceptical method is
defined in juridical terms, which led Kant to identify the antinomy with a
conflict in court. Both the image of the tribunal and the sceptical method are
characteristic of Kant’s philosophy throughout its development.70 However,
sceptical method and critical evaluation should not be identified tout court.
Such an identification would neglect specific features of either method. Scep-
tical method as a mode of investigation is applied within a judiciary context
to figure out what laws apply and to what extent they apply or fail to apply.
Critical examination and the subsequent formulation of critical judgement are
carried out in view of legislation (of reason). The legal metaphor provides the
comprehensive framework for these perspectives, both of which are present
in the above quotation (sc. as legislator and judge).
Application of the sceptical method is possible only if there is a third
position apart from the two alternatives offered in each antinomy (thesis
or antithesis).71 In view of these alternatives there has to be an impartial
position from which the sceptical method may be applied, and, secondly,
there has to be a typical kind of judgement that is fit to express the results of
the sceptical method from an impartial standpoint. This kind of judgement
is called infinite judgement (see next chapter). Impartiality and infinite
judgement refer to the legal practice in a court of justice.
The impartial viewpoint is necessary since the common procedure to
construct proofs in support of either thesis or antithesis is not sufficient
to come to a conclusive solution. Dogmatic assertions and sceptic denials
leave the matter unsettled. The possibility of impartiality with respect
to the antinomy is based on the legislation of reason as presented in the
Transcendental Analytic which provides the point of reference to determine
the validity of (dogmatic or sceptic) claims of (cosmological) knowledge.
This critical impartiality is determined in terms of the legal metaphor. It
69Fumiyasu Ishikawa, Kants Denken von einem Dritten. Das Gerichtshof-Modell und
das unendliche Urteil in der Antinomienlehre, Frankfurt am Main/Bern/New York/Paris:
Lang, 1990, (Studien zur Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, 2), 9–11.
70Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 16–26.
71That is why Ishikawa refers to “Kants Denken von einem Dritten”. Cf. also “ein Drittes”
wich was discussed in the context of synthesis in §6.4.
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is the position of an “impartial umpire”.72 Kant also appeals to this kind
of impartiality on the part of his readers and he calls them “judges”.73
The juridical nature of this impartiality is emphasised when Kant makes
a comparison between legislation in case of reason and political legislation
which marks the transition from a state of nature to the status civilis. Kant
explicitly mentions this comparison at KrV, B779–780:
Man kann die Kritik der reinen Vernunft als den wahren Gerichts-
hof fu¨r alle Streitigkeiten derselben ansehen [. . . ] Ohne dieselbe
ist die Vernunft gleichsam im Stande der Natur [. . . ].
Antinomy offers an example of reason in its natural state. Kant also adopts
the image of chivalrous fights (KrV, B450–451) and the image of (the history
of) metaphysics as the battlefield of endless controversies (KrV, Avii–x).
Critique and legislation put an end to ongoing struggles and controversies
and it “secures to us the peace of a legal order”.74 In the case of reason this
state of rest is called “indifference”.
Reason is indifferent with respect to what is at stake in the antinomy
so long as thesis and antithesis claim theoretical knowledge. Its purpose,
however, is not to assign theoretical, objective validity, but to discover the
source of dialectical illusion and to offer an assessment of the arguments
employed in support of it. An impartial approach, however, seems impossible
because reason is not indifferent by nature:
“Es ist na¨mlich umsonst, Gleichgu¨ltigkeit in Ansehung solcher
Nachforschungen [sc. in metaphysics] erku¨nsteln zu wollen, deren
Gegenstand der menschlichen Natur nicht gleichgu¨ltig sein kann.”
(KrV, Ax)
Also in the antinomy chapter Kant states that there is no excuse for avoiding
the antinomy (e.g. by claiming sceptic ignorance); reason is inevitably forced
to solve the problem (KrV, B505–506). Therefore, Kant presents “the interest
of reason” immediately after his presentation of the antinomy. Reason has
specific and quite demanding interests. There is, for example, a practical
interest;75 a speculative interest;76 and an architectonic interest.77 Reason
has some interest on every side of the antinomical conflict, which seems to
72KrV, B451, 503–504.
73KrV, Axv, xxi; Bxl–xli, xliv.
74KrV, B779.
75KrV, B492, 496, 769, 772, 832.
76KrV, B494, 496.
77KrV, B502–503.
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endanger a succesful appeal to impartiality. In other words, the impartial
approach by means of the sceptical method depends on the possibility to
formulate a critical alternative to the dialectical illusion of the antinomy
which is compatible with legislation as well as with the interest of reason.
This brings us to the second point mentioned above; infinite judgement.
After the presentation of the antinomy, and the determination of the
interest of reason, Kant stresses once more the necessity to come to a solution
(KrV, B504–512) and he presents a sceptical summary of the cosmological
questions (KrV, B513–518). Having done so, he is able to come to a critical
conclusion with the help of the principles of transcendental idealism.78 This
critical conclusion, or rather “decision”,79 settles the conflict of reason, just
like a judicial sentence settles a legal dispute. This decision is reached after an
analysis of the (first) antinomy in terms of an infinite judgement. The decision
itself is also expressed in the form of an infinite judgement. Infinite judgement
is already introduced at the beginning of Transcendental Logic (KrV, B95–98)
and it is an affirmative judgement containing a negative predicate, as in Kant’s
example “The soul is non-mortal.” Because of this negative predicate infinite
judgement cannot be reduced to a simple affirmation, nor to a negation, since
the latter would require a negative copula. Therefore, infinite judgement offers
the possibility of expressing something that differs from simple affirmation or
negation. This characteristic makes it possible to formulate an alternative to
the thesis (affirmation) and the antithesis (negation) in the antinomy. It is an
alternative that reflects impartiality, as well as a certain indifference regarding
the antinomy. The nature of this alternative bears the characteristic mark of
real repugnancy (according to the first rule of real opposition in Negative
Gro¨ßen); there are two positive grounds (claims of knowledge put forward as
thesis and antithesis), the effects of which are reciprocally cancelled and as a
result the solution to the antinomy does not represent knowledge, but rather
meta-level knowledge.80 In the next chapter this relation between infinite
judgement and real repugnance will be discussed in greater detail.
The contribution of infinite judgement to the solution of the antinomy is
twofold. Firstly, Kant employs an infinite reading of the predicate “endlich”
78More particularly: the distinction between appearance and thing in itself (KrV, B518–
525); cf. Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 101–110.
79Kemp Smith translated “Entscheidung” (KrV, B525) into “solution”, whereas “decision”
is more appropriate since it reflects the legal connotation of “Entscheidung” (cf. also
“Sentenz” in KrV, B780).
80Ishikawa also offers this interpretation of the solution in terms of real repugnance,
though he puts emphasis on the transcendental aspect, cf. Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . ,
104–110
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(“finite”), namely “nichtunendlich” (“non-infinite”) (KrV, B532). Due to
this reading Kant is able to discover the source of dialectical illusion in the
first antinomy and to unmask it as a dialectical opposition.81 Secondly, the
sentence expressing the critical decision about this dialectical opposition also
takes the form of an infinite judgement, since it declares both statements
in the (first antinomical) opposition to be untrue.82 Ishikawa regards this
function of infinite judgement as the most significant example of the presence
and importance of the image of the tribunal:
In diesem Sinne kann man zu Recht sagen, daß es das unend-
liche Urteil ist, das die Tiefenschicht des ganzen Prozesses der
Vernunftkritik, insbesondere die der Antinomienlehre, beherrscht.
Jene “ho¨here und richterliche Vernunft”kann deswegen mit Recht
als der Tra¨ger des unendlichen Urteils, ja sogar als dieses Ur-
teilsmoment selbst, charakterisiert werden in dem Sinne, daß sie
bei der Pra¨sentation und der Pru¨fung der Antinomie sich auf
den dritten Standort setzt und am Ende ein drittes Urteil fa¨llt.
(Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 82)
In addition to this analysis of the first antinomy, which is primarily based on
Ishikawa’s study, one could add yet another consideration regarding infinite
judgement in the context of the legal metaphor. In fact, infinite judgement
creates the possibility of making assertions which are neither purely affirma-
tive, nor negative. Against the background of the Transcendental Analytic
one could say that neither the legitimacy (validity), nor the illegitimacy of
an infinite judgement can be proven, which makes this kind of judgement
not-invalid (understood in an infinite sense). In a juridical context it is not
uncommon to refer to actions or statements in terms of non-invalidity, or
non-illegitimacy. Such references, however, do not imply any validity, or
legitimacy. As we shall see in §7.10, §8.5 and §8.7 below, Kant will use
this feature of infinite judgement in his argumentative strategy for practical
purposes. In doing so he will make explicit reference to the legal metaphor.
7.9 Transcendental Dialectic—proofs of the existence of God
There are no explicit references to the legal metaphor in commentaries and
interpretations of the third chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic, “The
81Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 89–100.
82KrV, B532, 559; cf. Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 96–98, 117–118. In the case of dynamic
antinomy both statements may be true (KrV, B560, 590).
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Ideal of Pure Reason”.83 However, the terminology of the legal metaphor
turns up again at the beginning and towards the end of this chapter and also
in the appendix to the entire Transcendental Dialectic.84
As to the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological proofs of
the existence of God (KrV, B619), Kant concludes that any such proof is
impossible, since speculative reason is not fit to claim and justify knowledge
about the existence of things transcending the possibility of experience. His
arguments are in line with the preceding cases of dialectical illusions.
The reason why juridical terminology turns up again at the end of
this chapter and at the end of the Transcendental Dialectic as a whole, is
that it supplies the appropriate terms to sum up the main result of the
Transcendental Dialectic. The legal metaphor provides the framework for a
more general conclusion. Although knowledge of a highest being and proofs
of its existence are not possible, transcendental theology may be employed
negatively, i.e. to prevent speculative reason from transcending experience,
while at the same time it is clear that there is no proof to the contrary
(the non-existence of God) either. This negative employment is called the
permanent censorship of our reason. In the concluding part of the Dialectic,
this lack of proof to the contrary causes Kant to speak of the regulative
use of ideas, as opposed to the constitutive use. The very last paragraph
of this part of KrV provides a short summary of the results thus far. The
investigation of the dialectical illusion is called a “laborious interrogation
of all dialectical witnesses” and a “lawsuit”, the records of which are to be
deposited in the archives of human reason (KrV, B731–732).
83Heimsoeth only mentions it in a footnote, cf. Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale
Dialektik. Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
& Co, 1966–1971, 643n.
84Tarbet noticed that metaphors often appear at these points in KrV (Tarbet, ‘The
Fabric of Metaphor . . . ’, 257. Examples of the terminology are: “nichts . . . was . . . einen
gegru¨ndetern Anspruch machen ko¨nnte.” (KrV, B614); “Gunst, um den Mangel seiner Recht-
sanspru¨che zu ersetzen” (B615); “die Vernunft wu¨rde bei ihr selbst, als dem nachsehendsten
Richter, keine Rechtfertigung finden” (B617); “justify” (“mit Recht . . . postulieren”) (B662);
“Rechtfertigung” (B663); “rechtfertige(n)” (B666–667, 698); “eine besta¨ndige Zensur un-
serer Vernunft” (B668); “unaufho¨rliche Zensur einer . . . Vernunft” (B669); “Vernunft
. . . , dieser oberste Gerichtshof aller Rechte und Anspru¨che unserer Spekulation” (B697);
“(transzendentale) Deduktion” (B697–699); “Gesetzgebung unserer Vernunft” (B728); “An-
maßung(en)” (B729, 731); “Abho¨rung aller . . . Zeugen” (B730); “die Akten dieses Prozesses”
(B732).
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7.10 Transcendental Doctrine of Method
In this part of KrV the notion of a tribunal (“Gerichtshof”) occurs three
times (KrV, B768, 779, 815). Discussion of these passages in connection with
the legal metaphor is almost absent in secondary sources.85 Perhaps this is
due to a relative neglect of this part of KrV in Kant scholarship, but there is
good reason not only to stress the importance of this part of KrV in regard
to the project of critique, but also to regard the doctrine of method as crucial
at least insofar as the legal metaphor is concerned. In the doctrine of method
the function and significance of the legal metaphor reach their full extent,
notably because the tribunal occupies a prominent position.86
In the introduction the transcendental doctrine of method is defined as
“die Bestimmung der formalen Bedingungen eines vollsta¨ndigen Systems der
reinen Vernunft” and Kant compares it to what is called “practical logic”.
This doctrine comprises a discipline, a canon, an architectonic and a history
of pure reason (KrV, B735–736). In KrV the former two constitute the major
part of the transcendental doctrine of method (sc. B736–859); only 24 pages
deal with the latter two. The chapters on discipline and canon deal with two
points that have been mentioned above: the negative function of critique
(discipline) and the practical relevance (canon). We will concentrate on this
negative function.
Discipline is “the compulsion, by which the constant tendency to disobey
certain rules is restrained and finally extirpated” (KrV, B737). Due to its
natural tendency to transcend the limits of possible experience, reason is
in need of negative instruction preventing itself from errors. As such it is
the “natural” and more systematic continuation of censure (safeguarding
us from particular errors) and critique (ridding us of their causes) (KrV,
B739). If we regard the Transcendental Analytic as the legislation of reason
(pure understanding), discipline is a negative legislation providing systematic
instructions against systematic errors (KrV, B737). Thus, discipline of pure
reason serves formal and methodological purposes regarding the way reason
should be employed; it supplies “negative instruction”(KrV, B737) and
“admonitory negative teaching” (KrV, B740).87 Kant distinguishes between
85Exceptions are: Onora O’Neill, ‘Vindicating reason’, in: Paul Guyer, editor, The
Cambridge Companion to Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 280–308;
and Volker Gerhardt, ‘Die Disziplin der reinen Vernunft, 2. bis 4. Abschnitt’, in: G. Mohr
and M. Willaschek, editors, Immanuel Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Berlin: Akademie
Verlag, 1998, (Klassiker Auslegen, Band 17/18), 571–595.
86O’Neill and Gerhardt discuss the function of the tribunal in light of the political
dimension of reason.
87As to “discipline”, “canon” and “critique” cf. Giorgio Tonelli, Kant’s Critique of Pure
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discipline of pure reason in its dogmatical, polemical, hypothetical and
demonstrative employment.
Discipline in respect of the dogmatical employment of reason shows the
inapplicability of the mathematical method in philosophy. Discipline with
regard to hypotheses is to prevent us from improper use of hypotheses (i.e.
if they are not part of the practical employment of reason, KrV, B804).
As to the discipline of pure reason with regard to its proofs, Kant directly
refers to the legal metaphor: “Ein jeder muß seine Sache vermittelst eines
durch transzendentale Deduktion der Beweisgru¨nde gefu¨hrten rechtlichen
Beweises, d.i. direkt, fu¨hren” (KrV, B822). The part on discipline regarding
the polemical employment of reason, however, deserves more attention, for
here the metaphor is present right from the beginning and the relevance of
this section stretches over other sections as well (it is used at KrV, B424,
B804–810).
The possibility of the polemical employment of reason may come as a
surprise to any reader of KrV who is familiar with the results achieved
sofar. In the course of the critique legislation, application of the rules, and
negative legislation have been provided for in order to render impossible any
situation that would be polemical, i.e. a situation where opposing parties
put forward claims, while denying the claim of the other. In fact, Kant
states: “Auf solche Weise gibt es eigentlich gar keine Antithetik der reinen
Vernunft” (KrV, B771), and: “So gibt es demnach keine eigentliche Polemik
im Felde der reinen Vernunft.” (KrV, B784). By now, it should be clear that
the critique of pure reason supplies the means for deciding about claims of
knowledge in every possible case of conflict: “Man kann die Kritik der reinen
Vernunft als den wahren Gerichtshof fu¨r alle Streitigkeiten derselben ansehen”
(KrV, B779). This reference to the tribunal is part of a larger passage where
Kant compares the function of critique to political legislation, marking the
transition from a status naturalis into a status civilis as described by Hobbes.
Conflicts in the state of nature are wars, which can only be ended by victory
of one party over another. Conflicts in a status civilis have to be submitted
to a tribunal and then the conflict has the form of a legal process, which ends
in a judicial sentence (making possible perpetual peace, KrV, B779–780).
Subjection to the tribunal of pure reason therefore implies the impos-
sibility of truly polemic conflicts. Yet, Kant describes a kind of polemical
employment of reason which is still open for consideration. This description
explores the meaning of the legal metaphor to its furthest reaches. The
Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic, Hildesheim/Zu¨rich/New York: Georg Olms,
1994, (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Band 37), 98–105, 116–118.
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polemical employment of pure reason means: “die Verteidigung ihrer Sa¨tze
gegen die dogmatische Verneinungen derselben.” (KrV, B767–768). This
defense is carried out by stressing the fact that any such dogmatic denial
cannot be demonstrated. On the other hand there is also no proof available in
support of its own assertions, which are, presumably, dogmatic affirmations
(cf. KrV, B767, 769). But this lack of proof does not affect this dogmatic
claim as long as it is made in view of the (practical) interest of reason (KrV,
B769–770, 772). If these affirmative claims were speculative, they would have
to be repudiated right away, just like dogmatically negative claims. Hence,
reason is employed polemically in defense of dogmatic assertions with respect
to the practical interest, if it points to the fact that opposite denials are
indemonstrable. Because of the fact that there is no proof to the contrary,
reason is entitled to assert its practical-dogmatic standpoint. The burden of
proof rests with the party challenging this position: “Der Gegner soll also
beweisen.” (KrV, B805). This kind of justification in support of a claim is
characterized as “kat’ anthro¯pon”, and is further described in legal terms:
“eine Rechtfertigung kat> Łnjrwpon [. . . ], die wider alle Beeintra¨chtigung si-
chert, und ein titulierten Besitz verschafft” (KrV, B767).88 Kant mentions
similar justifications in case of the discipline with regard to hypotheses (KrV,
B804–806; cf. MS, AA VI, 354) summarizing the main point in the phrase
“melior est conditio possidentis”.89 In §7.7 above it was shown that Kant also
applied this argumentative stategy to the subject of thought in a practical
perspective.
Polemical employment of reason represents an alternative to legislation
and negative legislation of reason. It takes advantage of the opportunity to do
what is allowed, which is something that is neither prohibited, nor obligatory.
With this alternative function of reason the meaning of the legal metaphor
is extended. Not only does it comprise legal and juridical moments, but it
also contains an explicitly political connotation.90 This shift of perspective
88Cf. KrV, B768: “Denn wir sind alsdenn doch nicht bittweise in unserem Besitze, wenn
wir einen, obzwar nicht hinreichenden, Titel derselben vor uns haben, und es vo¨llig gewiß
ist, daß niemand die Unrechtma¨ßigkeit dieses Besitzes jemals beweisen ko¨nne.”
89KrV, B805. Cf. “Besitz” and “titulus possessionis” in MS, AA VI, 251. The formula
“Beati possidentes!” is a principle of natural right, cf. MS, AA VI, 251, 257; and AA VIII,
395.
90Cf. Stenzler expresses this view right from the beginning (and refers to the legal
metaphor continuously, but does not evaluate it expressis verbis). As to the political
implications cf. Peter Burg, ‘Der politische Gehalt der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’ ’, in:
Akten des 5.Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz 1981, Volume I.2, Bonn: Bouvier
Verlag, 1981, 898–908; and O’Neill, ‘Reason and politics . . . ’; and O’Neill, ‘Vindicating
reason’. More recently O. Ho¨ffe has proposed a political reading of KrV, cf. Otfried Ho¨ffe,
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into an alternative direction is introduced in Kant’s following remark:
Ganz anders ist es bewand, wenn sie [die reine Vernunft] es
nicht mit der Zensur des Richters, sondern den Anspru¨chen ihres
Mitbu¨rgers zu tun hat, und sich dagegen bloß verteidigen soll.
(KrV, B767)
This additional connotation of the metaphor does not diminish or alter its
importance and function. On the contrary, this enrichment only makes the
metaphor more fruitful and increases its expressiveness. It also does not harm
the legal and juridical moments contained in the metaphor. What is more,
these moments presuppose a political connotation in a twofold sense. Kant’s
reference to Hobbes’s state of nature (KrV, B779–780) makes clear that a
lawful order itself is based on pre-eminently political events (termination
of the state of nature and submission to the constraint of law). Secondly,
the political connotation that is introduced at this stage of KrV makes it
possible to differentiate between different perspectives on law. In case of
the Transcendental Doctrine of Method it is civil law which provides the
context to deal with conflicts.91 In the case of the transcendental doctrine
of elements, on the other hand, it is rather criminal law which provides the
framework to employ the legal metaphor in order to describe the purifying,
corrective and censoring functions of critique.
7.11 Conclusion
The discussion and detailed evaluation of literature on specific occurrences
of the legal metaphor and the additional presentation of neglected but
characteristic aspects of this metaphor in KrV show that the legal metaphor
is indeed a pervasive and predominant metaphor in KrV. It is clear that the
most significant function of the metaphor is to determine the argumentative
‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Eine kosmo-politische Lektu¨re’, in: Ko¨nigliche Vo¨lker. Zu Kants
kosmopolitischer Rechts- und Friedenstheorie, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001,
(Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1519), 238–263, especially 246. T. Hirata claimed
that in KrV B the “Polizeimodell” is substituted for the “Gerichtshofmodell” of KrV, Axi
and that this “Polizeimodell” is characteristic of KrV. In this claim the continuous presence
of the legal metaphor in KrV, B seems to be underestimated or even misunderstood. The
“Polizeimodell” is not a substitute, but rather an addition to, or a modification of the legal
metaphor. It seems to highlight the political connotation. (cf. Toshihiro Hirata, ‘Kants
Modellwechsel im Hinblick auf die Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Vom Gerichtshofmodell
zum Polizeimodell’, in: Kant und die Berliner Aufkla¨rung. Akten des IX. Internationaler
Kant-Kongresses, Volume 2, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 748–757).
91Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum . . . ’, 293.
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or methodological structure of KrV (Tarbet, Henrich). This is not just a
superficial similarity between KrV and legal practice and discourse. Influence
from juridical discourse is demonstrable at highly specific levels, viz. in the
transcendental deduction (Henrich), and in the solution to the antinomy
(Ishikawa). There is no reason to assume that Kant dealt with juridical
metaphors in a general sense only, since his knowledge of specific legal
procedures was highly sophisticated (Kiefner). Kant knew very well what he
was talking about. The possibilities of this argumentative strategy are put
to the utmost test in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.
In the context of the legal metaphor the issue of real opposition is present
in the sense that it offers a crucial pattern for developing and structuring
arguments that allow for a real alternative beyond mere affirmation (the-
sis, dogmatic affirmation) and negation (antithesis, sceptical denial). This
makes the pattern indispensable in view of an essential function of the legal
metaphor; deliberating the pros and cons from a neutral position, and thereby
bringing a controversy to an end. The common methodological background
of the metaphor and the pattern accounts for the fact that the pattern is
applicable in the context of the metaphor at all.
Kant’s own views on the relation between concept and intuition and the
function of analogy account for the necessary predominance of the metaphor.
The metaphor completes KrV. Without it, Kant would not have succeeded in
complying with his own standard of philosophical clarity. Due to a consequent
application of the metaphor, Kant is able to develop his critical project at
points where other (conceptual) means are not available. By employing the
metaphor he puts into practice the results of his theoretical endeavours
thereby creating some sort of “strange loop”, since a meaningful application
of the metaphor would require the results of critique which could only have
been achieved with the help of a persistent application of the metaphor in
the first place. Therefore, the relation between the metaphor and KrV is
twofold: on the one hand the metaphor serves to make our concept of pure
reason sensible, while on the other hand the critique of pure reason serves
to make our intuition intelligible. If meaning and function of the metaphor
are understood in this sense, one could also counter the common objection
of Hegel and others about the uncritical and therefore insufficient basic
assumption of KrV, viz. insofar as the text of KrV itself represents knowledge
(sc. about pure reason) it is not subjected to the principles of knowledge
carefully spelled out in KrV, although it should be so. The metaphor offers a
way out of this difficulty, since it represents an image instead of conceptual,
discursive knowledge.
Of course, the succes of Kant’s strategy should be judged by its result,
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but apparently, in Kant’s view, the use of the legal metaphor would not have
been succesful if there had not been an analogy to begin with. Kant tried
his best to draw as many conclusions from this analogy as possible. This
significance of the legal metaphor may once more point to the primacy of
practical reason in Kantian philosophy, since the legal metaphor derives its
meaning from a practical context and it is applied in view of the practical
employment of reason. The legal metaphor is also present in other works of
Kant, especially in the notion of conscience as “Das Bewußtsein eines inneren
Gerichtshofes im Menschen (‘vor welchem sich seine Gedanken einander
verklagen oder entschuldigen’)”92 and in his essay “U¨ber das Mißlingen aller
philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee” which is deliberately composed
so as to represent the proceedings of a trial before the tribunal of reason.93
92Cf. MS, AA VI, 438 (at 400–401 conscience is represented as an “A¨sthetischer Vorbe-
griff”). As to conscience and the tribunal cf. Fumiyasu Ishikawa, ‘Das Gerichtshof-Modell
des Gewissens’, Aufkla¨rung , 7 (1992), 43–55.
93Cf. AA VIII, 255. In line with this juridico-political model of the theodicy the three
features of divine wisdom are conceived in correspondence with the trias politica (AA VIII,
257).
Chapter 8
Infinite Judgement
8.1 Infinite judgement
In the previous chapter (§7.8) infinite judgement turned out to play a
substantial role in the sceptical method of reasoning and the solution of
the antinomy. Earlier on we encoutered some less explicit occurrences of
infinite judgement, sc. in discussions about empty space (§4.2), about actio in
distans (§4.4) and about the noumenon (§6.6). Apparently, there is something
peculiar about infinite judgement that caused Kant to employ this kind of
judgement in his arguments. In the current chapter we will show that, due
to its distinctive properties, infinite judgement plays a key role in the legal
metaphor, since it is capable of doing what a judgement in the legal sense
is supposed to do. It can offer an authorative alternative in cases where
opposing, controversial options are at stake. Moreover, this alternative belongs
to a categorically different level than the level of the controversy and the
possibilities it contains. Infinite judgement is characterised by the fact that
it is an affirmation (though not in the ordinary sense) by means of negation
(though not in the ordinary sense of logical negation). In this respect infinite
judgement expresses the characteristics of the pattern of real opposition.
In the table of logical functions of understanding Kant introduced “infinite
judgements” in addition to the common logical distinction between affirmative
and negative judgements.1 Correspondingly, Kant included “limitation” in the
table of categories in addition to the categories of reality and negation (KrV,
B106). Kant’s example of infinite judgement was “Die Seele ist nichtsterblich.”
(The soul is not-mortal). Kant acknowledged that this division of judgements
may come as a surprise because in general logic infinite judgement is classed
with affirmations (KrV, B96–97). In transcendental logic, however, he took
1KrV, B95. Cf. Logik §22 (AA IX, 103–104).
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great care to distinguish it from both negative and affirmative judgements.
It is not a negative judgement, since it is a logical affirmation (copula is
not negated). Unlike ordinary affirmative judgements, however, it contains
a negative predicate. Hence, infinite judgement is a logical affirmation by
using merely a negative predicate in order to say something about our total
knowledge and the content of knowledge u¨berhaupt .2
Notwithstanding this explanation, Kant’s introduction of infinite judge-
ment and the category of limitation has met with misunderstanding, neglect
and rejection ever since. Schopenhauer, as usual, was clear and quite amus-
ing in his disapproval. According to him Kant only introduced it in the
table of logical functions for reasons of symmetry. For Schopenhauer infinite
judgement is nothing more than:
“einen spitzfindig erdachten Lu¨ckenbu¨ßer, was nicht ein Mal
einer Auseinandersetzung bedarf, ein blindes Fenster, wie er
[Kant] zu Gunsten seiner symmetrischen Architektonik deren
viele angebracht hat.”3
According to Hegel it was not a judgement at all.4 Peirce also maintained
that Kant added infinite judgements “because it rounded out his triad of
categories of quality”5 De Vleeschauwer mentioned a philological reason with
respect to the category of limitation: “Elle constitue donc une retouche de
la dernie`re heure.”6 To Kemp Smith, Kant’s distinctions reflected “a very
artificial and somewhat arbitrary manner” in preparation “for the ‘discovery’
of the category of limitation.”7
2KrV, B97 and B98. The phrase “in Ansehung des Inhalts der Erkenntnis u¨berhaupt”
echoes the phrase “in Ansehung des gesammten Erkenntnisses” from the previous page (cf.
Jabik Veenbaas and Willem Visser, Kritiek van de zuivere rede, Amsterdam: Boom, 2004,
(Dutch translation of KrV)). Kemp Smith seems to be missing this reference to knowledge
in general; he does not translate u¨berhaupt .
3Cf. Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie, 559–560, in: Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung I .
4Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ‘Wissenschaft der Logik II. Die subjektive Logik oder
die Lehre vom Begriff’, in: G.W.F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Volume 12, Hamburg: Felix
Meiner Verlag, 1981, 69–70. Nevertheless Hegel states (at p. 70): “Ein reelleres Beyspiel
des unendlichen Urtheils ist die bo¨se Handlung.”
5Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Elements of Logic’, in: C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, editors,
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume II, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1960, §376, 223 (cf. also §381 at 228–229)
6H.J. de Vleeschauwer, La de´duction transcendentale dans l’œuvre de Kant,
Antwerpen/Paris/’s-Gravenhage, 1934–1937, 231 (and t. II, 55–57)
7Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Atlantic
Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1993 (reprint of 19232; 19181), 192.
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Instead of blaming Kant for something he did not write down, i.e. instead
of ascribing to him motives that merely serve to account for misunderstand-
ings or unclarity on our own part, Kant’s distinction itself should be taken
more seriously. In line with our methodological remarks in §1.2 we will as-
sume that Kant must have had good reasons to introduce infinite judgement.
There is no reason to assume that he did include the warning observation
(KrV, B97) in vain.
Kant’s insistance on this form of judgement is not as far-fetched as his
commentators would have it. In non-philosophical language it is not unusual
to use negative predicates in sentences that are intended to express specific
meanings. Many of those sentences resemble the basic structure of infinite
judgement. So, for example, the statement “This claim is inadmissable.”,
uttered in a specific judicial context, is meant to indicate that the necessary
requirements for admittance of that claim have not been fulfilled.8 Accord-
ing to Kant infinite judgement is affirmative, but the predicate contains
a negation, more specifically a single negation (“nichtsterblich”, formally
represented by not-p). Cases of double negation (e.g. “nicht unmo¨glich”,
formalised: not(not-p)), however, may even help us better to understand the
meaning and function of infinite judgement in the Kantian sense. As we shall
see later on, Kant himself will make use of double negation in the context
of infinite judgement. Examples of double negation in this sense are “not
impossible”, “not unimportant”, “not insignificant”, etc.
Logical analysis of occurrences of double negation in terms of classical
bivalent logic, which is the logic most philosophers would be inclined to
subscribe to, is insufficient and inappropriate. Application of the law of
double negation9 to these cases of double negation would reduce these cases
to simple affirmations (duplex negatio affirmat). This procedure, however,
would fail to point out the specific kind of affirmation that is expressed by
means of double negation. In non-philosophical, ordinary language it is also
not uncommon to employ double negation in this sense.10 For example, the
8Ishikawa is not right in believing that infinite judgement does not seem to make sense
in ordinary language, cf. Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 34, 99, 100.
9On (the law of) double negation cf. Lawrence R. Horn, A Natural History of Negation,
Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1989, 22, 296–308
10Cf. for example the claim that “The arrest and extradition of D.B. by the Brazilian
government is complicated, but not impossible.”, which is a response to a previous claim that
there was no point in arresting mr. D.B because subsequent extradition to The Netherlands
would be impossible. If “not impossible” in the quotation would be substituted by “possible”,
something quite different would be implied in the statement. Cf. De Volkskrant (August
26, 1997, p. 7), reporting on attempts made and not made by the Dutch government to
prosecute the former Surinam head of State D.B. for drugs-related crimes.
148 Infinite Judgement
use of figures of speech such as understatement and litotes, which may contain
double negations, cannot be adequately understood if they are supposed to
represent simple affirmations. In order to account properly for occurrences
of double negation, we must assume that there are good reasons for using
the long-winded expression instead of a shorter one.11 These reasons may be
pragmatic, rhetoric, or political, depending on the context of the expression.
Moreover, as a consequence of rigorous application of the law of double
negation at least some of the information about what is positive and what is
negative may be lost. Besides the fact that a predicate like “nichtsterblich”
can be represented by not-p, but just as well by p, in which case double
negation would be hardly recognisable, one cannot determine whether there
is a positive or negative meaning, simply by adding up negative markers like
“not”, “un-”, “in-”, etc.12 In the next section we will have a closer look at
the historical and systematic objections raised against Kant’s conception of
infinite judgement. Subsequently, we will explicate the immediate context of
infinite judgement in the Kantian sense (i.c. transcendental knowledge and
transcendental logic) in order to determine its meaning in the Transcendental
Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method in KrV.
8.2 Against infinite judgement
Kant’s case is clear: he proposes to make a distinction between affirmative,
negative and infinite judgement, which is particularly important in tran-
scendental logic and the field of pure knowledge a priori. If we take Kant’s
example as our starting-point we could exemplify the distinction as follows:
1. The soul is mortal. (affirmative judgement)
Die Seele ist sterblich.13
11Cf. Horn’s principle of the division of pragmatic labour: “The use of a longer, marked
expression in lieu of a shorter expression involving less effort on the part of the speaker
signals that the speaker was not in a position to employ the simpler version felicitiously.”
(cf. Horn, A Natural History . . . , 304).
12G. Peeters, ‘What’s Negative about Hatred and Positive about Love? On Negation in
Cognition, Affect and Behavior’, in: H. de Swart and L. Bergmans, editors, Perspectives
on Negation, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1995, (Essays in honour of Johan J. de
Iongh on his 80th Birthday), 123–133.
13Kant does not mention this specific example in this context. It is mentioned though in
R 3063: anima est mortalis. The fact that he does not mention this corresponding example
indicates an important aspect of Kant’s view of judgement: “judgement” means “true
judgement”. There is no true, affirmative judgement about the soul’s mortality. Therefore,
there is a true, negative judgement: it is not the case that the soul is mortal (cf. 2.).
Negative judgements in this sense may prevent us from making mistakes (KrV, B97), which
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2. The soul is not mortal. (negative judgement)
Die Seele ist nicht sterblich.
3. The soul is not-mortal. (infinite judgement)
Die Seele ist nichtsterblich.
Simple formalised representations of 1, 2, and 3 are:
4. S is p
5. not(S is p)
6. S is not-p
In his study of Kant’s infinite judgement Albert Menne echoed Schopen-
hauer’s reproach: Kant introduced infinite judgement to save the symmetry
of the table of categories.14 According to Menne there is no historical ground
to grant infinite judgement a separate position independent from affirmative
and negative judgement. Some logicians prior to Kant mentioned infinite
judgement, but this usage was not wide-spread.15 On the one hand, Kant’s
conception of infinite judgement seems to have originated in a misunder-
standing or the incorrect translation of “indefinite judgement” (enuntiatio
infinitus).16 On the other hand, it may have been shaped by the notion
of “indefinite term” (terminus infinitum) which is mentioned by Crusius.17
So, according to Menne, Kant’s limited knowledge of the proper sense of
an indefinite term and an indefinite judgement caused him to adopt the
notion of infinite judgement (unendliches Urteil) for cosmetic reasons. Sub-
sequently, the lack of historical ground caused him to write an extensive
though unconvincing justification (KrV, B97).
Apart from this, Menne denied the relevance of Kant’s literal reading
of “infinite” on systematic grounds. Even if predicate negation would be
characteristic of infinite judgement, it would only present something that
is logically equivalent to what is expressed in negative judgement. And so
is a characteristic function of negative judgement (KrV, B737).
14Albert Menne, ‘Das unendliche Urteil Kants’, Philosophia naturalis, 19 (1982), 151–162,
151–152, 159.
15Menne, ‘Das unendliche Urteil Kants . . . ’, 156.
16However, Kant must have been aware of and familiar with the difference between
“infinite” and “indefinite”. An important source on logic for Kant was Meier’s Auszug §294.
He wrote several Reflexionen about this section (sc. R3062–3072). In R3069 Kant dealt
with judicium indefinitum in the context of limitation and the infinite sphere outside the
sphere of a concept.
17Menne, ‘Das unendliche Urteil Kants . . . ’, 157–158.
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Menne maintains that, contrary to Kant’s suggestions, infinite judgement
resembles affirmative judgement. There is no difference between negative
and infinite judgement, if we examine both kinds of judgement from the
point of view of set theory. Negative and infinite judgement, represented by
formulas 5. and 6. above, are different ways of expressing one and the same
set theoretical distribution. According to this approach not-p is understood
in terms of the complement of p.
In addition, Menne called upon the generally accepted laws of traditional
logic, particularly Apuleius’s laws of equipollence, which state that an affir-
mative judgement is equipollent to the corresponding negative judgement if
the predicate is denied as well.18 This would entail that 4. is equipollent to:
7. not(S is not-p)
Again, Menne ignores Kant’s claim that infinite judgement is logically affir-
mative. In line with the Kantian idea of infinite judgement, formula 7. would
not be logically identical to 4. Instead it would rather be a negative, infinite
judgement.
Menne’s rejection of infinite judgement is based on the systematic argu-
ment that current laws of logic do not allow for an interpretation of infinite
judgement in the Kantian sense. Apparently, these principles are the law
of double negation (as is clear from 7.), the law of excluded middle (as is
clear from his conception of not-p in terms of the complement of p). Thus
he maintains that if the introduction of infinite judgement were to make
any sense, it would have been necessary for Kant to show that these formal
principles do not hold in the case of transcendental logic. According to
Menne19 Kant failed to supply such arguments and only offered problematic
speculation.
Menne’s rejection, however, is neither convincing, nor conclusive. It
ignores explicit information on the part of Kant about the distinction between
transcendental logic and general logic, which will be discussed in the next
section, as well as relevant information from other parts of KrV that provides
a context for understanding the sense of infinite judgement. Indeed, to
some extent the applicability of the above-mentioned logical principles is
questionable in case of transcendental logic. This point will be discussed in
§8.4 below.
18Menne, ‘Das unendliche Urteil Kants . . . ’, 160. Cf. Horn, A Natural History . . . , 25.
Meier (Auszug §294) also regarded predicate and copula negation as equivalent.
19Menne, ‘Das unendliche Urteil Kants . . . ’, 160.
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8.3 Transcendental knowledge, transcendental logic
Kant’s observation about infinite judgement is one of four observations which
are “nicht unno¨tig” in view of possible misunderstanding.20 In general logic
infinite judgement is rightly classed with affirmative judgement. Only in
transcendental logic is infinite judgement a separate member in the division
of judgements. Apparently, the difference between general and transcendental
logic is significant and decisive as far as infinite judgement is concerned.
In the present section we will examine this difference and we will try to
determine the function of infinite judgement given the characteristics of
transcendental logic.
In the introduction to KrV Kant stated:
Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht so wohl
mit Gegensta¨nden, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Ge-
gensta¨nden, so fern diese a priori mo¨glich sein soll, u¨berhaupt
bescha¨ftigt. (KrV, B25)
Transcendental knowledge does not represent knowledge about objects. It
is knowledge about our mode of knowledge, and more specifically about
the a priori possibility of our mode of knowledge of objects. Transcendental
knowledge is meta-knowledge.
This sense of “transcendental” is highlighted as soon as the notion of
transcendental logic is discussed:
na¨mlich: daß nicht eine jede Erkenntnis a priori, sondern nur
die, dadurch wir erkennen, daß und wie gewisse Vorstellungen
(Anschauungen oder Begriffe) lediglich a priori angewandt werden,
oder mo¨glich sein, transzendental [. . . ] heißen mu¨sse. [. . . ] Der
Unterschied des Transzendentalen und Empirischen geho¨rt also
nur zur Kritik der Erkenntnisse, und betrifft nicht die Beziehung
derselben auf ihren Gegenstand. (KrV, B80–81)
This quotation also contains an additional qualification: the distinction
between “transcendental” and “empirical” does not refer to the relation
between knowledge (Vorstellung) and object (Gegenstand), but it belongs to
the critique of knowledge. The distinction is a critical distinction.
If we try to order these distinctions there are at least four separate levels
in this theory of knowledge: 1) the object of knowledge (e.g. a body, the soul);
20KrV, B96. Note that Kant chose to emphasise the significance of these observations by
means of a double negation, which is lost in Kemp Smith’s translation, which has “may
serve” for Kant’s “werden [. . . ] nicht unno¨tig sein”.
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2) knowledge of 1; 3) transcendental knowledge about the a priori possibility
of 2; and finally 4) critique, providing the distinctions and concepts that are
needed to put 3 into words. To the extent that transcendental logic represents
a specific kind of transcendental knowledge it is part of knowledge at level 3.
General logic, as opposed to transcendental logic, abstracts from all
content of knowledge, i.e. from all relation of knowledge to the object. It
does not consider the possible variety of objects involved in knowledge and it
only considers the logical form and the form of thought in general, as Kant
maintains in the introductory remark of the section on transcendental logic.21
Therefore, general logic—in so far as it represents knowledge at all—differs
categorically from the kinds of knowledge we have just identified.
In transcendental logic, on the other hand, the content of knowledge is
taken into consideration and therefore the content or worth of the logical
affirmation by means of a negative predicate is considered, as Kant expli-
cated in his explanatory observation (KrV B97-98). Although the form of
infinite judgement is affirmative, its content is negative (and even infinite
as far as logical extension is concerned). Precisely this feature of infinite
judgement makes it “wirklich bloß beschra¨nkend in Ansehung des Inhalts der
Erkenntnis u¨berhaupt”.22 This indicates that “content” must not be taken in
the current sense just mentioned (i.e. in the sense of the a priori applicability
of representations, or the a priori possibility of objective knowledge). It refers
to knowledge in general and in this context infinite judgement has a function
with respect “to our total knowledge” (KrV, B97). Thus, infinite judgement
is a particular critical means to make a distinction between knowledge in
the sense of level 2 and 3 above and knowledge in a general sense which
comprises, for example, practical knowledge as well. Knowledge that is lim-
ited (in this case: objectively valid knowledge) is of a different kind than
knowledge expressing this limitation (infinite judgement). Knowledge that
is required to make a distinction, cannot be the object of distinction and
therefore infinite judgement belongs to the level of critical knowledge.
In the context of transcendental logic infinite judgement serves a specific,
limitative, critical function with respect to knowledge in general.23 The
21KrV, B79. Cf. also KrV, B76, 78, 97, 102, 171, and Logik, AA IX, 101.
22KrV, B98 (italics added). Regarding the limitative function of transcendental logic
in relation with formal logic, cf. Vladimir Bryushinkin, ‘The Interaction of Formal and
Transcendental Logic’, in: H. Robinson, editor, Proceedings of the Eighth International
Kant Congress Memphis 1995, Volume I-2, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995,
553–566.
23See also Mellin’s explanation of “Unendliches Urtheil” and “Limitation 2”: “Das
Begrenzen, Limitiren, einer Spha¨re durch andre Dinge, die nicht zu derselben geho¨ren, ist
also der Hauptact in den unendlichen Urtheilen.” (Mellin, Enzyklopa¨disches Wo¨rterbuch
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employment of this function is intended to make a distinction between
objectively valid knowledge on the one hand, and knowledge that is not
objectively valid, on the other hand. It represents transcendental knowledge,
but it is not a transcendentally logical term in the sense that it serves to
determine the a priori and objective applicability of concepts.
8.4 Infinite judgement and transcendental logic
According to Menne Kant failed to show that the formal principles of logic
(especially the laws of double negation and excluded middle) do not apply
in case of transcendental logic in order to account for a meaningful sense of
infinite judgement. In support of Kant’s claim we will now address the issue
of formal principles in transcendental logic.
Firstly, it is important to see that it is not necessary for Kant to show
the inapplicability of the formal principles. In Menne’s view it is, because he
interpreted infinite judgement as a kind of negative judgement. Kant, on the
other hand, regarded infinite judgement right from the beginning as a kind of
affirmative judgement. To this extent Menne’s arguments simply miss Kant’s
point. Nevertheless, it is very instructing to evaluate Kant’s view of formal
principles in relation to transcendental logic, because it helps understanding
the nature of infinite judgement.
Later on, the laws of double negation and excluded middle will be exam-
ined, but first we will focus on the principle of contradiction. The position
of this principle in (transcendental) logic is typical of the way Kant deals
with formal principles of logic. In the context of general logic it would be
better to speak of the principle of non-contradiction.24 The most general
requirement with respect to knowledge is that it is not contradictory, i.e.
that is in conformity with the general rules of thought. Non-contradiction in
this sense is a logical and purely formal criterion of truth. Non-contradiction,
however, does not warrant the agreement of knowledge with its object (i.e.
material truth). Therefore, non-contradiction is a conditio sine qua non, a
negative condition of all truth and it applies to thought in general (KrV,
B84), or knowledge in general (KrV, B190).
Non-contradiction as a formal and negative principle belongs to general
logic, which abstracts from all content. However, in transcendental logic,
which considers content as well, the formal principle of contradiction25 also
. . . , Band 4, 9–10.)
24Cf. KrV, B82–85 as regards non-contradiction in general logic.
25KrV, B190 defines this principle as: “Keinem Dinge kommt ein Pra¨dikat zu, welches
ihm widerspricht”. It is “a universal, though merely negative, criterion of all truth.”, cf.
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applies, and it even allows for a positive employment. It is called “the
universal and completely sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge” (KrV,
B190), which indicates that the field of application is limited to analytic
knowledge (KrV, B190-191). This does not mean that the principle is not
valid in case of synthetic knowledge. On the contrary, it does apply to this
kind of knowledge, but only in so far as another synthetic proposition has
been presupposed.26 Although it does not suffice to warrant material truth
(of synthetic knowledge), we must at least conform to it. In view of synthetic
knowledge this principle counts as negative condition comparable to the
function of non-contradiction in general logic.
The applicability of both non-contradiction, and the principle of contra-
diction is far-reaching. Only the part of transcendental logic dealing with
synthetic knowledge is excluded from the positive employment of the princi-
ple of contradiction. Surely, it is no coincidence that it is precisely this part
that is at the core of Kant’s investigation of the synthetic a priori (i.e. the a
priori applicability of concepts to objects). In this respect there is only one
highest principle of all synthetic judgements, which—not surprisingly—does
not belong to general or formal logic:
ein jeder Gegenstand steht unter den nothwendigen Bedingungen
der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung in
einer mo¨glichen Erfahrung. (KrV, B197).
This principle answers the question as to the a priori applicability of repre-
sentations to objects, i.e the objective validity of synthetic knowledge. In
addition to the formal and logical criterion of truth this is the material and
transcendental criterion. The part of Transcendental Logic which is devoted
to this criterion is the Transcendental Analytic, also called “a logic of truth”
(KrV, B87).
The material insufficiency of the principle of contradiction in case of
synthetic judgement is presented quite detailed in Kant’s exposition of
the principle of synthetic judgements (KrV, B193–194). The possibility
of affirmative analytic judgements can be explained by reference to some
identity of the concepts involved. In case of negative judgements this can be
explained by the contradiction of the concepts involved. Neither identity, nor
contradiction suffice to account for the possibility of synthetic judgements.
Something else is needed to account for the synthetic relation between
§6.2 above.
26Cf. KrV, B14: “ein synthetischer Satz kann allerdings nach dem Satz des Widerspruchs
eingesehen werden, aber nur so, daß ein anderer synthetischer Satz vorausgesetzt wird, aus
dem er gefolgert werden kann, niemals aber an sich selbst.”.
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the concepts that make up a synthetic judgement.27 In Kant’s words this
“something else” is ein Drittes.
Thus, in transcendental logic something else, something apart from
affirmation and negation, is required for the sake of answering the question
about the a priori possibility of synthetic judgements. This need for something
else is reflected in Kant’s system of judgements. Apart from affirmative and
negative judgement, he introduced a third kind, sc. infinite judgement, which
offers an alternative to affirmation and negation; affirmation by negation.
Menne’s refutation of the systematic relevance of infinite judgement
was primarily based on the analysis of infinite judgement in terms of the
laws of double negation and excluded middle. As far as double negation is
concerned Kant does not seem to be implying that this principle is not valid
in transcendental logic.28 His point is rather that predicate negation is not
cancelled by an additional copula negation. Therefore, he would simply deny
the equivalence of 4 and 7 above. Kant does not reject the law of excluded
middle either. As is clear from the function of the principle of contradiction
in general logic and in transcendental logic, Kant recognises its validity in so
far as the principle of contradiction is applicable. The truth of an analytic
judgement can be explained on the basis of the principle of contradiction
(KrV, B190), but only—we would have to add in the present context—if a
third possibility has been excluded. Therefore, Kant maintains that the truth
of an analytic judgement implies the falsity of the opposite judgement. Again,
Kant introduced infinite judgement not because the current formal laws of
logic do not apply, but rather because these laws are simply insufficient
with respect to Kant’s question about the synthetic a priori. The highest
principle of synthetic judgements fills the crucial need of a critique of reason
that cannot be satisfied by applying current laws of logic. So does infinite
judgement.
Conformity to the principle of synthetic judgements consitutes material
truth, or objectively valid knowledge. In this respect Kant called the Tran-
scendental Analytic “a logic of truth”. The principle itself, however, is not an
instance of material truth. It is neither true nor untrue, but transcendental,
and in terms of the four levels of knowledge mentioned at p.151 above it
belongs to the level of transcendental knowledge (level 3) specifying the a
27KrV, B194: “Also zugegeben [. . . ]: so ist ein Drittes no¨tig.” Cf. KrV, B315: “Wo
ist hier das Dritte, welches jederzeit zu einem synthetischen Satze erfordert wird, um in
demselben Begriffe, die gar keine logische (analytische) Verwandtschaft haben, mit einander
zu verknu¨pfen?”
28Cf. KrV, B532 where Kant explains that “endlich” is equivalent to “nichtunendlich”.
Detailed interpretation of this point is offered in §8.5 below.
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priori possibility of material truth (level 2). Thus, objectively valid relations
between representation and object are determined. The principle states which
knowledge is to be regarded as real knowledge. If we realise that truth may
be either positive or negative, and if we consider this distinction in close
connection with the distinction between the categories of reality, negation
and limitation, which are based on the affirmative, negative and infinite
function of understanding, then there is an obvious correspondence between
affirmation and reality, and between negation and negation (as a category).
Knowledge in accordance with the principle of synthetic judgements is real
knowledge which—if we take the correspondence seriously—is expressed
in affirmative judgements. Likewise, negative judgement serves to express
negative truth (i.e. claims of knowledge which are not in accordance with the
principle, and which are not objectively valid). Infinite judgement, however,
is a transcendental means to express claims of knowledge which are neither
true nor false in the sense of objectively valid (and real) or objectively invalid
(and not real). Claims of knowledge expressed by infinite judgement represent
some truth outside the field of objective validity, and hence beyond the field
of possible experience. Yet the very fact that these claims exceed the domain
of the principle of all synthetic judgements does not render them invalid
or false; these qualifications and the dichotomy of (in)validity do simply
not suffice to characterise this type of claims. Infinite judgement refers to
non-validity, i.e. validity which is categorically different from objectively real
(in)validity.
As to the formal principles of logic, Kant does not deny their applica-
bility, but he rather denies the claim that application of those principles is
exhaustive with respect to knowledge. Kant needs a technical vocabulary to
put his critical epistemological position into words. “Infinite judgement” is a
significant and major term in this respect. It is there to make possible a kind
of knowledge that stretches beyond the domain of objective validity and the
formal principles of logic.
In addition to the conclusion of the previous section we can even extend
the comparison. Affirmation with respect to reality is possible only in accor-
dance with the principle of synthetic judgements. This is the major tenor of
the Transcendental Analytic in KrV. Negation with respect to the reality of
claims which are not in accordance with the principle (e.g. claims about the
objective reality of the soul, or God) is the typical subject of the Transcen-
dental Dialectic. Limitation, on the basis of infinite judgement, is a critical
operation consisting of two opposite functions that are performed at the
same time. On the one hand it recognises the results of the Transcendental
Analytic, but on the other hand it recognises that it is possible to make
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claims of knowledge which go beyond the field of possible experience. Of
course these latter claims are very different from false claims about the soul,
the world and God. They do not pretend to express theoretical, objectively
valid knowledge but rather practical knowledge about objects of our will.
Critical limitation is structured according the patern of real repugnance;
opposing realities are linked together and balanced so as to make possible
yet another (i.c. practical) reality.
8.5 Infinite judgement and antinomy
The function of negative judgement in the Transcendental Dialectic is com-
parable to and implied by the function of affirmative judgement in the
Transcendental Analytic. Affirmative judgement are true judgements which
represent transcendental knowledge about what is to be considered as ob-
jectively real knowledge. Negative judgements, on the other hand, are true
judgements representing negative transcendental knowledge, i.e. knowledge
of what is not to be considered as objectively real knowledge (i.e. a false,
affirmative claim, or any claim regarding objects that cannot be given in
possible experience such as the soul, the world and God). Affirmative claims
regarding these objects are denied by true negative judgements. This makes
the Transcendental Dialectic the negative counterpart of the Transcendental
Analytic. In this sense Kant referred several times to the important negative
function of critique (KrV, Bxxiv–xxv, 25, 740, 823). With respect to each of
the “impossible” objects mentioned, one could refer to even more specific
formulations.29
However, the main focus of attention is not negative, but infinite judge-
ment which occurs several times in the Transcendental Dialectic and which
has an even more significant role in this part of KrV. The most telling
example of infinite judgement is to be found in the “Kritische Entscheidung
. . . ” (KrV, B531–532) and it is presented in preparation of the solution to the
antinomy, especially the first one about the spatial and temporal (in)finity
of the world.
29For example, with respect to the thinking subject: it is impossible to know oneself
as noumenon (KrV, B430). With respect to the paralogisms in general Kant concludes
at B432: “Dieses hat nur zur Verhu¨tung des Mißverstandes, dem die Lehre von unserer
Selbstanschauung, als Erscheinung, leicht ausgezetzt ist, gesagt sein sollen.” With respect
to God, the object of a speculative use of reason, Kant maintains: “Ich behaupte nun, daß
alle Versuche eines bloß spekulativen Gebrauchs der Vernunft in Ansehung der Theologie
ga¨nzlich fruchtlos und ihrer inneren Beschaffenheit nach null und nichtig sind” (B664).
Cf. also the titles of chapters about the impossibility of certain proofs of God’s existence
(B620, 631, and 648).
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The general description of “antinomy” is “conflict of laws” (sc. of pure
reason, KrV, B434). Detailed examination of this conflict shows that there
are four possible, concrete conflicts, each of which is related to a cosmological
idea. It has become common practice to use the terms “first antinomy”,
“second antinomy”, etc. if a conflict in the latter sense is meant. Kant,
however, prefers to speak of “antinomy” in a general sense,30 because there
is fundamental pattern underlying each of the four conflicts mentioned. This
pattern is decribed in the chapter on the system of cosmological ideas (sc.
KrV, B445–446).
Dialectical illusion in case of the cosmological ideas is a result of a
requirement of reason, sc. the principle that states that when the conditioned
is given, the sum total of conditions (i.e. the absolute unconditioned) is also
given (KrV, B436; cf. also B364, 525). The pattern or the basic structure of
the antinomy is described by Kant when he specifies two possible relations
between the (series of) conditioned (elements) and the unconditioned: either
the unconditioned consists of a complete series, which—in its entirety—is
unconditioned, whereas all of its elements are conditioned (in which case
the successive regressus from conditioned to condition is infinite), or the
unconditioned is an element of the series (in which case it is the first element
to which all other elements in the series are subordinated). If the first
relation applies, the regressus is infinite (sc. “potentialiter unendlich” as
Kant remarks at KrV, B445). If, however, the second relation applies we
are forced to acknowledge the (spatial and temporal) finity of the world,
the simplicity of the parts of the world, causality based on freedom, and an
absolute natural necessity.
Both alternatives seem to meet with the requirement of reason and both
are supported by elaborate arguments. Because this antinomical state of
reason is a consequence of the application of its own principle, and because
reason is forced by nature to apply this principle, the dialectical illusion of
the antinomy is natural, inevitable, even necessary.
The pattern describing the two alternatives regarding the possible rela-
tions between the unconditioned and conditioned, together with the conse-
quences following from either alternative are subject to detailed examination
in the antithetic of pure reason (KrV, B448). There Kant provides the
analysis of the antinomy in terms of each of the four cosmological ideas
(KrV, B454–489). Each analysis presents a thesis and antithesis together
30With the exception of KrV, B592: “die Antithesis der vierten Antinomie”. For discus-
sion of “antinomy” and “antinomies” cf. Wolfgang Malzkorn, Kants Kosmologie-Kritik.
Eine formale Analyse der Antinomienlehre, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999,
(Kantstudien, Erga¨nzungshefte 134), 91–97.
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with arguments in support of both thesis and antithesis. The proof-structure
of all of these arguments is indirect. To put in Kant’s own terms: in every
conflict of transcendental ideas both thesis and antithesis are supported by
apagogical proof (KrV, B817, 819–820), which means that a certain claim
is proven to be true by the indirect means of the refutation of the opposite
claim. This proof-structure could also be described as reductio ad absurdum.
This argumentative strategy is only succesful under logical conditions of the
principles of non-contradiction, of excluded middle and of double negation.
As has been stated above infinite judgement plays an important role
in the solution to the antinomy. In order to determine the function and
significance of infinite judgement in this respect, we will first analyse its
function with respect to the first conflict of transcendental ideas. Then we
will address the issue of the function of infinite judgement for the antinomy
at large.
In case of the first cosmological idea the conflict is formulated as follows:
“The world is finite.” (thesis) versus “The world is infinite.” (antithesis).31 To
prove either of these statements Kant formulates a reductio ad absurdum. In
case of the thesis it runs as follows: Assume that the world has no beginning in
time, then up to a given moment an eternity has elapsed (and there has passed
away an infinite series of successive states of things in the world). Since the
infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed through
successive synthesis (cf. also KrV, B460), Kant concludes that is impossible
for an infinite successive series to have passed away. This impossibility would
make the existence of the world impossible (since, presumably, its existence
requires a completed successive series) and therefore, Kant finally concludes,
a beginning of the world is a necessary condition for its existence, which is
precisely what was expressed in the thesis. So the absurdum in this case is
the impossibility of a complete successive series, and—by implication—the
non-existence of the world, which forces Kant to regard the thesis to be
proven. Proofs regarding the spatial finity of the world, as well as the (spatial
and temporal) infinity of the world are mutatis mutandis also based on a
reductio ad absurdum.
As a result of this line of argument both antithesis and thesis are proven
31Kant’s formulations are more extensive: “Die Welt hat einen Anfang in der Zeit, und ist
dem Raum nach auch in Grenzen eingeslossen.” (thesis) and “Die Welt hat keinen Anfang,
und keine Grenzen im Raume, sondern ist sowohl in Ansehung der Zeit, als des Raums,
unendlich.” (antithesis). The latter formulation (“Die Welt [. . . ] ist [. . . ] unendlich.”),
together with the formulations “unendlich” and “endlich” in the proofs of both statements
has led me to employ the shorter phrases for the sake of clarity. Later on we will see that
Kant’s own solution is based on phrases like these (cf. KrV, B532).
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to be false in support of the truth of the thesis and antithesis respectively.
The result is a deadlock; a conflict between two opposed claims which are
grounded on the requirements of reason and developed in accordance with
the standards of reason, and which therefore can not be solved by an appeal
to experience.
Kant’s solution to this conflict is formulated very simple: the world is
neither conditionally nor unconditionally limited (B550). To conform to the
above formulation of the conflict one might say: the world is neither finite
nor infinite. Formulated this way the solution exceeds the original options as
presented in the antinomy, sc.: the world is either finite or infinite. Going
beyond these alternatives implies that the principle of excluded middle32
does not apply in case of the antinomy (although the antithetic construction
as well as the attempted solution of the first conflict was based on the
assumption that it did). However, this does not mean that the principle of
excluded middle is invalid altogether, but only that is not a suitable means to
solve (logical) problems at this (critical, transcendental) level. Its application
is limited.33
At the critical level other logical means are needed to make a solution
possible. This is clear from the fact that each of the four solutions presented by
Kant (KrV, B545–593) is preceded by a preparatory “Kritische Entscheidung
des kosmologischen Streits der Vernunft mit sich selbst” (KrV, B525–534). In
this section Kant carries out the logical analysis that is needed to solve the
antinomy. The main point of this analysis is the introduction of the distinction
between analytical opposition and dialectical opposition (KrV, B532).34 The
former kind of opposition is an opposition between contradictory opposites,
and therefore it would be solvable by means of the principle of excluded
middle:
Sage ich [. . . ]: die Welt ist dem Raume nach entweder unendlich,
oder sie ist nicht unendlich (non est infinitus), so muß, wenn der
32Kant’s formulation of this principle is to be found in his Logik §48 (in: AA IX, 116–117):
two contradictory opposed judgements cannot both be true, and they cannot both be
false; if one of these judgements is true, then the other is false and vice versa. A formal
reconstruction of the principle in relation to the first antinomical conflict is offered by
Zeljko Loparic, ‘The Logical Structure of the First Antinomy’, Kant-Studien, 81 (1990),
280–303, 282–283.
33Cf. Loparic, ‘The Logical Structure . . . ’, 295: “This explains why [. . . ] L4 [sc. the
principle of excluded middle with predicate negation, WvdK] is not a universally valid
logical law.”, and cf. Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 96. About Ishikawa’s study see also
Takuji Kadowaki, ‘Zur Wiedereinsetzung des unendlichen Urteils’, Aufkla¨rung , 7 (1992),
75–76.
34J. E. Llewelyn, ‘Dialectical and analytical opposites’, Kant-Studien, 55 (1964), 171–174.
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erstere Satz falsch ist, sein kontradiktorisches Gegenteil: die Welt
ist nicht unendlich, wahr sein. (KrV, B531)
Kant’s addition of the Latin “non est infinitus”35 indicates that this op-
position consists of contradictory opposites: an affirmative and a negative
judgement (with copula negation). Therefore it is an analytical opposition
that could—in principle—be solved by means of the reductio ad adsurdum.
In case of the antinomy, however, application of this strategy fails. This
failure should not lead us to reject the logical principles involved, but rather
to question underlying assumptions. How do we find out what assumptions
have been made in case of the antinomy?
In order to find out the basic assumption Kant proposes to reconstruct the
conflict with the help of infinite judgement so as to show that the opposition
involved is dialectical:
Hieße es aber: die Welt ist entweder unendlich, oder endlich
(nicht-unendlich), so ko¨nnten beide falsch sein [. . . ] wenn na¨mlich
die Welt gar nicht als ein Ding an sich, mithin auch nicht ihrer
Gro¨ße nach, weder als unendlich, noch als endlich gegeben sein
sollte. (KrV, B532).
Unlike the case of the analytical opposition, in which copula negation was
employed, in the dialectical opposition Kant reconstructs the second part of
the opposition in terms of predicate negation. Explicit reference to “nicht-
unendlich” indicates that this part of the opposition is to be understood in
terms of infinite judgement: it is a logical affirmation by means of a negative
predicate. Moreover, in case of this predicate the principle of double negation
applies since “nichtunendlich” is equivalent to “endlich”.36 The first part of
the opposition also consists of an infinite judgement: “The world is infinite”
(logical affirmation and predicate negation).
Once the conflict has been restated in these terms, Kant is able to uncover
the underlying assumption. This formulation of the conflict clearly states that
there is a world which is either not-E (negative predicate) or E (a positive
predicate equivalent to (not(not-E)). The statement that there is a world, or,
as Kant states in technical terms, that the world is a thing in itself, is the
basic assumption: “Denn ich sehe alsdenn die Welt, als an sich selbst, ihrer
Gro¨ße nach bestimmt an” (B532). Once the assumption has been exposed,
35About Kant’s reason for using Latin phrases cf. Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 91–93.
36This equivalence implies that “nichtunendlich” is not a predicate with an infinite
sphere which seemed to play an important role in the (nominal) explanation of “infinite
judgement” at B97–98.
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the solution of the conflict that is based on this assumption is simple: don’t
make the assumption,37 deny that the world in these formulations is to be
treated as a thing in itself. As a consequence the solution is that the world
is neither infinite, nor finite.38 So the antinomy can be solved if the basic
assumption is rejected and this can only be done after the conflict has been
reformulated with the help of infinite judgement so as to indicate that the
opposition at hand is dialectical (instead of analytical).39
This analysis in terms of a dialectical opposition seems to suggest that the
solution applies to the first conflict only. At B533, however, Kant maintains
that the same argument goes for the other three conflicts as well. Nevertheless,
it seems strange that so much attention is devoted to the first conflict, and
there is also the peculiarity that Kant’s phrase “neither infinite, nor finite”
does not correspond to the respective alternatives offered in the formulations
of the first conflict, sc. that the world is either finite or infinite. In these
formulations “finite” and “infinite” are put in the reverse order. An answer
to both of these questions—why does there seem to be so much emphasis on
the first conflict, and why is the solution not formulated in correspondence
to the initially formulated conflict?—will eventually help us to understand
the significance of infinite judgement.
In order to answer these questions we should take a close look at the
construction of this part of the Transcendental Dialectic. The table of contents
shows that Kant’s exposition of the four conflicts (KrV, B454–488) and
their solutions (KrV, B545–593) are “merely” concrete elaborations of the
main point he is trying to make. The main line of argument, however, is
constructed so as to present the main systematic problem (sc. the antinomy
in the singular), to put it in the context of the interest of reason and in the
context of the results of the Transcendental Analytic (sc. transcendental
idealism), to solve the antinomy and to reformulate the result in terms
of “regulation” (instead of “constitution”). Finally, the concluding note on
37Cf. “Voraussetzung”, KrV, B532, 535 and “falsche Voraussetzungen” at KrV, B557.
38The fact that both statements are false, already expressed in the quotation from KrV,
B532 above, indicates that Kant has offered a reconstruction in terms of the traditional
square of opposites; contraries may both be false (KrV, B559), whereas subcontraries may
both be true. The latter analysis is employed in case of the dynamical antinomy (KrV,
B560), cf. Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 96, 117–118.
39Strobach offers an analysis of the first antinomical conflict and its solution in terms
of predicate negation. He also mentions, but does not explicate, the relation between
predicate negation and infinite judgement. Cf. Niko Strobach, ‘Qualifizierte Negation als
Schlu¨ssel zum Versta¨ndnis der 1. Antinomie in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, in:
Volker Gerhardt, editor, Kant und die Berliner Aufkla¨rung. Akten des IX. Internationaler
Kant-Kongresses, Volume 5, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 94–105.
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the antinomy (KrV, B593–595) summarises the results and anticipates the
exposition of a loose end that is left over (sc. absolutely necessary being).
If we look at the line of argument this way, we should not be led astray by
comparing the solution to the first antinomical conflict (although Kant seems
to be suggesting this to exemplify his solution). We should rather compare
the solution to the initial formulation of the antinomy and then it is clear
that both formulations correspond perfectly well. As has been stated above
the basic pattern of the antinomy offers two alternatives: a series is either
infinite or finite (cf. KrV, B445–446). The solution denying both alternatives
deals with the options of infinity and finity in exactly the same order.
This shows why the solution to the first antinomy is not restricted to the
first conflict only. This shows why one should not compare the solution to
the first conflict exclusively. Although “The world is either finite or infinite”
(first conflict) has a similar terminology, the solution refers to the antinomy
tout court.40 It is not primarily intended to provide the answer to this specific
conflict and therefore it does not correspond to its formulation.41
Thusfar we have seen that Kant used infinite judgement as a means to
analyse and solve the antinomy. It is a clear example of the assumption he
made with respect to infinite judgement at B98: the function of understanding
expressed by infinite judgement may perhaps be of importance in the field
of its pure a priori knowledge. According to Ishikawa there is yet another
instance of infinite judgement that is present in Kant’s formulations. Infinite
judgement is also the appropriate means to express the result of the analysis.
Ishikawa42 deals with this point quite briefly. He refers to the “weder . . . , noch
. . . ” formulations in the “Kritische Entscheidung . . . ” (KrV, B533–534) and
the solution to the first antinomical conflict (KrV, B550) and he reconstructs
a “sowohl . . . , als auch . . . ” formulation with respect to the solution of the
dynamical-transcendental ideas. These formulations themselves are also to
40Malzkorn’s reconstruction of dialectical opposition shows that all four conflicts rep-
resent cases of dialectical opposites (cf. Wolfgang Malzkorn, ‘Analytical and Dialectical
Oppositions Reconsidered: New Perspectives on Kant’s Antinomies’, in: Volker Gerhardt,
editor, Kant und die Berliner Aufkla¨rung. Akten des IX. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses,
Volume 5, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 37–44).
41Ishikawa points out why the solution may nevertheless be said to apply to the first
conflict although it is formulated in the reverse order: since the dialectical opposition is a
contrary opposition, both elements are positive and therefore interchangeable (Ishikawa,
Kants Denken . . . , 111). With this analysis of the construction of the main line of argument
of this part of KrV I offer an alternative quite opposite from the analysis carried out by
Bennett who claims that sections 1, 3, 4, and 5 are less important and who maintains that
the antinomy (in the singular) is a mirage (Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, 116, 115).
42Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 117–118 (with references to p. 87 as well).
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be regarded as instances of judgement. However, they are meta-judgements,
i.e. judgements about the issues at stake (sc. thesis and antithesis of the
antinomy). As such they are critical judgements representing the concluding
result of Kant’s analysis. In relation to the legal metaphor in KrV Ishikawa
maintains that reason in case of the presentation and examination of the
antinomy places itself in a different position than the two alternatives under
consideration and that it forms a judgement about the alternatives that
expresses the reality of this third possibility.43 Infinite judgement possesses
the properties to function in a meaningful sense at this critical (or meta-)
level.
In addition to Ishikawa, some of Kant’s own expressions could be referred
to to show this. For example, with respect to the third antinomical conflict
Kant concludes that the least we can say is that nature does not contradict
causality through freedom (“daß Natur der Kausalita¨t aus Freiheit wenigstens
nicht widerstreite”, KrV, B586). If the phrase “nicht widerstreite” was
taken in a merely negative sense it would just deny something. An infinite
reading of the phrase, however, would imply that nature in relation to
causality from freedom is really something else than a contradiction, which
is exactly the point that Kant wants to make: “So wu¨rde dann Freiheit
und Natur, jedes in seiner vollsta¨ndigen Bedeutung, [. . . ] zugleich und ohne
allen Widerstreit angetroffen werden.” (KrV, B569). In terms of infinite
judgement the phrase “zugleich und ohne allen Widerstreit” is another way
of indicating the possibility of their mutual relation, which is announced in
the title of the section beginning at B566. Another example can be taken
from the solution to the fourth antinomical conflict: the law of the empirical
employment of understanding must be limited in order that it does not
declare the intelligible impossible (KrV, B590). This phrase “not impossible”,
in terms of a limitative and infinite reading, would mean “possible” in view
of a practical, not a speculative employment of reason.
The third, or critical position from which these judgements are passed is
to be understood against the background of the objective Kant intends to
attain in (this part of) KrV. As has been noted above the construction of
this part of the Transcendental Dialectic is important in this respect. It is
constructed along a main line of thought: the antinomy tout court and its
solution. To put this line of thought in its proper perspective Kant elaborates
on the interest of reason and the regulative principle of reason. Detailed
analysis of the four antinomical conflicts, as well as the four solutions seem
43Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 78–83.
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to be of secondary importance.44 In §8.7 we will deal more specifically with
this background in terms of the practical perspective in relation to infinite
judgement.
8.6 Infinite judgement and omnimoda determinatio
In addition to Menne’s historical account there is more to be said about
infinite judgement if we look at the beginning of the third chapter of the
Transcendental Dialectic. At KrV, B599–600 Kant stated that every thing,
as regards its possibility, is subject to the (ontological) principle of com-
plete determination (omnimoda determinatio), “nach welchem ihm von allen
mo¨glichen Pra¨dikaten der Dinge, so fern sie mit ihren Gegenteilen verglichen
werden, eines zukommen muß.” (cf. also KrV, B596). This principle concerns
the content, rather than the mere logical form of knowledge. This feature
distinguishes it from the logical determinability of concepts, which is in fact
the combination of the principle of contradiction and excluded middle (KrV,
B600n). As we have pointed out above, this distinction is exactly what makes
the difference between infinite judgement, on the one hand, and affirmative
and negative judgement, on the other.
There is a close link between infinite judgement and the omnimoda
determinatio. This principle represents the (historical) origin of infinite
judgement.45 It also confirms systematic points that were neglected by Menne,
which make Kant’s use of infinite judgement meaningful. The main point of
agreement between infinite judgement and the principle is that they relate to
a content, i.e. a thing. Every thing that exists is completely determined (KrV,
B601). In accordance with this proposition specific pairs of contradictory
predicates are not only compared with one another logically, but the thing
itself is transcendentally compared with the sum total of all possible predicates
(KrV, B601). In its turn, this sum total is also completely determined as
the concept of a thing called the ideal of pure reason (KrV, B601–602). This
44This interpretation of the construction of the antinomy chapter would probably also
account for the fact why Kant was forced to insert additional considerations following the
solutions of the second and third antinomy; in the course of the detailed analysis of the
second conflict Kant recognised that he had to make additional specifications with respect
to the antinomy. Cf. for example the phrase “Wir haben aber hiebei einen wesentlichen
Unterschied u¨bersehen” (KrV, B557), sc. the distinction between a mathematical and
dynamical synthesis of appearances (KrV, B557). Formal analysis of the logic of Kant’s
cosmological conflicts shows that Kant’s arguments are not conclusive, and, what is more,
that the conflict of reason is not inevitable, as Kant would have it, cf. Malzkorn, Kants
Kosmologie-Kritik . . . .
45Ishikawa, Kants Denken . . . , 57-69.
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ideal represents the transcendental content, the transcendental substrate,
the matter, the whole of reality or the omnitudo realitatis of the possibility
and complete determination of all things.
The complete determination of a particular thing is based on the limitation
of this omnitudo; some thing is completely determined in so far as the
omnitudo is limited to a certain extent or, as Kant puts it “die durchga¨ngige
Bestimmung eines jeden Dinges beruht auf der Einschra¨nkung dieses All der
Realita¨t” (KrV, B605). It is exactly at this point that infinite judgement
is a meaningful means to express a partial step in the process of complete
determination. The negation contained in the judgement does not affect the
copula nor does it express the non-existence of a thing, since the existence
is presupposed as soon as we take up the determination of a thing. Kant
referred to this “presupposition” by calling it “transzendentale Bejahung”
in contradistinction to a “transzendentale Verneinung”, which means “das
Nichtsein an sich selbst” (KrV, B602). Infinite judgement refers to a thing
while expressing transcendental affirmation, but it also expresses that only
one of two contradictory predicates is to be assigned to a thing, thereby
limiting the infinite sphere of all possible predicates represented by the
omnitudo. In this context it is clear why Kant’s example of the not-mortal
soul (KrV, B97–98) is not identical to a negative judgement. In “The soul is
not-mortal”, “the soul” refers to something and this something is determined
to the extent that “mortal” is not an appropriate predicate belonging to that
thing.
8.7 Infinite judgement and the polemical employment of rea-
son
Speaking about something does not necessarily entail the real existence of the
things spoken about. In fact, in the Transcendental Analytic existing things
are limited to whatever can be given in possible experience. In the Tran-
scendental Dialectic, judgements about illusory objects and their presumed
existence are unmasked. Still, Kant allowed for some kind of judgement
about these objects, although not in theoretical perspective. In order to
say something relevant about these “objects” we see them in a practical
perspective, as if they were practically real, not objectively real. In this
respect infinite judgement plays its most significant role.
We have to be brief about this “as if” character of objects in a practical
perspective. As early as his critical examination of dialectical illusion Kant
alluded to the practical use of objects. As to the substantiality and perma-
8.7 Infinite judgement and the polemical employment of reason 167
nence (immortality) of the soul, for example, we cannot claim knowledge
because any such claim would transcend the limits of possible experience,
but:
Gleichwohl wird hiedurch fu¨r die Befugnis, ja gar die Notwendig-
keit, der Annehmung eines ku¨nftigen Lebens, nach Grundsa¨tzen
des mit dem spekulativen verbundenen praktischen Vernunftge-
brauchs, hiebei nicht das mindeste verloren (KrV, B424).46
Although we cannot claim knowledge, we are entitled to postulate a future
life. Strictly speaking, this postulate is not legitimate because there is no
possible proof to support it; it transcends the possible limits of knowledge.
It is not illegitimate, either, because there is no (possible) proof that it is.
The only way left open is to claim some right to postulate a future life as if
the soul were an object, as long as it serves a practical interest. The proper
judgement to express this claim is infinite: it is not illegitimate to claim a
future life, since this illegitimacy, expressed in a negative judgement, cannot
be proven.
Apparently, an interpretation of the critical result in terms of infinite
judgement must also allow the occurrence of double negation (e.g. “not
illegitimate”) in infinite judgement. In the previous section this was already
pointed out in the case of Kant’s solution to the antinomy. There are also
examples of Kant’s employment of double negation concerning the critical
results in view of a practical perspective: the problematic noumenon is the
representation of something that is neither possible, nor impossible (KrV,
B343); neither the severity of criticism has rendered reason a not unimportant
service (KrV, B424); transcendental employment of pure reason prepares the
site for building our moral edifices, a task that is not unmeritorious (KrV,
B375); we limit the law of the empirical use of understanding, but not to
declare the intelligible impossible (KrV, B590) (all italics mine). These are
telling examples, but Kant’s systematic employment of infinite judgement
and his arguments are found in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.
In the chapter on the discipline of pure reason, Kant supplied a negative
legislation (discipline) in addition to the positive legislation of the Tran-
scendental Analytic. In so far as the speculative use of reason is dialectical,
transcendental logic is nothing but a discipline (KrV, B824). Hence, a disci-
pline of pure reason supplies a systematic account of the negative function of
critique, which was mentioned at the end of §8.4 and the beginning of §8.5
above: it is “admonitory negative teaching” (KrV, B740).
46Cf. also KrV, B166n, 421, B431–432. In the antinomy chapter the practical view is
dealt with in the section on the interest of reason.
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The section on the discipline of the polemical employment of reason seems
to be an exception in this respect. It seems to represent a relapse into a purely
polemical situation, i.e. a situation in which opposing claims constitute a
conflict of reason. However, conflicts of this kind have already been solved
in the Transcendental Dialectic on the basis of the formal conditions of
knowledge. Hence, conflicts and polemics have basically been prevented:
“So gibt’s demnach keine eigentliche Polemik im Felde der reinen Vernunft.”
(KrV, B784; cf. KrV, B771, 778). Nevertheless, reason may be employed
polemically, but only to defend certain propositions against opposite dogmatic
denials (KrV, B767). These defensive propositions are also dogmatic, but
they are affirmative and they are made in view of the practical interest
of reason (KrV, B769–770; cf. KrV, B777). Here we encounter the same
strategy that Kant employed in his solution to the antinomy. Neither the
assertion nor the denial can be demonstrated conclusively. If the assertion
is made in respect of the practical interest, however, there is no conclusive
proof to support it, but, what is more important, there is also no valid
proof of the opposite dogmatic denial. This lack of proof leaves open the very
possibility of practical dogmatic assertions and, consequently, these assertions
are not illegitimate. In this sense the position of polemical employment of
reason is expressed by the double negation of “not illegitimate” in an infinite
judgement, which should not be reduced to the simple affirmation of the
legitimacy of that claim. An infinite judgement declaring certain claims “not
illegitimate” secures the provisional competence or authority in preparation
for the practical employment of reason. Its function is exactly to formulate
one of Kant’s main objectives: to deny knowledge in order to make room for
faith (KrV, Bxxx).
Finally, even this denial of knowledge is expressed in terms of an infinite
judgement. In the section on the impossibility of a sceptical satisfaction of
reason, following the section on polemical employment, Kant presented his
version of the docta ignorantia in the form of critical ignorance expressing
the scope and limits of our knowledge. Ignorance in this sense is not a lack of
knowledge, but it is affirmative knowledge about what cannot be known. To
be critically ignorant one needs fundamental knowledge of what can and what
cannot be known. This ignorance delimits the room available for practical
assertions and faith.
8.8 Conclusion
Infinite judgement may have different functions, but the differences should
not obstruct our view on the basic pattern of infinite judgement. Infinite
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judgement is structured in accordance with the pattern of real opposition.
Therefore, infinite judgement is fit to represent a (non-contradictory) relation
between opposites. On the same acoount, infinite judgement is the appropriate
means to express a viable alternative to either of the (undesired, untrue or
impossible) opposites involved.
Therefore, infinite judgement is not insignificant. In fact, it is the most
important kind of judgement in KrV, since it has the particular properties that
are necessary to express the results of Kant’s critical project. Apart from the
fact that the distinction between affirmative, negative and infinite judgements
corresponds to the structure of KrV (viz. Transcendental Analytic, Dialectic
and Doctrine of Method), Kant employed infinite judgement in his solution
to the antinomy and paralogisms and in the critical limitation of knowledge
which prepares for the practical employment of reason. Furthermore, infinite
judgement is used in polemical and defensive strategies to ensure realization
of the practical interest of reason.
Neglect of the systematic and structural importance of infinite judgement
would pose serious problems to any interpretation of Kant’s critical work.

Conclusion
The importance of Realrepugnanz for Kant’s philosophy and his philosophical
development may have been mentioned and highlighted in occasional remarks
by authors commenting on Kant’s philosophy and philosophical development,
but a systematic account of the meaning, and an assessment of its importance
are not provided in secondary sources. This gap has caused us to inquire
into the background, the meaning, and the significance of the notion in (a
part of) Kant’s work.
Kant’s interest in metaphysics as well as his concern for the methodological
issues of philosophy constitute the background of real opposition (chapter
2–4). Despite his undeniably sceptical attitude toward metaphysics before
1771, his philosophical efforts are just as well aimed at metaphysical reform.
These efforts are concerned with an evaluation of force and action, as well
as closely related issues like space, time and the highest degree of reality.
Real repugnance, which is a specific relation (respectus), sc. an opposition
between realities, represents an exemplary case of fundamental relations that
are characteristic of metaphysics in the broader sense of the term: being
and non-being, identity and contradiction, position and exclusion, positive
and negative truth, attraction and repulsion. A concern for methodological
issues is an important element in these metaphysical attempts. A crucial
consideration in this respect is the extent to which mathematics is relevant
or fruitful for metaphysics, and for philosophy in general. The mathematical
concept of negative magnitude makes a significant contribution to philosophy,
but contradiction—representing another instrument of rational thought—is
only applicable to a limited extent. This insufficiency of contradiction is due
to the fact that (human) knowledge is not absolute, it does not produce the
objects of knowledge, but it is dependent on the limitations of our cognitive
faculties. Metaphysics and a strong methodological awareness constitute the
systematic background of real repugnance.
171
172 Conclusion
The meaning of real opposition is something that is always presented as the
negative counterpart of logical opposition (contradiction): real opposition
is something that logical opposition is not (chapter 3, §5.2 and §6.2). It is
a relation between opposite realities, that can exist (either potentially or
actually), whereas a contradiction, a merely logical relation between oppo-
sites, cannot possibly exist at all. In this respect real opposition is something
categorically different, but since its meaning is developed in contradistinction
to logical opposition it is also systematically dependent on it. In the context
of Kant’s methodological awareness introduction of the mathematical notion
of negative magnitude made it possible to deal with opposition in a way that
offered a philosophically relevant alternative to contradiction.
So, in addition to the negative definition Kant also presented a positive
description of real repugnance: whenever there is a positive ground, as well
as a result that amounts to nothing (= zero), there is eo ipso a case of
real repugnance. Given the metaphysical background a variety of meanings
can be assigned to real repugnance, for this background provides a quite
general, but firm basis for the application of real repugnance to various
philosophical areas. The nature of the realities involved may vary—it may be
moral, mental, physical, natural, et cetera—but on account of the underlying
metaphysics and the application of negative magnitude oppositions between
realities in each of the areas mentioned, are to be counted among the real
oppositions. Fundamental relations in each of the areas mentioned (knowing
and not knowing, love and hate, virtue and vice) are relations that are
structured according to the pattern of real opposition (§4.5); they are not to
be understood in terms of contradictory opposites.
Real repugnance may have emerged in a metaphysical context, and it may
have been presented in all its glory on the occasion of Negative Gro¨ßen, but
its significance extends well beyond these particular circumstances. Real
repugnance offers a general pattern of thought that enables Kant to structure
his philosophical thought beyond the scope of mere contradiction in a way
that makes oppositions fruitful instead of impossible. The extent to which
this pattern is deployed suggests that it is a fundamental trait of Kant’s
thought. In the course of the development of Kant’s thought real opposition
appears as a general pattern of thought in various contexts and in relation to
various topics. It is present in the way Kant conceives the relation between
sensibility and understanding (chapter 5, §6.4 and §6.5), it is a structural
element in Kant’s argumentative strategy, in the solution of the conflict of
reason (§7.8, §8.5), and in the conceptual structure of crucial notions (such
as critique and the noumenon).
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Firstly, the importance of real opposition consists in the fact that it offers
a systematic alternative to logical opposition and its alleged function in
philosophy. The insufficiency of contradiction, and hence the shortcomings
of rationalistic philosophy are exposed by the emphatic introduction and
explanation of real opposition. From the perspective of real opposition it is
possible to offer a systematic critique of contradiction as a philosophical and
methodological tool.
Secondly, the elaborate explanation of real opposition is significant in
view of the development of Kant’s thought. The considerations about real
opposition enable him to question the nature of experience, to question the
relation between experience and rational knowledge and to evaluate the
function of the cognitive faculties involved.
So, thirdly, in the course of Kant’s evaluation of the relation between
rational knowledge and experience the pattern of real repugnance is applied
so as to structure the opposition between sensibility and understanding. In
the Dissertation, propagating the subjectivity of space and time, as well as
the systematic separation between sensibility and understanding, the pattern
of real repugnance is applied so as to structure the interrelation between
both faculties. This construction of the opposition in terms of dissensus also
plays a crucial part in methodological considerations at this point of Kant’s
philosophical development.
Fourthly, application of this pattern of thought reaches its full extent in
KrV. The initial problem that was raised with reference to Realrepugnanz
(e.g. the epistemological foundation of causality) is solved once the problem
about the systematic relation between representation and object has been
solved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic. The solution to this
latter problem is dependent on the pattern of real opposition. The opposition
between both cognitive faculties in KrV is no longer just a matter of dissensus,
but by means of the transcendental deduction both faculties are systematically
linked together. Original synthesis is the point (in the sense of Zero = 0)
that both faculties have in common. Because there is something in common
the opposites involved are not related as contradictories, but rather as
supplementary and interdependent realities. As long as this relation of
dependency is properly balanced it is constitutive of knowledge.
In the fifth place, the significance of real opposition is shown by the
fact that the pattern plays a decisive role in Kant’s argumentative strategy.
Infinite judgement is used in the solutions of dialectical problems, and in
the methodological context of the polemical use of reason. Well before 1770
Kant had already employed this mode of argumentation in case of empty
space and the actio in distans (§4.2 and §4.4), but by 1781 it has become a
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systematic and powerful tool of the critique of reason. Further occurrences
of the pattern of real opposition are results of a typical modus operandi
of Kant’s thought. If a distinction needs to be made in order to solve a
problem, then the opposite elements contained in the distinction are related
as negative magnitudes, and there is a meta-level unity—which is real in
its own right—from which this distinction is dependent. This is displayed
in the notion of the negative noumenon which is limiting with respect to
sensibility (and the empirical employment of understanding), and with respect
to the transcendental employment of understanding (§6.6). Yet, a positive
interpretation of the noumenon is not ruled out inasmuch as an ens rationis
can be the object of practical reason.
The argumentative force of the pattern of real opposition is also displayed
in the Transcendental Dialectic and the remainder of KrV. Once the firm
ground of possible experience is left, Kant has to resort to other means in or-
der to create clarity and certainty. These means are found in the juridical way
of reasoning which takes place within the framework of the legal metaphor
(chapter 7). This specific metaphorical means enable Kant to express (at a
critical level) what is inexpressible (at the object level). Especially infinite
judgement (chapter 8) plays a key role in this respect. It offers the technical
means to express the alternative to (dogmatic) affirmation and (sceptical)
denial: sc. affirmation by negation.
Given the significance of the pattern of real repugnance in Kant’s argu-
mentation, and given the fact that this mode of argumentation belongs to
the meta-level language of critical, or transcendental philosophy, application
of the pattern is characteristic of critique. In fact, it is a decisive feature of
critical reasoning. In accordance with this pattern 1) critical reasoning is able
to make non-exclusive distinctions in regard of the object of critique; 2) the
elements of this distinction are related as negative magnitudes, which—as
such—make possible a situation of rest; and 3) given this neutral situation
of rest, critical reasoning can offer perspectives on alternative possibilities
or realities, and 4) the argumentative force of critical reasoning requires
adequate figurative speech which is derived from the legal metaphor. As
to possible alternative realities, Kant’s attention is primarily focused on
practical reality. At several points in our study we have pointed in this
direction, but a systematic assessment was not aimed at. This point, as well
as an inquiry into the significance of real repugnance in the context of the
faculty of judgement and Kant’s political philosophy, would require further
study.
As a result of the practical orientation of Kant’s philosophy, particularly in
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KrV, there are two fundamental features of real opposition that have changed
considerably in comparison with the early 1760’s. Firstly, the principle that
both positive moments of opposition are of equal value is abandoned. In 1763
both moments in a real opposition were considered to be equally positive
and neither of these was to be considered as something negative in itself:
only their combination resulted in negation. After 1781 priority is given to
one moment over the opposite moment, and—for that very reason—this
latter moment is considered to be something intrinsically negative, like it is
expressed in the case of knowledge versus faith: “I have therefore found it
necessary to deny knowledge.” Secondly, in 1763 examples of cancellation
resulting in Zero = 0 were typical, but this zero-sum of real repugnancy was
not necessary at all; another outcome (such as 4a − a = 3a) could just as
well be the result. After 1781, however, Zero = 0 seems to have become the
preferable outcome of real opposition. Rest and balance, the annihilation
of something that is considered to be inferior or negative have become the
desired effect of real opposition. Both changes enable Kant to employ the
pattern of real opposition in order to make something counterbalance or
even outweigh the (possible) negative effect of something that is regarded as
objectionable. Thus, the pattern of real repugnance has become a significant
instrument to prevent or combat negative, i.e. undesired, effects. Exactly
this instrument was deployed when Kant was trying to dispel the gloomy
thoughts associated with the name of his former servant.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In 1763 publiceert Immanuel Kant zijn essay Versuch den Begriff der nega-
tiven Gro¨ßen in die Weltweisheit einzufu¨hren. In dit essay doet hij verslag
van zijn poging om de wiskundige notie van negatieve grootte een zinvolle
toepassing te geven binnen de wijsbegeerte. Op basis van deze notie con-
strueert hij in het eerste deel van zijn essay het begrip Realrepugnanz (ree¨le
repugnantie, ree¨le tegenstelling, ree¨le oppositie). Er is sprake van een ree¨le
tegenstelling tussen twee dingen wanneer het ene ding de werking van het
andere ding teniet doet. Beide dingen zijn weliswaar ree¨el, maar het ene
verhoudt zich tot het andere als iets negatiefs en ook het resultaat van deze
verhouding kan iets negatiefs zijn. Zo kan, aldus Kant’s voorbeeld, een schip
op zijn reis ’s morgens door de oostenwind worden voortbewogen, maar
de westenwind zal het schip ’s avonds in tegenovergestelde richting doen
bewegen. De verplaatsing in westelijke richting wordt teniet gedaan door
de verplaatsing in oostelijke richting en wanneer beide winden die dag even
lang en even hard hebben gewaaid, zal het schip na een dag niet verplaatst
zijn. Dit gebrek aan beweging, deze stilstand, is niet veroorzaakt door de
afwezigheid van voortstuwing, maar door het feit dat voortstuwing in de
ene richting werd opgeheven door negatieve beweging (voortstuwing in de
tegenovergestelde richting).
Vervolgens laat Kant in een opsomming van voorbeelden zien dat de
ree¨le tegenstelling ten grondslag ligt aan de centrale noties in verschillende
wijsgerige disciplines. Hij stelt dat de verhoudingen tussen terugstotings-
en aantrekkingskracht in de fysica, tussen lust- en onlustgevoelens in de
psychologie, tussen deugd en ondeugd in de ethiek, tussen warmte en koude,
tussen electrische ladingen, en tussen magnetische ladingen in de fysica
allemaal verhoudingen zijn die begrepen moeten worden in termen van ree¨le
tegenstelling.
In het derde en laatste deel van zijn essay trekt Kant een paar algemene
conclusies en geeft hij het verhaal tot slot nog een andere wending met een
fundamenteel wijsgerige vraag. We kunnen de ree¨le tegenstelling weliswaar
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herkennen en toepassen binnen een groot aantal gebieden van de filosofie,
maar het blijft de vraag hoe we het u¨berhaupt kunnen verklaren en begrijpen
dat er een verband kan zijn tussen twee ree¨el tegengestelde dingen: “Hoe
moet ik het begrijpen dat, omdat iets is, er iets anders (niet) is?”. Hoe kan,
met andere woorden, een ding dusdanig op iets anders betrokken zijn, dat
het dit andere ding kan be¨ınvloeden? In een meer specifieke contekst zou deze
vraag geherformuleerd kunnen worden als een vraag naar het systematische
verband tussen oorzaak en gevolg.
Het is bekend dat dergelijke vragen een leidraad zijn geweest in de filoso-
fische ontwikkeling van Kant. In de slotalinea van zijn essay kondigt hij dan
ook aan dat hij in de toekomst uitvoerig zal terugkomen op de antwoorden
van dergelijke vragen. In zijn latere werk van na 1780 zijn de antwoorden
echter niet meer in het jargon van de Realrepugnanz gesteld. We komen
deze technische notie in het latere werk dan ook niet meer tegen. Toch is
de constructie van de ree¨le tegenstelling later nog wel degelijk herkenbaar,
bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van de antinomie (KrV), in de onmaatschappe-
lijke maatschappelijkheid (in Idee), en in de notie van de doelmatigheid
zonder doel (in KU). In de secundaire literatuur over Kant’s filosofie wordt
het belang van dit essay en van het begrip Realrepugnanz voor het geheel
van Kant’s werk onderstreept (Rosenkranz, Heimsoeth, Saner, Wolff, Bau-
manns). Een systematische presentatie en analyse van dit belang wordt
echter nergens geleverd. Het is de bedoeling van het hier gepresenteerde
onderzoek om in die lacune te voorzien. Dit onderzoek richt zich in het
bijzonder op de achtergrond, de betekenis en het belang van het begrip van de
ree¨le repugnantie in Kant’s vroegere werk en in de Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt het onderwerp van de studie gepresenteerd aan
de hand van een persoonlijk kattebelletje dat de hoogbejaarde Kant schreef
op een moment dat de verschijnselen van vergeetachtigheid en dementie zich
bij hem definitief hadden geopenbaard. Begin 1802, na een dienstverband van
enkele decennia, had Kant zijn dienaar Martin Lampe ontslagen, vanwege
dronkenschap en ander ongepast gedrag. Om niet voortdurend geconfronteerd
te worden met deze onverkwikkelijke episode schreef Kant het volgende briefje:
“De naam Lampe moet nu helemaal vergeten worden.” Het is makkelijk om
zich vrolijk te maken over het feit dat iemand opschrijft wat vergeten moet
worden, maar in dit geval handelt Kant in overeenstemming met metafysische
beginselen die hij veertig jaar eerder al had gepubliceerd. Wie iets is vergeten
heeft bepaalde kennis, of bepaalde gedachten niet meer. De afwezigheid van
bepaalde gedachten is een toestand die op twee manieren tot stand kan
zijn gekomen. Gedachten kunnen afwezig zijn simpelweg omdat je ze nooit
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gehad hebt, of omdat de gedachten die je had, verloren zijn gegaan. Het
tweede geval, zegt Kant, kan zich alleen voordoen als bestaande gedachten
worden opgeheven, teniet worden gedaan door tegengestelde gedachten. De
verhouding tussen bestaande gedachten en daaraan tegengestelde gedachten
is een geval van ree¨le tegenstelling. Kant’s kattebelletje moet tegen deze
achtergrond begrepen worden. Onaangename herinneringen aan Lampe zul-
len niet verdwijnen, tenzij ze worden tegengewerkt; de naam Lampe moet
vergeten worden! En wie vergeetachtig aan het worden is, zal dat moeten
opschrijven om het goed te onthouden.
De uitvoerige presentatie en uitleg van deze anecdote dienen ook om
het methodologische uitgangspunt van de studie duidelijk te maken. Dit
uitgangspunt stelt dat we Kant’s woorden voor lief moeten nemen. Hiermee is
niet bedoeld dat Kant de waarheid in pacht heeft, maar dat we er van uit gaan
dat ze zinvol zijn, ook al lijken ze—zoals de woorden uit het kattebelletje—op
het eerste gezicht absurd. Het zijn immers de woorden waar we de interpretatie
van moeten laten afhangen, niet Kant’s vermeende geestesgesteldheid (een
veronderstelling die al een interpretatie is). Dit uitgangspunt confronteert ons
wel met de heterogeniteit van de bronnen waar we Kant’s woorden kunnen
vinden: het verhaal over het kattebelletje is ons overgeleverd door Kant’s
vriend Wasianski; we hebben aantekeningen van Herder, gemaakt tijdens
een college waarin Kant de ree¨le tegenstelling ter sprake bracht; er is Kant’s
eigen (gepubliceerde) werk; en er zijn Kant’s Reflexionen bij de handboeken
waarover hij doceerde. Deze heterogeniteit is geen belemmering, maar veeleer
iets dat interpretatie eerst mogelijk maakt. De woorden winnen aan betekenis
wanneer we ze in relatie tot andere, soms zelfs in relatie tot anderssoortige
teksten beschouwen.
Aan het begin van hoofdstuk 2 wordt kort de historische achtergrond
van de termen repugnantia en Realrepugnanz uiteengezet. Tot in Kant’s tijd
was het Latijnse repugnantia, naast contradictio, de gebruikelijke technische
term geweest om een logische tegenstelling of tegenspraak mee aan te duiden.
Met het voorvoegsel real- smeedde Kant van het verduitste Repugnanz een
neologisme dat de wijsgerig onderlegde Duitser onmiddellijk duidelijk was.
Deze begreep dat hiermee een tegenstelling in de realiteit was bedoeld, die
heel iets anders was dan de logische tegenspraak.
Kant introduceert deze notie tegen de achtergrond van de metafysica, die
voor hem een cruciale wijsgerige discipline is ondanks het feit dat ze haar
aanspraken niet kan waarmaken. De achtergrond wordt ook gevormd door
zijn methodologische inspanningen ten bate van metafysische kennis. Op
grond van methodologische overwegingen erkent Kant dat de mathematica
weliswaar succesvol is op verschillende terreinen van wetenschap (m.n. in de
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vorm van Newton’s fysica), maar dat een louter mathematische benadering
van de filosofie onbevredigend moet zijn omdat bepaalde, specifiek metafy-
sische thema’s daarmee niet aan de orde kunnen komen. Kant bedoelt dan
met name het thema “kracht” dat hij in termen van een substantie-ontologie
begrijpt als de verhouding tussen substantie en accident. De verhoudingen
die in Kant’s metafysica verder vooral in het geding zijn, zijn ruimtelijke ver-
houdingen, tijdelijke verhoudingen, de verhoudingen tussen dingen (identiteit,
tegenstelling) en de verhouding tussen gedachten. Een volwassen metafysica
waarin het thema van de verhouding adequaat kan worden begrepen is niet
op mathematische leest geschoeid.
In hoofstuk 3 staat een bijzonder soort verhouding centraal: de logische
repugnantie (contradictie, logische tegenspraak of tegenstelling). Logische
tegenspraak kan als principe van metafysische kennis functioneren, maar
aanvulling met een aantal andere principes is vereist om die kennis inhoud
te geven: het principe van bepalende grond, en de principes van successie
en coe¨xistentie. Ondanks de aanvullingen blijft deze vorm van metafysische
kennis beperkt: ze biedt geen kennis van zijnsgronden, geen kennis van niet-
logische relaties, geen kennis van verhoudingen die empirische gegeven zijn.
Om kort te gaan: ze biedt geen ree¨le kennis. De beperkingen van de logische,
of rationalistische middelen voor metafysische kennis benadrukken weliswaar
het belang van de ervaring, maar welke status deze dan precies heeft, is
onduidelijk.
Na de logische verhouding staat in hoofdstuk 4 de ree¨le verhouding, en
dan met name de ree¨le tegenstelling, centraal. Volgens Kant vinden we deze
tegenstelling in allerlei disciplines van filosofie en wetenschap (ethiek, fysica,
psychologie, economie, etc.). Het is zo’n wijdverbreid verschijnsel, zou je
kunnen zeggen, omdat het een exponent is van zijn metafysica van “kracht”,
en omdat deze tegenstelling in algemene, wiskundige termen van de negatieve
grootte beschreven kan worden. De specifieke verschijningsvormen van deze
tegenstelling zijn gebaseerd op algemenere metafysische en mathematische
principes. Deze toepassing van een wiskundige notie is volgens Kant een
leerzaam voorbeeld van het nut dat de wiskunde kan hebben voor filosofie en
metafysica. Mathematica kan de filosofie, en met name de krachtenmetafysica,
ook nog op een andere manier van dienst zijn: de mathematische formulering
waarin Newton de aantrekkingskracht beschreef, verschaft het ervarings-
gegeven van de attractie zijn verklarende waarde. Zonder een dergelijke
ondersteuning zou een verwijzing naar “attractie”, “kracht”, of “verhouding”
een lege metafysische speculatie blijven. Dit laatste lijkt te gelden voor de
terugstotingskracht, de tegenhanger van de aantrekkingskracht. Voor deze
kracht bestaat immers geen mathematische beschrijving, maar dit gemis
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compenseert Kant met een metafysische evaluatie van een gegeven uit de
innerlijke ervaring. Bovendien argumenteert Kant, op basis van de ree¨le
tegenstelling, dat deze kracht zich ten opzichte van de attractie verhoudt als
een negatieve grootte.
Kant’s inhoudelijke en methodologische bemoeienis met de metafysica
leidt er toe dat de positie van de ervaring, waarin ons de ree¨le verhou-
dingen gegeven zijn, geproblematiseerd wordt. Een beroep op de ervaring,
ondersteund door mathematische formulering of metafysische analyse, kan
weliswaar voorzien in de tekorten van een logische, rationalistische benade-
ring als het gaat om attractie en repulsie, maar een afdoende verklaring van
ree¨le verbanden in de ervaring is daarmee nog niet gegeven. De vraag naar
de kentheoretische positie van de zintuiglijkheid als bron van ervaring is in
toenemende mate van belang voor Kant’s filosofie. Binnen de metafysica
die hij ontwikkelt gelden vo´o´r 1770 in ieder geval een aantal fundamentele
relaties: parallel aan de ontologische tegenstelling tussen zijn en niet-zijn is
er de epistemologische tegenstelling tussen positieve en negatieve waarhe-
den waarvoor het tweeledige principe van identiteit (ondersteund door het
principe van tegenspraak) geldt; binnen het domein van de ervaring is er de
fundamentele relatie van de ree¨le tegenstelling, waarvoor de tegengestelde
krachten van attractie en terugstoting exemplarisch zijn.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt vervolgens de thematiek uit de voorafgaande hoofd-
stukken besproken in het kader van Kant’s inaugurele dissertatie uit 1770.
De notie van ree¨le tegenstelling komt daar niet in voor, maar wel de verwante
begrippen reluctantia subiectiva, repugnantia obiectiva, en dissensus. Logische
repugnantie is in ons onderzoek het ijkpunt, zoals dat het ook was in Kant’s
eigen analyse in Negative Gro¨ßen. Kant bespreekt de logische repugnantie in
een methodologische contekst en hij maakt wederom duidelijk dat de reik-
wijdte van de contradictie beperkt is en dat overschrijding van die beperking
tot fouten leidt, en vooral ook tot miskenning van de eigen aard van de
ervaring of zintuiglijk gegeven kennis. De belangrijke boodschap van Kant’s
methodologische overwegingen aan het begin en eind van de dissertatie is dat
verstandelijke kennis en zintuiglijke kennis niet met elkaar verward moeten
worden. Niet alles van verstandelijke oorsprong kan conform de condities van
zintuiglijke kennis worden voorgesteld. Dat iets onvoorstelbaar is in termen
van zintuiglijke kennis, betekent nog niet dat het onmogelijk is. “Onmoge-
lijk” is immers een term van begrippelijke aard. Dit verschil tussen beide
soorten kennis berust op het verschil tussen verstand en zintuiglijkheid, de
kenvermogens waaraan die kennis ontsprongen is. Dit verschil kenschetst
Kant als een dissensus (onenigheid). Ofschoon de notie van ree¨le repugnantie
in de dissertatie niet voorkomt, vertoont de dissensus tussen kenvermogens
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de karakteristieke eigenschappen van de ree¨le tegenstelling: de onenigheid
verwijst niet naar een logische onmogelijkheid, of de afwezigheid van overeen-
stemming, maar naar een ree¨le toestand (miskenning van de onenigheid leidt
namelijk tot fouten, misvattingen, wat Kant op vergelijkbare wijze herhaalt
ten aanzien van de antinomie in KrV); in de onenigheid zijn beide vermogens
nog op elkaar betrokken, en wel dusdanig dat beide op elkaar moeten zijn
afgestemd. Ree¨le repugnantie levert hiermee een model om de verhouding,
de tegenstelling tussen oorspronkelijke vermogens vorm te geven. Kant’s aan-
dacht binnen de metafysica voor de verhouding tussen gedachten, is nu ook
gericht op de verhouding tussen de onderliggende vermogens. In de contekst
van Kant’s methodologische overwegingen, heeft de ree¨le repugnantie, in
onze reconstructie, een methodologisch belang als fundamentele denkvorm
waarmee over tegenstellingen gedacht kan worden in andere termen dan die
van de tegenspraak.
Los van de methodologische overwegingen zet Kant ook een belangrijke
inhoudelijke stap in de dissertatie. Ruimte en tijd zijn de formele gronden
van het fenomenale, de subjectieve vormen van zintuiglijke kennis. Deze
subjectivering van ruimte en tijd geeft Kant’s vroegere denken over tijdelijke
en ruimtelijke verhoudingen in de metafysica een vorm die het ook in KrV
nog zal hebben.
In KrV, die in hoofdstuk 6 centraal staat, treffen we de term Realrepugnanz
niet aan. De thematiek is echter niet verdwenen, netzomin als de verwante
terminologie. Bovendien blijkt dat Kant het stramien van ree¨le tegenstelling
als denkvorm toepast op niet-contradictoire tegenstellingen. Een directe
verwijzing naar de ree¨le tegenstelling is niet aanwezig, omdat in KrV de
kwestie onder de meer algemene noemer van synthese wordt behandeld. In
tegenstelling tot analytische kennis, kan synthetische kennis niet afdoende
worden verklaard op basis van het principe van tegenspraak, dat dus wederom
het ijkpunt vormt. Weliswaar kan verwijzing naar de ervaring het synthetische
karakter van kennis verklaren, maar dit maakt de vraag naar de mogelijkheid
van ervaring als synthetisch geheel alleen maar urgenter. Beantwoording van
deze vraag in KrV sluit aan bij eerdere ontwikkelingen. De kenvermogens
waarop kennis, meer in het bijzonder de ervaring, gebaseerd is, worden
gekenmerkt door momenten van synthese: ruimte en tijd in geval van de
zintuiglijkheid, begrippelijke structuur voor het verstand. Het verband tussen
beide vermogens, dat uiteindelijk de ervaring als e´e´n geheel eerst mogelijk
maakt, benoemt Kant met het “Ik denk” en de “origineel-synthetische
eenheid van apperceptie”. Dit origineel-synthetische punt is gemodelleerd
naar het stramien van de ree¨le tegenstelling: het is het moment waarin beide
tegengestelde, maar onderling afhankelijke vermogens verbonden zijn zonder
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dat er sprake is van een contradictie. Dit moment waarborgt dat de werking
van het ene vermogen beperkt wordt door die van het andere. Deze fundering
van de ervaringskennis als zinvolle vorm van mogelijke kennis legt Kant
in de Transcendentale Analytik. Niet voor niets duikt op het eind van dit
deel van KrV de terminologie weer op die ten nauwste verwant is met de
Realrepugnanz. Het beroep op deze terminologie (zoals realiter entgegengesetzt,
reale Widerstreit) dient ertoe om de noodzakelijke, zintuiglijke condities van
kennis te onderstrepen. Met de afbakening van het veld van mogelijke kennis,
waarmee tevens de grenzen aan de speculatieve rede zijn gesteld, is ook het
gebied van illusoire kennis of de dialektische schijn gelocaliseerd: die ligt
namelijk daarbuiten en stelt niets voor. Alleen het noumenon als grensbegrip,
is nog een zinvol object van het denken dat weliswaar buiten het veld van
mogelijke ervaring ligt, maar dat in het perspectief van de praktische rede
toch iets voorstelt. De structuur van het noumenon als grensbegrip, alsook
de verhouding die er tussen speculatieve en praktische rede bestaat, hebben
de vorm van een ree¨le tegenstelling. Met Kant’s kritische oplossing van
het probleem van de synthese, van oorzakelijke verbanden, en daarmee ook
van de Realrepugnanz, zien we de ree¨le tegenstelling terugkeren, en wel in
die zin dat haar structuur een denkmodel is waarmee Kant problemen van
methodologische aard te lijf gaat. Het denkmodel is met name van belang
wanneer het vaste referentiepunt van de ervaring ontbreekt.
In hoofdstuk 7 zien we dat Kant dit denkmodel toepast binnen de kaders
van de juridische metafoor waar heel de KrV van is doordrongen. Waar
het vaste referentiepunt van de ervaring ontbreekt, en waar geen adequate
terminologie is om de zelfopvatting van de rede tot uitdrukking te brengen,
valt Kant terug op beeldspraak, en wel de juridische beeldspraak van het
tribunaal van de rede. Het is geen oppervlakkige gelijkenis die met deze
beeldspraak wordt uitgedrukt. Kant was van bepaalde aspecten van het
Pruisische civiel(proces)recht goed op de hoogte en de metafoor vinden we
in alle delen van KrV, soms zelfs op cruciale punten (de transcendentale
deductie, de Transcendentale Dialektiek en de Transcendentale Methodenleer).
Het denkmodel van de ree¨le repugnantie wordt met name toegepast in
argumentatiestrategiee¨n die, net als in het geval van rechtspraak, tot doel
hebben om een oordeel te vellen in een zaak waarin twee tegengestelde
posities aanspraak maken op het gelijk. Het oordeel bestaat in het geval
van KrV niet uit toekenning van dit gelijk aan een partij, maar veeleer
uit de kritische overweging dat de bewijslast van een partij, of van elk der
partijen niet voldoet om de aanspraak waar te maken. Zo’n overweging, of
tegenwerping maakt Kant ten aanzien van de paralogismen, de antinomie, de
godsbewijzen en hij systematiseert het in het polemische gebruik van de rede.
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Het vertoont de structuur van de ree¨le tegenstelling omdat de tegengestelde
aanspraken zich niet als logische tegenstelling verhouden (ofschoon dat soms
wel zo lijkt), omdat het oordeel dat de kritische tegenwerping uitdrukt het
midden houdt tussen beide aanspraken en omdat het zelf een ree¨le positie
uitdrukt, zij het op het meta-niveau van de kritiek.
Het gee¨igende technische middel om de kritische tegenwerping te ver-
woorden, zo wordt betoogd in hoofdstuk 8, is het oneindige oordeel. Naast
negatieve en bevestigende oordelen is dit een derde oordeelsvorm die in de
receptie van Kant’s werk onderbelicht is gebleven of als curiosum is afgedaan.
Het is echter een oordeel waarin ontkenning en bevestiging zinvol samengaan
ten behoeve van transcendentaal-logische, of kritische kennis. De combinatie
van ontkenning en bevestiging vormt ge´e´n logische tegenspraak, en is ook
niet iets dat te reduceren is tot louter bevestiging o´f ontkenning. Het is de
typische oordeelsvorm die Kant gebruikt ten behoeve van zijn argumentatieve
strategie om een kritische oordeel uit te drukken in geval van met name de
antinomie en het polemische gebruik van de rede. Een vergelijkbare strategie
en oordeelsvorm had Kant ook al gehanteerd bij zijn bespreking van de actio
in distans, en de legitimiteit voor het praktisch gebruik van de rede.
Het belang van de notie van ree¨le repugnantie is er op de eerste plaats
in gelegen dat het gedurende Kant’s wijsgerige ontwikkeling altijd als con-
tragewicht heeft gediend tegen overspannen rationalistische aspiraties. Het
toonde de beperkingen van de logische tegenspraak als filosofisch of epistemo-
logisch instrument. Het vormde een alternatief waar een volwassen metafysica
een antwoord op zou moeten kunnen geven.
Kant’s antwoord in KrV op de vraag naar de mogelijkheid van a priori
synthese lost de problemen op die hij eerder naar aanleiding van de ree¨le
tegenstelling formuleerde. De term verdwijnt uit zijn werk, maar het stramien
blijft aanwezig als een denkvorm die Kant op verschillende momenten toepast.
Het lijkt zich zelfs te hebben ontwikkeld tot een grondtrek van Kant’s
methodologie; wanneer hij onderscheidingen maakt, verhouden de elementen
uit zo’n onderscheiding zich als negatieve grootten, en wordt het verband
tussen de elementen gedacht als een eenheid die van een andere orde is
dan de gemaakte onderscheidingen. De verhouding tussen zintuiglijkheid en
verstand volgt het stramien van de ree¨le tegenstelling (de dissertatie uit 1770
gaf hiertoe de aanzet reeds), en culmineert in het “Ik denk” als punt waar
alles van af hangt. De verhouding tussen speculatieve en praktische rede is
gemodelleerd als ree¨le tegenstelling en het oneindige oordeel, waarin Kant
zijn kritische resultaten kan uitdrukken, volgt ook dat model.
Met de toepassing van de ree¨le tegenstelling als denkmodel is er wel een
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subtiele verschuiving opgetreden in vergelijking met de structuur van de
ree¨le tegenstelling zoals die in Negative Gro¨ßen werd beschreven. “Negatief”
duidde toen op de onderlinge verhouding (kapitaal is een negatieve schuld,
maar evenzogoed is schuld een negatief kapitaal), maar bij de toepassing van
de tegenstelling als denkmodel krijgt een van beide momenten de voorkeur
boven het andere dat daarmee als iets intrinsiek negatiefs wordt beschouwd
(het weten, bijvoorbeeld, moet worden opgeheven). Daarnaast is de uitkomst
Zero = 0, als resultante van een ree¨le tegenstelling, de gewenste uitkomst
geworden, terwijl dat in 1763 nadrukkelijk e´e´n van de mogelijkheden was.
De toestand van balans of rust vormt de gewenste uitkomst in een situatie
waarin iets negatiefs moet worden tegengewerkt. Dit was precies de situatie
waarin Kant voor zichzelf het kattebelletje schreef. Wilde hij zijn gemoedsrust
terugwinnen, dan moesten de negatieve gedachten over Lampe verdreven
worden. Gemoedsrust is het resultaat van de nodige inspanning.
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